Tourists as Post-Witnesses in Documentary Film: Sergei Loznitsa's Austerlitz and Rex Bloomstein's KZ @cardiffuni

David Clarke, Cardiff University, is publishing Tourists As Post-Witnesses in Documentary Film: Sergei Loznitsa's Austerlitz (2016) and Rex Bloomstein's KZ (2006) in the Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Forthcoming. Here is the abstract in English and Spanish.

English abstract: This article compares two documentary films that address an apparent crisis of post-witnessing at memorials that commemorate the victims of National Socialism. In the context of contemporary debates about appropriate behaviour for tourists at sites of “dark” or “difficult” heritage, Sergei Loznitsa’s Austerlitz (2016) and Rex Bloomstein’s KZ (2006) take very different approaches to observing the act of visiting concentration camp memorials. Whereas Loznitsa adopts an observational documentary mode, constructing a cultural hierarchy between the touristic observer and the cinematic observer at memorials in Germany, Bloomstein’s film uses a participatory mode to prompt the viewer to consider the complexities of the affective-discursive practice of tourists engaging with the suffering of victims at the Mauthausen memorial in Austria. The article argues that Bloomstein’s decision to adopt a participatory approach is more productive in allowing us to think about the significance of responses to victims’ suffering at such sites.

Spanish abstract: Este artículo compara dos documentales que giran en torno a una aparente crisis del post-testimonio en monumentos a las víctimas del nacionalsocialismo. En el contexto del debate actual sobre cómo deben comportarse los turistas en lugares de herencia “oscura” o “difícil”, Austerlitz (2016), de Sergei Loznitsa, y KZ (2006), de Rex Bloomstein, observan de forma muy diferente el acto de visitar antiguos campos de concentración. Mientras Loznitsa adopta un modo de observación documental, construyendo una jerarquía cultural entre el observador turístico y el cinemático, Bloomstein opta por un modo participativo para exhortar al espectador a considerar las complejidades de las prácticas afectivo-discursivas de los turistas que se comprometen con el sufrimiento de las víctimas. El artículo argumenta que la decisión de Bloomstein de adoptar un enfoque participativo es más productivo a la hora de propiciar nuestra reflexión sobre el significado de las respuestas al sufrimiento de las víctimas en esos lugares.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Religious Expression and Courtroom Oaths

Frederick B. Jonassen, Barry University School of Law, is publishing 'So Help Me?': Religious Expression and Artifacts in the Oath of Office and the Courtroom Oath in volume 12 of the Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal (Spring 2014). Here is the abstract.

For the purpose of taking an oath, the use of the Christian Bible, which includes both the Old Testament (the Jewish scriptures) and the New Testament (the scriptures relating to Jesus Christ), or the use of the New Testament alone, has been traditional and commonplace in Western culture because Christianity was historically the West's predominant religion. However, as non-Christians were permitted to participate more fully in legal proceedings and to work as government officials, the use of other religious texts or symbols, or the non-use of any religious artifact at all, has become more common. Although it is argued that non-Christians could swear on the Bible as the source of the values that animate the American government, the imposition of the Bible as the only means of taking an oath is unacceptable. Such a rule would be a religious test, specifically prohibited by the Constitution, as well as a violation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause.

But aside from this, for many, an oath is a personal commitment to tell the truth or keep a promise, so it is appropriate that the oath-taker not be coerced into professing a religious belief she does not have. For most people, the oath long ago became a perfunctory form of asserting the truth of a statement or promise with little regard for the religious text that supported the truth of the declaration. Nevertheless, the Biblical text that accompanies the oath creates a difficulty for the oath-taker who places no credence in Christianity. The act of swearing upon the religious text conveys the appearance of a personal faith or belief in the religion represented by the text. For the individual who does not believe in Biblical revelation, the deception is hardly consistent with a ceremony meant to represent a commitment to truth telling. Indeed, any commitment to be truthful based on a religious belief that one does not hold would appear to be of little value. In the times that required oaths to be sworn upon the Bible, conscientious non-Christians, as well as Christians with religious objections to oath taking, refused to take an oath on the Christian scriptures, and as a result were effectively excluded from legal procedures or public offices.

This article reviews the history of the struggle to remove the obligation to swear an oath with the Bible or with any religious text or artifact. In view of that history, the article concludes that the freedom to choose from a variety of religious or secular texts is consistent with arguments that favored the adoption of the No Religious Test Clause of the Constitution at the ratifying conventions of the states. However, the acceptance of this freedom of choice and diversity raises issues of jury bias in regard to courtroom oaths and of political manipulation by religious symbols in regard to oaths of office. The article concludes that while religious choice may be appropriate for the oath of office, such choice for the oaths of witnesses and jurors is likely to create difficulties that necessitate the complete removal of religious artifacts and expression from the courtroom oath.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.