Cameron on Dialogue in Charter Interpretation

Jamie Cameron, Osgoode Hall Law School, has published Collateral Thoughts on Dialogue's Legacy as Metaphor and Theory: A Favourite from Canada as Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 66/2016. Here is the abstract.

“Collateral Thoughts” is part of a special issue edited by Professor James Allan, who invited and challenged a group of scholars to select and discuss a favourite law review article. I chose “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” because it is the most influential article to date in the Charter of Rights and Freedom’s relatively short history (since 1982). I call this reflection “Collateral Thoughts” because my interest is less in the merits of dialogue theory than in its remarkable impact, at home in Canada as well as abroad, in the broader reaches of comparative constitutionalism and constitutional theory. In the main, this reflection asks how and why “dialogue” became a runaway concept, and considers what that tells us about the nature and formation of constitutional theory. It shows that Dialogue was fundamentally connected to Canada’s catharsis of rights, in 1982 and in the early years of Charter interpretation. That is why its claim that the legitimacy battles which define American judicial review are irrelevant – because Canada’s system of rights protection is based on “dialogue” – was so explosive. Not only did this article command attention in Canada, the concept of dialogue would be “reified”, castigated and deeply analyzed by scholars and Commonwealth jurisdictions who wondered whether weaker or weak-form judicial review was institutionally possible. Much like other theories in the US constitutional tradition, Dialogue responded to controversy by theorizing and attempting to legitimize review. Despite failing in its objective to eliminate legitimacy concerns about review, Dialogue catalyzed a national and international movement in constitutional thought.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Bakht and Collins on Freedom of Religion and the Preservation of Aboriginal Sacred Sites in Canada

Natasha Bakht and Lynda Margaret Collins, both of the University of Ottawa, Common Law Section, have published The Earth is Our Mother: Freedom of Religion and the Preservation of Aboriginal Sacred Sites in Canada as Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2016-24. Here is the abstract.

For centuries, the Canadian state engaged in systematic religious persecution of Aboriginal peoples through legal prohibitions, coercive residential schooling and the dispossession and destruction of sacred sites. Though the Canadian government has abandoned the criminalization of Aboriginal religious practices, and is beginning to come to grips with the devastating legacy of residential schools, it continues to permit the destruction and desecration of Aboriginal sacred sites. Sacred sites play a crucial role in most Aboriginal cosmologies and communities; they are as necessary to Aboriginal religions as human-made places of worship are to other religious traditions. The ongoing case of Ktunaxa Nation v BC represents the first opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to consider whether the destruction of an Aboriginal sacred site constitutes a violation of freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter. Building on the ground-breaking work of John Borrows and others, we will argue that Aboriginal spiritual traditions have a home in this provision and merit a level of protection equal to that enjoyed by other faith groups in Canada. In general, section 2(a) will be infringed by non-trivial state (or state-sponsored) interference with an Aboriginal sacred site. Moreover, the approval of commercial or industrial development on an Aboriginal sacred site without consent and compensation will generally be unjustifiable under section 1.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

DesBaillets on Magna Carta and Contemporary Canadian Law

David DesBaillets, University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM), Faculty of Law; University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, has published Symbolism and Significance: The Place of Magna Carta in Contemporary Canadian Law. Here is the abstract.

When the e-mail arrived in my inbox inviting me to view the Magna Carta I was, as I imagine any law student would be, utterly thrilled. The event was part of the international celebration of the 800th anniversary of the ancient Latin legal document from the 13th century BCE that would see a handful of surviving copies tour the world, including a Canadian sojourn, and be given the sort of red carpet treatment normally reserved for rock stars and foreign heads of State.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Muniz-Fraticelli and David on Religious Institutionalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli, McGill University Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science, and Lawrence David, McGill University Faculty of Law, are publishing Religious Institutionalism in a Canadian Context in the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

Does freedom of religion protect religious institutions, or does it only protect the individual religious conscience? Canadian jurisprudence after the Charter of Rights and Freedoms takes a decidedly individualist turn, deliberately avoiding the question of the rights of religious institutions. This individualist focus neglects the historical trajectory of religious freedom, the social understanding of religious faith by religious adherents themselves, and the institutional structures in which religion emerges and develops, and through which it is ultimately protected. An institutional account of religious liberty can complement the individualist account, as it better explains the legal order, better reflects actual religious practice, and better preserves both institutional and individual religious liberty. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada go some way towards correcting this individualist bias, but balk at resolving the legal status of religious institutions. This persistent ambiguity will prove problematic in controversies over religious autonomy already making their way through the courts.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Interpretative Rules and the Canadian Charter

Benjamin J. Oliphant, University of Toronto, is publishing Taking Purposes Seriously: The Purposive Scope and Textual Bounds of Interpretation Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a slightly altered form in the University of Toronto Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

In order for judicial review under the constitution to be compatible (sic) the rule of law, there must be some tangible constraints on judicial interpretation. The author puts forward an account of interpretation under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that views both the text and purposes underlying it as meaningful constraints on the range of meanings available to interpreters. In particular, the author seeks to demonstrate that ‘purposivism’ as a method of interpretation can, and frequently has in the Canadian context, operated to narrow the scope of vague and under-determinate constitutional guarantees. The author criticizes more expansive forms of purposivism, which seek not only to inform the meaning of the words included in the Charter, but also to give those purposes said to animate the guarantees independent legal force. This point is illustrated with particular reference to the Supreme Court of Canada’s right to vote jurisprudence. The author concludes that these more aggressive approaches to purposivism risk elevating judicially-ascertained purposes to the same legal status as the language enacted into law, and undermine the defence frequently offered in support of the legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter – that it stems from the deliberate choices of the people. 

Download the draft of the article from SSRN at the link.