Showing posts with label Thomas Hobbes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Thomas Hobbes. Show all posts

January 15, 2026

Molina Bustos and Pérez Páez on Moral Philosophy and Archetypes in the Symbolic Cohesion of the Tale of Juan Matachin

Francisco Fabiany Molina Bustos and Jenny Alejandra Pérez Páez, both of the Social Sciences Observatory and Human Resources in Ibagué/ Edukivotos, have published Moral Philosophy and Archetypes in the Symbolic Cohesion of the Tale of Juan Matachin. Here is the abstract.
This paper examines the moralizing value of Rafael Pombo’s tale Juan Matachín within the Colombian cultural context, interpreting it as a narrative device for ethical and social regulation. Through an interdisciplinary approach combining literary analysis, moral philosophy, and political theory, the study explores the figure of the “anti-villain” as an ambivalent agent who, through fear, seeks to preserve the common good, social order, and harmony with nature. Drawing on Hobbes’s and Machiavelli’s reflections on fear as a foundation of order, the analysis shows how symbolic terror operates pedagogically to deter harmful behavior and reinforce communal norms. The tale is thus understood as more than children’s literature, functioning as a cultural archive that embeds collective values, mechanisms of social control, and an implicit ethic of ecological protection and community cohesion in the Colombian imaginary.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

April 23, 2019

Magendanz on Church Power, Sovereignty, and Freedom of Religion in Thomas Hobbes

Doug Magendanz, Independent Scholar, has published Church Power, Sovereignty and Freedom of Religion in Thomas Hobbes. Here is the abstract.
This paper examines Thomas Hobbes's critique of Church power and governance. The paper describes the role of publicity - public law and communication - as a key tool Hobbes used to relegate the Catholic Church to a private association.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

November 14, 2016

Andrew Moore's New Book: Shakespeare Between Machiavelli and Hobbes @andrewjmoore

Andrew Moore, Professor of Great Books, St. Thomas University, has published Shakespeare Between Machiavelli and Hobbes: Dead Body Politics (Lexington Books, 2016). Here is a description of the book's contents from the publisher's website.
Shakespeare between Machiavelli and Hobbes explores Shakespeare’s political outlook by comparing some of the playwright’s best-known works to the works of Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli and English social contract theorist Thomas Hobbes. By situating Shakespeare ‘between’ these two thinkers, the distinctly modern trajectory of the playwright’s work becomes visible. Throughout his career, Shakespeare interrogates the divine right of kings, absolute monarchy, and the metaphor of the body politic. Simultaneously he helps to lay the groundwork for modern politics through his dramatic explorations of consent, liberty, and political violence. We can thus understand Shakespeare’s corpus as a kind of eulogy: a funeral speech dedicated to outmoded and deficient theories of politics. We can also understand him as a revolutionary political thinker who, along with Machiavelli and Hobbes, reimagined the origins and ends of government. All three thinkers understood politics primarily as a response to our mortality. They depict politics as the art of managing and organizing human bodies—caring for their needs, making space for the satisfaction of desires, and protecting them from the threat of violent death. This book features new readings of Shakespeare’s plays that illuminate the playwright’s major political preoccupations and his investment in materialist politics.

March 30, 2016

Heinze on Sovereign Authority in Shakespearean Political Drama

Eric Heinze, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, is publishing Foundations of Sovereign Authority: The Example of Shakespearean Political Drama in Shakespeare and Authority (K. Halsey and A. Vine, eds., Palgrave, 2016-17). Here is the abstract.
As post-Renaissance Europe creates modern concepts of statehood and sovereignty, figures like Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes undertake ‘constructive’, system-building theories of sovereign authority. Dramatists, in the meantime, are de-constructing sovereignty by unsettling the divergent bases of authority and legitimacy claimed for it. Concepts like ‘rule of law’, ‘popular consent’, or ‘natural law’ often serve to characterise rival legitimacy claims, but such concepts’ scope and interrelationships can be vague. This essay proposes a vocabulary and topology of legal and political authority within early modern drama. Two core categories — ‘right’ and ‘duty’ — are introduced to analyse legitimacy claims more precisely. Those, in turn, attach to twin normative claims, identified as legal ‘transcendence’ and legal ‘positivity’. Hence four basic types of legitimacy claims, each constantly defining itself in contrast to the others: ‘transcendent right’, ‘transcendent duty’, ‘positive right’, and ‘positive duty’. As those exercising or seeking power manoeuvre through their various legitimacy claims, they enact the scope and limits of the claims themselves, pointing us towards ‘deconstructive’ theories of sovereign authority.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

August 18, 2014

Early Modern Ideas of Legal Pluralism

Richard J. Ross, University of Illinois College of Law & University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Department of History, and Philip J. Stern, Duke University Department of History, have published Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 109-141 (Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross, eds.; New York: New York University Press, 2013).


Legal pluralism occurs when two or more legal orders exert control within a given territory or over a particular social group and yet are not part of a single hierarchical “system” under a coordinating authority. Most historical scholarship on legal pluralism concentrates on its shifting structures in local contexts and on its political and economic implications. By contrast, our essay probes historical actors’ uses of political and religious thought to justify or undermine plural legal regimes in the late sixteenth through early eighteenth centuries. Historians of early modern political thought preoccupied with the rise of the modern state have lavished attention on ‘centralizing’ discourses, particularly theorists such as Bodin, Hobbes, and Pufendorf represented as champions of sovereignty. Against this tendency, we emphasize how ideological support for plural legal orders could be found in a wide range of intellectual projects. These ranged from debates over the right of resistance and the divine right of rulers, through historical work on the ancient Jewish commonwealth and theological disputes over which precepts “bound conscience,” and finally to writings on political economy and the place of family.

Social scientific and jurisprudential work on legal pluralism has focused a set of canonical problems. Should we focus on jurisdictional or normative accounts of pluralism? How can we distinguish the “legal” from the “non-legal,” a dispute that centers on whether to include in pluralist models the norms of families and civil society organizations? How can we model the complex dialectic relation of state and nonstate systems of order? To the extent that this work relies on a historical account spanning the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, it assumes that a once rich medieval legal pluralism withered as European statebuilding consolidated crown control of law with the ideological support of theories of sovereignty. The intellectual foundation for — if not the practice of — legal centralism arose in this period. The frequent invocation of Bodin, Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf as the founding theorists of sovereignty and legal centralism creates the impression that pluralistic thinking was impoverished or on the wane. The central ambition of our article is to provide an alternative historical genealogy for legal scholars of pluralism. Workaday legal pluralism did not struggle against a predominantly hostile intellectual climate. Many discourses supported pluralism. And the most emphatic theorists of a powerful singular sovereign were often responding to intellectual projects that valorized pluralism.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link. 

August 22, 2011

King Lear and Leviathan

Alex Schulman, Duke University, has published From Lear to Leviathan: On States of Nature and Social Contracts in Shakespeare's Politics as an APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Here is the abstract.


Philosophers have been more ready to incorporate insights from the dramas of William Shakespeare than political theorists, who have focused more of their energies on ancient Greek tragedy. I argue that Shakespeare’s plays are a valuable and necessary resource for a political theory open to imaginative literature, by focusing specifically on King Lear and reading it against Hobbes’s Leviathan. I argue that Shakespeare tragically depicts the same process – the recreation of sovereignty out of a state of nature and emergent social contract – that Hobbes argues for normatively. Shakespeare’s play shows what is required of us psychologically and even emotionally in carrying out the Hobbesian process of disassembling hierarchical feudalism and constructing a modern political rationalism. will be provided by author.
Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

May 25, 2011

The State of Nature: Whence Politics?

William A. Edmundson, Georgia State University College of Law, has published Politics in a State of Nature. Here is the abstract.


Aristotle thought we are, by nature, political animals. Political philosophy in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke sees political society not as natural but as an artifice. For this tradition, political society emerged from a pre-political state of nature by the exercise of innate normative powers. Those powers, together with the rest of our native normative endowment, both make possible the construction of the state, and place sharp limits on the state’s just powers and prerogatives.

Thus described, a state-of-nature theory has three components. One is an account of the native normative endowment, or “NNE.” Two is an account of how the state is constructed using the tools included in the NNE. Three is an account of the state’s resulting normative endowment, which includes a (purported) moral power to impose duties of obedience.

State-of-nature theories disagree about the NNE. For Hobbes, it consists of a moral permission to do whatever seems to one to be necessary to survival, and a moral power to covenant. Locke specified a more constraining NNE, which also included a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Rawls excluded personal desert from the “original position,” his refurbishing of the state of nature. In each case, the NNE is not treated as though it were a matter of empirical investigation and discovery, but rather were one of reflective adjustment to the other two components of the theory.

The work of social psychologist Stanley Milgram and his students suggests a quite different NNE, one far more constrained than what state-of-nature theories have allowed. Norms that constrain moral reproof are of particular interest here. Contrary to Locke, people do not behave in experimental settings as one would predict if they possessed a “natural executive right” to punish wrongdoing. Moral reproof is subject to standing norms. These norms limit the range of eligible reprovers.

This paper draws on this work to support two claims. One, is that the native normative endowment is (as Aristotle held) already political. The other is that political authority should be re-conceived as a matter of standing - that is, as the state’s unique possession of a moral permission to enforce moral norms, rather than as a moral power to impose freestanding duties of obedience.
Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

October 27, 2009

The Language of Power in Racine

Eric Heinze, Queen Mary University of London School of Law, has published "'This Power Isn’t Power If It’s Shared': Law and Violence in Jean Racine’s 'La Thébaïde'" in volume 22 of Law & Literature (2010). Here is the abstract.
The Seventeenth century witnesses the steady demise of the fragmented or overlapping power regimes that had been rooted in the European Middle Ages. Centralised control increasingly structures emerging states. Jean Racine's La Thébaïde, recreating a chapter in the Oedipus myth, displays the Hobbesian drive for undivided sovereignty pushed to its logical conclusion: even two shareholders in power become one too many. Legal norms are constantly invoked to resolve a political and military power struggle, including discourses of absolute and shared sovereignty, separations of powers, popular consent, public welfare, national interest (raison d’état), natural law, and just war. Far from overcoming a brute power dynamic, however, those legal discourses show how the emerging modern state turns them into a tool of coercive power.

Download the abstract from SSRN here.