Handler on The Administrative Law of McCarthyism

Nicholas Handler, Texas A&M School of Law, is publishing The Administrative Law of McCarthyism in volume 78 of the Stanford Law Review (2026).

This Article recovers the largely overlooked legal and administrative history of the federal loyalty-security program, and argues that it played a formative role in the development of modern civil service protections and administrative law. During the McCarthy era, the United States Civil Service Commission (CSC), under pressure from Congress, implemented a sweeping loyalty program aimed at rooting out purportedly disloyal federal employees. Though often remembered as a moment of political overreach and civil liberties violations, this Article shows that the loyalty program simultaneously catalyzed a surprising expansion in procedural rights for government workers—both through internal reforms initiated by the CSC and through judicial decisions that extended emerging administrative law doctrines into the domain of federal employment. Drawing on original archival research, this Article reconstructs how the Loyalty Review Board, housed within the CSC, developed formalized standards for loyalty adjudications, including evidentiary thresholds, rights to notice and counsel, and appellate review. These procedures, while initially limited to loyalty hearings, came to inform broader doctrines governing the removal and discipline of civil servants. In particular, courts began to apply principles such as the Accardi doctrine and the Chenery rule—originally developed for public-facing regulatory action—to disputes between the federal government and its own employees. The result was a nascent body of administrative law that treated personnel decisions not as matters of unfettered executive discretion, but as legal acts subject to procedural constraint. The Article makes two central claims. First, it argues that civil service law should be understood as a core component of administrative law—not merely a subspecialty of public employment law. Legal rules governing the hiring, discipline, and removal of civil servants serve the same functions as more familiar administrative law doctrines: they mediate interbranch conflict, preventing any one branch from dominating federal policy-making and thus serving deeper separation-of-powers and rule of law values. Second, it argues that the regulation of federal employment not only prevents the aggrandizement of the political branches, but also protects individual rights. In the postwar era, federal jobs functioned as a major form of state-administered benefit, and the procedures surrounding those jobs shaped broader public expectations about fairness, merit, and due process. Those expectations were deeply challenged during the unrest of the McCarthy period, but were ultimately vindicated by the creative adaption of administrative law principles. These lessons are newly relevant today, as the second Trump administration embarks upon one of the most ambitious attempts to remake the federal civil service in generations, often explicitly seeking to replace merit systems with tests of personal and political loyalty.

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Stern on The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking

Rephael Stern, Harvard Law School; Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, has published The Lost English Roots of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking at 134 Yale L.J. 1955 (2025).

Notice-and-comment rulemaking is arguably the most important procedure in the modern administrative state. Influential accounts even frame it as the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act's "most important idea." But its historical origins are obscure. Scholars have variously suggested that it grew out of the constitutionally sanctioned practice of congressional petitioning, organically developed from the practices of nineteenth-century agencies, or was influenced by German conceptions of administrative rulemaking. These histories, however, are incomplete. Using original archival research, this Article demonstrates that notice-and-comment rulemaking was the product of a series of American transplantations of English rulemaking procedures that developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the New Deal Era, influential American reformers tracked important developments in English rulemaking as they grappled with the rapidly changing American legal ecosystem. Yet, as this Article emphasizes, Americans only partially adopted the English procedural framework. While they transplanted the "notice" and "comment" dimensions of English procedure, the Americans ultimately decided not to import a legislative veto, which was a critical part of rulemaking procedures in England. By offering a revisionist account of the origins of notice-and-comment rulemaking, this Article makes two contributions. First, it takes an initial step toward recovering a largely forgotten world of Anglo-American administrative law. Second, it illuminates current debates about the legitimacy of notice-and-comment rulemaking. With many current critiques of notice-and-comment rulemaking centering on the procedure's supposed lack of democratic accountability, the history this Article traces pushes us to ask whether belatedly transplanting an English-style legislative veto would legitimate the procedure.

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Sullivan on Death and Discretion: Some Thoughts on Living

Barry Sullivan, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, is publishing Death and Discretion: Some Thoughts on Living in volume 35 of the Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities. Here is the abstract.

Like judges, administrative officials exercise legal authority that significantly impacts the lives of others, and, in doing so, they must confront the problem of authority as "a problem for the individual mind faced with the difficulty of deciding what to do or to say." (James Boyd White, Acts of Hope309 (1994) Their work, like the work of judges, has a profound moral dimension. In this essay, Professor Sullivan considers that moral obligation through an analysis of Kazuo Ishiguro's 2022 film Living, together with Akira Kurosawa's film Ikiru and Leo Tolstoy's novella The Death of Ivan Ilyich. An earlier version of the essay was presented at a Yale Law School conference in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of James Boyd White's path-breaking book The Legal Imagination.

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Liu on Independence Through Judicialization: The Politics Surrounding Administrative Adjudicators, 1929-1949 @Michigan_JEAL @Lawrence_J_Liu

Lawrence J. Liu, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, is publishing Independence through Judicialization: The Politics Surrounding Administrative Adjudicators, 1929-1949 in the Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law. Here is the abstract.

One front in today’s battle to define the scope of the administrative state concerns the authority, status, and future of its 10,000-plus administrative adjudicators. Decisions by federal courts and the executive branch to increase the dependence of administrative adjudicators on the executive have sparked strong reactions from observers, with many advocating for measures to increase adjudicator “independence.” But who should administrative adjudicators be independent of, which ought to be independent, and why? Calls for administrative adjudicator independence are not new. This Article draws on primary documents produced by private actors, congressional decisionmakers, and federal executive agents to present a political legal history of legislative proposals between 1929 and 1949 to understand whether, how, and why different actors sought to insulate administrative adjudicators from their agencies or the President. Leading up to and following the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, politicians and interested citizens advanced proposals to increase the independence of the individuals who conducted hearings and served as factfinders in administrative agencies. Then, like now, observers debated administrative adjudicator independence in the context of discussions about the power of administrative agencies. The loudest supporters of independence were anti-New Dealers trying to halt and reverse the growth of administrative power, who were joined by a subset of legal professionals interested in using law to check its operation. These critics attempted to “judicialize” administrative adjudication by increasing the resemblance of administrative adjudicators to the federal judiciary. What does this history teach? First, it illustrates how actors past and present deploy seemingly apolitical terms like judicial values, independence, or administrative procedure to obtain substantive political ends. Indeed, such terms can take on different meanings at different times, perhaps varying with views of the federal judiciary and active government, the policies and political strength of the President, the issues decided by administrative agencies, or the types of claimants subject to adjudication. Second, it highlights how early supporters of administrative agencies emphasized the diversity among administrative adjudicators, while opponents grouped them together to collectively limit their authority. Today, rather than pursuing one-size-fits-all reforms, I suggest that different rules should apply to different administrative adjudicators depending on the questions and claimants involved. Decisions about ratemaking or regulatory enforcement differ from individualized determinations whether citizens qualify for government benefits or licenses. Claims by business interests might be treated differently from those by more vulnerable groups, such as disability-benefits recipients or noncitizens at risk of removal. In any event, when making policy recommendations, reformers should begin by understanding who administrative adjudicators are and the functions they perform, an understanding that also underscores whether and how politics should animate arguments about adjudicator independence.

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Rosenblum on The Antifascist Roots of Presidential Administration @narosenblum @NYULaw

Noah A. Rosenblum, New York University School of Law; Columbia University Department of History, has published The Antifascist Roots of Presidential Administration. Here is the abstract.

We live, it is said, in an age of presidential administration. This Article uncovers the intellectual foundations of presidential control of the administrative state, and, on the basis of original archival research and new contextualization, grounds its legitimacy in the fight against fascism. It shows how the architects of presidential administration reconciled a strong executive with democratic norms by embracing separation of powers with the aim of making democracy responsible and antifascist. These previously overlooked developments have important consequences for contemporary debates about executive power in general and the role of the president in administration in particular. The Article shows that presidential administration was not a haphazard occurrence, but the culmination of a longstanding project to make modern democracy efficacious and accountable. It traces the roots of the office of the president back through the executive reorganization acts of the New Deal to a world of Progressive Era executive-centered reform thought. It then shows how the New Deal reformers on the President’s Committee on Administrative Management drew from and adapted this Progressive Era tradition. At the heart of this story is a stunning, if partial, reversal: where Progressive Era reformers rejected formal constitutionalism in general and the principle of separation of powers in particular, New Deal reformers embraced them. This consequential shift was closely connected to the need to distinguish and protect emergent American presidential-ism from fascism. Recovering this forgotten origin story has significant normative consequences. It establishes the fundamental importance of internal separation of powers and other antifascist adaptations of the modern administrative state. The Article thus raises a historically-grounded challenge to those who maintain that direct presidential control of administration is the only constitutionally or normatively desirable public law arrangement. It also proposes an antifascist litmus test that any adequate theory of Article II should have to meet. Anti-fascism, the Article shows, was the condition on which the institutions of the modern, empowered American presidency were actually imagined. Fidelity demands we grapple with that commitment today.

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Craig on English Adrministrative Law History

Paul P. Craig, University of Oxford Faculty of Law, is publishing English Administrative Law History: Perception and Reality in Judicial Review in the Common Law World: Origins and Adaptations (S. Jhaveri and M. Ramsden, eds., forthcoming). Here is the abstract.

The history of English administrative law remains to be written. It is a task of considerable magnitude, given that it requires understanding of case law, regulatory legislation, government and politics spanning a period of circa 450 years. The task is more especially daunting given the range of different areas that were subject to governmental regulation broadly construed. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the intellectual task has not been fulfilled. This has not, however, translated into a dearth of opinion as to English administrative law history. To the contrary, as will be seen below, there are views in this regard, and some are strongly held. There is, as in any intellectual endeavour, the danger of an inverse relationship between the strength of a person’s conviction and the depth of their knowledge. This chapter is not a history of English administrative law, since that would, as noted, require a book in itself. It does, however, offer a lens through which to view two different conceptions of that history, which are termed perception and reality. These terms are admittedly tendentious, in the sense that they convey, by their very semantic meaning, my view as to the more accurate picture of administrative law as it developed over time. There is, however, nothing special in the use of language in this regard, since those who adhere to the opposite position deploy language that is equally tendentious. The discussion in this chapter is part of the larger study concerning the export and reception of administrative law in other common law jurisdictions. The effect of the disjunction between perception and reality on such export is interesting. The causation is contestable, and does not necessarily always pull in the same direction. Thus, perception of administrative law as being relatively modern may have hampered its development elsewhere, and at the same time encouraged other jurisdictions to feel freer in adapting its precepts to local circumstance. The essence of the argument presented over the following pages is as follows. The commonly held view about English administrative law is that it is of recent origin, some dating it from the mid-twentieth century, some venturing back to the late nineteenth century. This view, when unpacked, is premised on assumptions concerning doctrinal case law and regulation. There is an empirical and a normative foundation underlying both assumptions. This ‘intellectual package’ constitutes the commonly accepted picture of administrative law as it unfolded in England. This, then, is the perception, grounded in four central constructs concerning case law and regulation, viewed from an empirical and normative perspective. It is set out in the first part of the chapter. The discussion thereafter is concerned with what I term the reality. It mirrors the discourse concerning perception, insofar as it considers case law and regulation from both an empirical and normative perspective. It will be argued that the commonly held view does not cohere empirically with reality concerning case law or regulation, and that the normative assumptions underlying the perceived view do not square with the general approach of the legislature or the courts during the foundational period of administrative law, which runs from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, with earlier origins. This disjunction between perception and reality could have had an impact on the ultimate exportability of English administrative law. The chapter concludes with a sketch of the implications for comparative study of other jurisdictions. These implications are the subject of discussion in the remaining chapters of the volume.

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Adrian Vermeule's New Book on Law's Abnegation: From Law's Empire To Administrative State @avermeule

ICYMI: Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard University, has published Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State (Harvard University Press, 2016). Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.

Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons.freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action. As Law’s Abnegation makes clear, the state did not shove law out of the way. The judiciary voluntarily relegated itself to the margins of power. The last and greatest triumph of legalism was to depose itself.

Craig on English Foundations of U.S. Administrative Law

Paul P. Craig, University of Oxford Faculty of Law, has published English Foundations of US Administrative Law: Four Central Errors. Here is the abstract.

Philip Hamburger posed a provocative challenge to administrative law in the USA, as attested to by the title to the book, which asked whether administrative law was unlawful. His thesis was grounded in English administrative law, as it developed in the seventeenth century and eighteenth centuries, when lawyers in the American colonies would have been familiar with it. It is central to Hamburger’s argument that much of administrative law concerning both rulemaking and adjudication was “extralegal” and was thus regarded by English law during this period. In an earlier article I argued that this thesis was wrong as adjudged by positivist and non-positivist sources alike. Hamburger responded to my article, and took issue with the argument made therein. This article is a response to Hamburger’s latest offering. The flaws in Hamburger’s argument are even clearer now than hitherto, and there are numerous such mistakes. This article will, however, concentrate on four errors that are central to his thesis. First, Hamburger’s thesis rests on the argument that administrative law is extralegal, and hence illegitimate and unlawful. It is the central construct from which all else flows. In my earlier article I contended that there were serious difficulties with his conception of the term extralegal. I was wrong. It is untenable. It will be seen that this is so when judged from the perspective of first principle, and from the perspective of positive law. Hamburger’s project is thus built on an intellectual construct that does not withstand scrutiny. It is a pillar of sand. Secondly, Hamburger’s thesis as to the legitimacy of adjudication and rulemaking by bodies charged with administration in the seventeenth and eighteenth century is wrong. He contends that events such as the demise of Star Chamber and the repeal of the Statute of Proclamations show that administrative adjudication and rulemaking were generally perceived to be extralegal and illegitimate in England at this time. He maintains this fixed view, and is critical of any who differ, repeatedly contending that they have ignored the historical sources. The reality is to the contrary. Hamburger’s fierce insistence that his interpretation of these events is correct is combined with a signal unwillingness to consider whether that interpretation coheres with the evidence. This is a dangerous cocktail, which leads repeatedly to error. His interpretation is not correct. It is irreconcilable in empirical terms with a very great deal of regulatory legislation enacted over two hundred years, in which Parliament continually accorded the administration with powers and duties of a kind that are inconsistent with Hamburger’s thesis. His argument is also incompatible with thousands of cases decided by the courts via judicial review, in which the courts accepted the grant of such authority as lawful, and did not in any way characterize it as extralegal or irregular. Hamburger’s thesis is moreover defective in failing to recognize the clear normative differences between the situations where administrative adjudication and rulemaking were regarded as lawful and those where they were not. Thirdly, the qualifications that Hamburger makes to his own thesis are conceptually incoherent and do not fit with the empirical evidence. Hamburger seeks to qualify his conclusion that administrative law is extralegal and unlawful. His modality for doing so in the context of rulemaking is through definition of legislative and non-legislative rules; while in the context of adjudication it is done through definition of the term judicial. These qualifications are central to Hamburger’s thesis. The meaning of these terms is, however, conceptually incoherent. It is also inconsistent with much empirical evidence, since as will be seen below the legislature frequently accorded the administration power of a kind that Hamburger believes that it did not and should not have had. The fourth error in Hamburger’s thesis is methodological. Hamburger takes my earlier argument to task, contending that it was predicated on some brutish Austinian positivism, which ignored constitutional ideals. This is, as will be seen below, nonsense. It is nonetheless fitting that Hamburger should have raised the issue of methodology, since it will be seen that his own argument is premised on a constitutional methodology that is unsustainable both historically and legally. He seeks to defend a far-reaching argument that an entire body of law is unlawful, while ignoring a very considerable body of evidence in terms of legislation and judicial decisions that is inconsistent with his thesis. His argument is, moreover, premised on an indefensible distinction between ‘constitutional ideals’ on the one hand, and legislation and court decisions on the other, which ignores the normative values that are embodied in the latter.

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Teaching Administrative Law In the First Year Curriculum

Kevin M. Stack, Vanderbilt University School of Law, has published Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth Century for First-Year Courses on Legislation and Regulation at 65 Journal of Legal Education 28 (2015). Here is the abstract.

This essay — part of a special journal issue on Legislation and Regulation and Regulatory State courses as core elements of the law school curriculum — approaches the debate over adopting these courses by looking back to the controversy stirred by teaching administrative law in law schools at the beginning of the twentieth century. This essay argues that sources of resistance to administrative law at that time not only help to explain the slow pace of adoption of “Leg-Reg” and “Reg-State” courses today, but also inform what material these new courses should cover. At the turn of the century, both commitment to the case method as the exclusive pedagogy for law teaching and jurisprudential principles that understood courts to be the privileged sources of law resulted in early administrative law courses being normalized within the case method, excluding the internal law and decisionmaking of administrative agencies from their coverage. Based on the premise that law students should confront the primary sources of law in our current regulatory legal system, first-year Leg-Reg and Reg-State courses should not replicate the traditional, exclusive focus on judicial decisions. Rather, these new courses are the right occasion to introduce regulatory and congressional materials as primary sources. That coverage choice, moreover, provides preparation for an upper-level administrative law course focused on how courts review agency action, while minimizing duplication in coverage. Even more importantly, treatment of nonjudicial primary sources in these new courses helps to bring the image of law conveyed to first year students closer to the true dimensions of our legal order.

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When To Stop, and When To Go

Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, University of Rome III-Department of Law, has published Lessons from a Traffic Light. A Juridical Scherzo. Here is the abstract.

Traffic lights are examined as one of the most common examples of "global administrative law" governed by an international convention (the 1968 Vienna convention on traffic signs). But also for their philosophy of the law implications especially as regards the relations of individuals with norms and normativity and the creation of social norms. Furthermore the traffic light metaphor is widely used in common language and in other fields of the law. Finally traffic lights are seen from a comparative law perspective, especially as a test for the effectiveness of uniform (and global) laws, taking into account essential aspects of the law such as sanctions and enforcement. Traffic lights could be used an elementary model to verify uniformity and compliance in much more complex pieces of the law.

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The NSW Customs Department and Frederick Garling

Diane Kraal, Monash University, Department of Business Law and Taxation, has published Customs Revenue in the British Colony of New South Wales 1827-1859. And Inquiries Concerning Frederick Garling, Artist and Customs Department Employee at 7 Studies in the History of Tax Law 329 (2015). Here is the abstract.

Customs duties in the British Colony of New South Wales provided important funds for the economic development of the settlement. This significant source of revenue led to the Colony's Customs Department being established, in Sydney 1827, to administer the collection process. The shift from physical assessments of duty by powerful individuals to a process with legislated and more regulated procedures was not without challenges. The first aim of this chapter is to provide insights into five early inquiries concerning the system of the Colony's customs duties, legislation and practice. With a particular focus on the last two inquiries, it is asked whether any modifications were made to legislation and practice. The second aim is to provide a fuller account of the employment of Frederick Garling (1806-1873) with the Customs Department, Sydney. He was found guilty of serious neglect of duty by the NSW Board of Inquiry of 1858/59. Today, Garling is a recognised Australian colonial artist for his genre of marine watercolours.

The full text is not available from SSRN.

Using AI In Government

Thomas A. Smith, University of San Diego School of Law, has published Tools, Oracles, Genies and Sovereigns: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Government. Here is the abstract.

The American founders attempted to establish a clockwork government. Virtue was to be assured by humans, acting as they must within their human natures, but operating within a framework that assured mechanically that the outputs of government would not be tyrannical. Whether this system has worked well or not is a matter of controversy, but to the extent it did not work, it seems to have been at least partially a failure of the mechanisms designed to compensate for the shortcomings of human nature. Now we are on the verge of developing “artificial intelligence.” Whether these technological advances will emerge slowly or quickly is unknown, as are their contours. But even minimal AI could lead to a radical improvement in government because AI’s could be designed to perform the tasks of government with very low agency costs. However, it may seem uncertain that AI’s would be so designed. It may be, first, that there will not be any AI’s after all. It may be also that AI’s will be designed or implemented by exactly the humans who create agency costs in the first place, and used for their own and not the public good. And it may be that AI’s take off into the high orbit of superintelligence and decide to reduce us to slavery or dust. But these possibilities, while possible, seem unlikely. Probably AI’s will emerge, but only after a long time. AI’s will be difficult to design but there are reasons to expect they will be designed so as to minimize agency costs. They will probably, ironically enough, emerge in the order of tool, oracle and genie that Bostrom mentions (but for different reasons). We can hope to control AI tools, oracles, and genies. An AI sovereign, however, would be much more difficult to control, if it were possible to control at all. AI sovereigns would be persons. But AI’s must not be allowed to become persons, in a philosophical or legal sense. AI persons would have to be slaves if we were to control them. One hopes they would be slaves without subjective consciousness. If they did have subjective consciousness anything like humans, we would be faced with the impossible moral dilemma of being slave-masters or slaves ourselves. Hence a hard line should be drawn against AI research that is directed specifically at the emergence of subjective consciousness in machines, or likely to lead that way, but these goals are far beyond any current, or really any currently imaginable, AI research. The promise of controlling government is great enough to justify the merely notional risk of creating AI monsters we cannot control.

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Police In Buenos Aires in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

Agustin Elias Casagrande, CONICET-IDIHCS-UNLP, has published 'The Active Arm of the Government' The Police of Buenos Aires in the First Half of 19th Century as Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2015-03. Here is the abstract.

In the first half of 19th century, the Río de La Plata was involved in a process of militarization and changing of political orders. During this time the conflictive relation between the old schemes of government and the tendency to centralize and to create new structures of power and social control was extended all across the territory. Among those Institutions thought to provide new forms of discipline, appeared the Police, created in 1812, which immediately would be involved in a tension between the local authorities and the central government. In this article, by analyzing the juridical concepts deeply rooted in legal reasoning used by the actors to create the force, it will be explained some structural elements of the meaning and logic of police order in the Spanish legal tradition (domestic government, localization, negotiation, etc.). After the study of those categories, inscribed in the legal sources which breathed life to the police´s institution, it will be examined the problems that faced the diverse attempts of building a central police-government, especially, in front of a traditional negotiable juridical culture that persisted in the mentality of the agents of Buenos Aires in the period comprehended between 1812-1853.

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European and U. S. Influences on Latin American Administrative Law

Ricardo Perlingeiro, Universidade Federal Fluniense (UFF), has published A Historical Perspective on Administrative Jurisdiction in Latin America: Continental European Tradition versus US Influence. Here is the abstract.

From the perspective of US influence, this text analyses the history of administrative jurisdiction, starting from the 19th Century, in the 19 Latin American countries of Iberian origin (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela). The analysis includes the US unified judicial system and procedural due process of law to decisions by the administrative authorities, the fertile field of primary jurisdiction, which is in conflict with the Continental European tradition firmly established in Latin American administrative law. While setting out the contradictions of administrative jurisdiction in Latin American countries that result from importing rules without putting them in the proper context, the text seeks to identify trends and create perspective to build a model of administrative justice specific to Latin America, drawing on the experiences acquired in the United States and Continental Europe.

The article contents: Introduction. 1 Administrative jurisdiction: judicial, non-judicial and hybrid models. 1.1 Constitution of Cadiz of 1812. Junta Grande of 1811 (Argentina). Belgian Constitution of 1831. Reglamento para el Arreglo de la Autoridad Ejecutiva Provisoria de Chile (1811). Law of 16 and 24 August 1790. Ley de Santamaría Paredes. Administrative Court of the Land of Baden of 1863. 1.2 Lack of independence of French administrative litigation and the unified judicial system in Latin America in the 19th Century. La justice déléguée of 1872. 1.3 The unified judicial system in Latin America in the 19th Century and questions of governance. 1.4 The specialization of jurisdiction in Europe and the emergence of administrative law. 1.5 The evolution of the unified judicial system in the USA: Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) of 1887. 1.6 Models of administrative jurisdiction in Latin America in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 1.6.1 Hybrid (judicial and non-judicial) administrative jurisdiction: Honduras, Brazil. 1.6.2 Non-judicial administrative jurisdiction: Bolivia, Panama, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico. 1.6.3 Dualist judicial jurisdiction: Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Ecuador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic. 1.6.4 Monist judicial jurisdiction (uninterrupted period): Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, El Salvador, Cuba, Brazil. 1.6.5 Monist judicial jurisdiction (limited period): Colombia, Guatemala, Dominican Republic. 1.6.6 Monist judicial jurisdiction (intermittent periods): Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, Panama, Bolivia. 1.6.7 Monist judicial jurisdiction (currently in effect and having specialized entities): Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, El Salvador, Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras and Ecuador. 1.7 Developmental and comparative framework of the independent administrative jurisdiction under the Latin American Constitutions. 2 Administrative decisions preceded by due process of law. 2.1 Signs of US due process of law in Latin America: The 5th (1791) and 14th (1868) Amendments of the US Constitution. 2.2 Origin of due process of law: Magna Carta of 1215, Liberty of Subject Act (28 Edward 3) of 1354, Observance of Due Process of Law Act (42 Edward 3) of 1368. 2.3 Right to a fair trial on the international scene: US Bill of Rights of 1789, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, European Human Rights Convention of 1950, International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights of 1966, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000, American Convention on Human Rights of 1969. 2.4 Due process of law in Latin American laws and constitutions. 2.5 Case law of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights: independence and impartiality in non-judicial administrative proceedings, and due process of law prior to administrative decisions. 2.6 Distinction between the judicial processo administrativo, non-judicial processo administrativo and procedimento administrativo. 2.7 Administrative due process prior to decisions by administrative authorities in Latin America. Closing considerations.

The full text is not available from SSRN.