Crowe on Pseudolaw, Folk Law, and Natural Law: How to Tell the Difference

Jonathan Crowe, University of Southern Queensland, School of Law and Justice, has published Pseudolaw, Folk Law and Natural Law: How to Tell the Difference. Here is the abstract.

Pseudolaw presents false or distorted, but superficially plausible, claims about legal doctrine. It is a dangerous and costly social phenomenon, with the potential to undermine social cohesion and the rule of law. Pseudolaw is dangerous, in part, because it is easily confused with two other phenomena that play important and legitimate, albeit widely overlooked, roles in legal processes: folk law and natural law. This chapter explicates the concepts of folk law and natural law, including their relationship to positive law and their place in legal decision-making. It distinguishes these concepts from pseudolaw, while also explaining why they tend to be conflated with it. I argue that folk law and natural law, properly understood, are crucial components of social cohesion and the rule of law; pseudolaw is harmful partly because it obscures and distorts the proper task of these notions in supplementing positive legal enactments.

Download the chapter from SSRN at the link.

Langford and Bryan on The Transformation of the Notion of Civitas Maxima @edgehill @LancasterUni

Peter Langford, Edge Hill University, and Ian Bryan, Lancaster University, have published 'From Wolff to Kelsen: The Transformation of the Notion of Civitas Maxima' in Hans Kelsen and the Natural Law Tradition 161-187 (P. Langford, I. Bryan, and J. McGarry, eds., Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2019).

A significant part of Kelsen’s work is devoted to the theoretical and methodological separation of positive law from natural law. The predominant impression of this process is of a determination to entirely sunder the conceptual framework of positive law from any continuing reliance upon natural law. However, certain of Kelsen’s works involve the appropriation of the notion of civitas maxima from Christian Wolff’s Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum (1749). The presence of this notion raises the question of the relationship between Kelsen’s theoretical framework and the conception of natural law developed by Christian Wolff. It is through an examination of the transformation of Wolff’s notion of civitas maxima that an important aspect of Kelsen’s relationship to the natural law tradition becomes apparent. The appropriation will be traced through the initial discussion of civitas maxima in Kelsen’s Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag Zu Einer Reinen Rechtslehre (1920/1928), and its further exposition and development in Kelsen’s 1926 Lecture Course (‘Les Rapports de Système entre le Droit Interne et le Droit International’) at the l’Académie de droit international, in the Hague. In this manner, the significant methodological divergences between a Kelsenian theory of positive law, as a theory of legal monism according primacy to international law, and the Wolffian theory of natural law, as a theory of the law of nations, will become evident. This methodological divergence, however, should not obscure a more than residual affinity between Kelsen and Wolff concerning the cosmopolitical orientation of their thought.

The full text is not available from SSRN.

A New Book On Legal Theory From R. H. Helmholz

New from Harvard University Press: R. H. Helmholz, Natural Law In Court: A History of Legal Theory In Practice (2015).  Here is a description of the contents from the publisher's website.

The theory of natural law grounds human laws in the universal truths of God’s creation. Until very recently, lawyers in the Western tradition studied natural law as part of their training, and the task of the judicial system was to put its tenets into concrete form, building an edifice of positive law on natural law’s foundations. Although much has been written about natural law in theory, surprisingly little has been said about how it has shaped legal practice. Natural Law in Court asks how lawyers and judges made and interpreted natural law arguments in England, Europe, and the United States, from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the American Civil War. R. H. Helmholz sees a remarkable consistency in how English, Continental, and early American jurisprudence understood and applied natural law in cases ranging from family law and inheritance to criminal and commercial law. Despite differences in their judicial systems, natural law was treated across the board as the source of positive law, not its rival. The idea that no person should be condemned without a day in court, or that penalties should be proportional to the crime committed, or that self-preservation confers the right to protect oneself against attacks are valuable legal rules that originate in natural law. From a historical perspective, Helmholz concludes, natural law has advanced the cause of justice.