Showing posts with label Nietzsche. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nietzsche. Show all posts

October 2, 2014

A New Book From Marianne Constable

Marianne Constable, University of California, Berkeley, has published Our Word Is Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts (Stanford University Press, 2014). Here's a description of the contents from the publisher's website.

Words can be misspoken, misheard, misunderstood, or misappropriated; they can be inappropriate, inaccurate, dangerous, or wrong. When speech goes wrong, law often steps in as itself a speech act or series of speech acts. Our Word Is Our Bond offers a nuanced approach to language and its interaction and relations with modern law. Marianne Constable argues that, as language, modern law makes claims and hears claims of justice and injustice, which can admittedly go wrong. Constable proposes an alternative to understanding law as a system of rules, or as fundamentally a policy-making and problem-solving tool. Constable introduces and develops insights from Austin, Cavell, Reinach, Nietzsche, Derrida and Heidegger to show how claims of law are performative and passionate utterances or social acts that appeal implicitly to justice.
Our Word Is Our Bond explains that neither law nor justice are what lawyers and judges say, nor what officials and scholars claim they are. However inadequate our law and language may be to the world, Constable argues that we know our world and name our ways of living and being in it through law and language. Justice today, however impossible to define and difficult to determine, depends on relations we have with one another through language and on the ways in which legal speech—the claims and responses that we make to one another in the name of the law—acts.








November 28, 2012

Studying Injustice


A new book from Eric Heinze, Queen Mary, University of London. Here is the description from the publisher's website.

The Concept of Injustice challenges traditional Western justice theory. Thinkers from Plato and Aristotle through to Kant, Hegel, Marx and Rawls have subordinated the idea of injustice to the idea of justice. Misled by the word’s etymology, political theorists have assumed injustice to be the sheer, logical opposite of justice.

Heinze summons ancient and early modern texts, philosophical and literary, with special attention to Shakespeare, to argue that injustice is not primarily the negation, failure or absence of justice. It is the constant product of regimes and norms of justice. Justice is not always the cure for injustice, and is often its cause.





Selected Table of Contents

Introduction;  1. Nietzsche’s Echo; PART ONE: Classical Understandings; 2. Injustice as the Negation of Justice; 3.Injustice as Disunity; 4. Injustice as Mismeasurement; PART TWO: Post-Classical Understandings; 5.Injustice as Unity; 6. Injustice as Measurement; 7. Measurement and Modernity; Works Cited.

About the Author

Eric Heinze is Professor of Law and Humanities at Queen Mary, University of London. His most recent publications on legal theory have appeared in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Ratio Juris, International Journal of Law in Context, Legal Studies, Journal of Social & Legal Studies, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Law & Critique, Law & Literature, and Law & Humanities.


Published October 2012| 232 pages | Hardback: 978-0-415-52441-4| $120.00 $96.00
                                    For more information, please visit: www.routledge.com/9780415634793

Use discount code ERJ94 to save 20% off when you order online.









*  discount valid on hardback and paperback formats only orders@taylorandfrancis.com

June 23, 2011

Looking For Like-ness

Bernard E. Harcourt, University of Chicago Law School, is publising Radical Thought from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, Through Foucault, to the Present: Comments on Steven Lukes’ ‘In Defense of False Consciousness’ in the University of Chicago Legal Forum. Here is the abstract.



In his essay “In Defense of ‘False Consciousness’” and book, Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes mounts a forceful defense of the idea of false consciousness; however, Lukes presents false consciousness and the notion of truth regimes as mutually exclusive. In this essay, I suggest that there are important family resemblances between the theory of ideology in the Marxian tradition, especially as developed by the Frankfurt School, and the critique of truth regimes rooted in the Nietzschean tradition of genealogy, especially as developed by Foucault – family resemblances that make it counter-productive to argue that one theory would make us reject the other. The task is not to defend one theory at the expense of the other, but to explore the intricate relationship between the two in order to sharpen our own critical interventions. That is the goal of this essay, drawing on the radical thought of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and Foucault. In addition, I go further and call for resistance, not simply to this or that way of being governed, but resistance to truth. The task, as I see it, is to unmask and enlighten, but then to shed the tools we have used before those very beliefs become oppressive themselves.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

January 12, 2007

Turner on Nietzsche, Foucault, and Scalia

William Turner (Emory Law School) has posted his paper, Nietzsche, Foucault, Scalia, on SSRN. From the abstract:
This paper explores the narrative strategies of majority and dissenting opinions in Lawrence v. Texas, Romer v. Evans, and Bowers v. Hardwick, all major lesbian/gay civil rights decisions. It demonstrates that the story of U.S. history - increasing protection for individual rights, or decreasing respect for moral and constitutional tradition - explains as much about the legal outcome as the doctrinal arguments that the opinions contain. In particular, it places these opinions into a discussion about the relationship between narrative and identity, individual and national. From this perspective, Justice Antonin Scalia shares with French philosopher Michel Foucault the belief that narrative is closely related to identity, with the important difference that Foucault celebrates the fragility of this connection while Scalia deplores it.