Narechania on Hamilton's Copyright and the Election of 1800 @tnarecha @BerkeleyLaw @WisLRev

Tejas N. Narechania, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, is publishing Hamilton's Copyright and the Election of 1800 in the Wisconsin Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Copyright is, perhaps surprisingly, a regular fixture of electoral campaigns. Candidates deploy copyright to obscure prior policy statements. Local governments assert copyright over recordings of public meetings to protect incumbents. And campaign committees have used copyright to prevent counter-advertisements—ads which respond to (by embedding) their adversaries’ ads. Are these examples of illegal copyright infringement or protected political speech? The Supreme Court has balanced copyright and First Amendment interests by looking both to copyright law’s internal doctrinal limits (e.g., fair use) and to the “historical record.” But, in political contexts, the doctrine is sparing: Candidates for public office, weighing the pressures of campaigning against the costs of copyright litigation, tend to prefer self-censorship—undermining protections for political speech. The historical record may help. In this Essay, I highlight an episode—overlooked until now—that sheds new light on the speech-copyright equilibrium. Drawing on a mix of novel primary materials and secondary sources outside the legal literature, I tell the story of Alexander Hamilton’s secret, copyrighted pamphlet aimed at unseating John Adams from the top of the Federalist Party—secret, that is, until it leaked to Hamilton’s political opposition. Viewed in its entirety, this episode may reflect a shared, if contested, understanding—shared by both Hamilton and his opponents—that favors a full and fair discussion of such matters of public importance, even if copyright’s rules might otherwise restrain such speech. This political precedent may thus have implications for the contemporary controversies in which candidates deploy copyright (and related speech restraints) to squelch public scrutiny over their prior statements regarding, say, abortion rights. And so I conclude by describing how the public governance interests in such political speech should trump copyright’s restraints[.]

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Bamzai on Alexander Hamilton, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and the Creation of the United States @adityabamzai @UVALaw @HarvardJLPP

Aditya Bamzai, University of Virginia School of Law, has published Alexander Hamilton, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and the Creation of the United States at 45 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 795 (2022). Here is the abstract.

In the period immediately preceding the Constitution’s adoption, New Yorkers engaged in a spirited debate over whether a proposed delegation from the State to the federal government authorizing collection of an impost would violate the clause of the New York Constitution that vested “supreme legislative power” in the State Assembly and Senate. Some, like Alexander Hamilton, believed that the clause did not bear on delegations to the federal government, but rather governed the relationship between the branches of the New York government. Others believed that a grant of impost authority impermissibly transferred legislative power away from the state legislature. This Article addresses the debate over delegation that occurred during this controversy—which, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, “begat” the Convention that wrote the U.S. Constitution. The Article also addresses the equally significant debates over delegation that occurred during the consideration of the Constitution itself. As this Article shows, the debates that led to and surrounded the Constitution’s adoption were in no small part debates about the legality of delegating sovereign legislative authority.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Barrett on Some Alexander Hamilton, But Not So Much Hamilton, in the New Supreme Court @CornellPress @JohnQBarrett

John Q. Barrett, St. John's University School of Law, Robert H. Jackson Center, has published Some Alexander Hamilton, But Not So Much Hamilton, in the New Supreme Court as St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20-0014. Here is the abstract.

This essay is one of thirty-five in the book Hamilton and the Law: Reading Today’s Most Contentious Legal Issues Through the Hit Musical(Cornell University Press, Lisa A. Tucker, ed., Oct. 2020). This essay considers the possibility that Hamilton: An American Musical, the sensation that has captivated so many, plus its soundtrack that plays on in our heads and on our devices, will stir and influence United States Supreme Court justices as they interpret the U.S. Constitution. Our Supreme Court justices have always been interested in the lives and the words of the Founding Fathers. For example, The Federalist essays of 1787-1788, most of them penned by Alexander Hamilton, have been cited in hundreds of Court decisions. So have other Founding-era materials, including many words from James Madison, the so-called Father of the Constitution. But as Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in the 1952 Steel Seizure Case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer), this judicial enterprise often is not illuminating—“a Hamilton may be matched against a Madison”; “Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.” When the musical Hamilton opened on Broadway in 2016, Hillary Clinton was on her way to being elected president. It was predictable that she would get to appoint new Supreme Court justices, and that they would be, as she is, inclined to read expansively the Constitution’s provisions defining national government powers. These newcomers would constitute a Supreme Court in the Hamilton era. They would see the musical, hear the songs, be stirred, and perhaps even quote from and cite to Hamilton. U.S. politics took a different path. Yes, many of the justices have seen Hamilton. More liberal, nationalistic, Alexander Hamilton-admiring justices have praised it. More conservative justices have had less to say about it. In Supreme Court decisions through June 2019, there is not much trace of Hamiltonian—forefather or modern musical—influence.

The full text is not available for download.

ICYMI: McGrath on Alexander Hamilton and the Transformation of the Common Law of Libel

ICYMI:

Paul McGrath, People v. Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the Transformation of the Common Law of Libel, 7 Judicial Notice 5 (2011). 

Lowe on Madison's Importance To the American Constitutional Tradition

Jessica Lowe, University of Virginia School of Law, is publishing Thank You, Mr. Madison in volume 53 of the Tulsa Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Alexander Hamilton may be fashionable these days, but according to two recent books, it is James Madison whom Americans should thank for — well, for just about everything. Michael Klarman’s The Framers’ Coup and Jeremy Bailey’s James Madison and Constitutional Imperfection persuasively demonstrate Madison’s centrality to the American constitutional tradition. They are very different books. Klarman’s is a sweeping and much-needed narrative history of the entire founding period, from the troubles of the 1780s through the ratification of the first amendments to the Constitution. Bailey’s is a work of political science, and focuses primarily on what came after — on the whole Madison, especially his later career — examining the difference between Madison and what has become known as “Madisonian Constitutionalism.” Both books provide critical additions to the multidisciplinary literature on the American founding, and in their own ways critique the idea of constitutional veneration Were the Framers elitist? Certainly. But maybe, instead of lamenting the Framers’ coup, we should say thank you, James Madison. Madison’s example provides an important caution about realizing the boundaries between the ideal and the possible. Today, America still has Madison’s imperfect Constitution — perhaps made more perfect by some developments in history, less perfect by others and by the passage of time. Here, a Hamiltonian solution might (ironically for an essay about Madison) be instructive. Not Hamiltonian in the 1790s sense, but in the sense of the popular twenty-first century musical: a reappropriation of America’s founding to seize the many things that it does have to say to twenty-first century America. Americans’ reverence for the founding provides a kind of shared glue, a common narrative, for the nation. This is, of course, also a problem, given the way that, as Klarman lays out, that narrative has been used at various points in American history. But perhaps the solution to that could be not to cede the ground, but to find a way to enthusiastically reclaim it.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Treanor on the Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of the Modern Theory of the Judiciary @GeorgetownLaw

William Michael Treanor, Georgetown University Law Center, is publishing The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of the Modern Theory of the Judiciary in the Cambridge Companion to the Federalist (Jack Rakove & Colleen Sheehan eds., Cambridge University Press Forthcoming). Here is the abstract.

In late May 1788, with the essays of the Federalist on the Congress (Article I) and the Executive (Article II) completed, Alexander Hamilton turned, finally, to Article III and the judiciary. The Federalist’s essays 78 to 83 – the essays on the judiciary - had limited effect on ratification. No newspaper outside New York reprinted them, and they appeared very late in the ratification process – after eight states had ratified. But, if these essays had little immediate impact – essentially limited to the ratification debates in New York and, perhaps, Virginia – they were a stunning intellectual achievement. Modern scholars have made Madison’s political and constitutional theory the great story of the Federalist, and Federalist 10, in particular, has long been “in the center of constitutional debate.” But careful study of essays 78 through 83 reveals that Hamilton had an innovative and consequential vision of the law and the judicial role that deserves at least as much attention as Madison’s contributions.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

William Baude @WilliamBaude), The First Day of Law School, and the Musical "Hamilton"

Via our friend Lyonette Louis-Jacques @LyoLouisJacques:

Professor William Baude invokes the musical Hamilton in his remarks to the University of Chicago Law School's class of 2019. 

Reid on Alexander Hamilton's Bank of the United States as the United States' First Great Constitutional Controversy

Charles J. Reid, Jr., University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), has published America's First Great Constitutional Controversy: Alexander Hamilton's Bank of the United States as U. of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-21. Here is the abstract.

This article aims at a careful reconstruction of what has been called America’s first great constitutional controversy — the 1791 debate over Alexander Hamilton’s Bank of the United States. This article reviews this debate both at the congressional level and within the executive branch. The debate over the bank led to the articulation of theories of constitutional interpretation that are with us still. On the one hand, we find theories of interpretation that stress implied constitutional powers and an expansive role for the federal government. On the other hand, we encounter theories of interpretation that emphasize limited federal authority and a preeminent role for the states. These debates included not only well known figures, such as Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, but other leading figures of the time less well known today, such as Fisher Ames, Theodore Sedgwick, and Elbridge Gerry.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Ferejohn and Hills on Publius's Political Science

John A. Ferejohn and Roderick M. Hills, Jr., both of NYU Law School, have published Publius's Political Science. Here is the abstract.

“Publius,” the collective author of The Federalist, was not just a polemicist and normative theorist but also a political scientist. We argue that the political psychology, and institutional predictions that comprise The Federalist are best understood as political science, because the predictions could be – and were – revised in light of “that best oracle of wisdom, experience” (Federalist 15). After outlining some “maintained hypotheses” about human nature that undergird The Federalist, we describe three respects in which James Madison revised, in light of post-1790 experience, Publius’ institutional predictions. The Federalist pressed the view that the national legislature would be the most powerful branch, requiring the Constitution to bolster the implied powers of the executive, limit states’ power, and dampen direct popular participation by the People themselves. After the successes of Hamilton’s initiatives demonstrated the potency of the Presidency during the 1790s, Madison radically revised all three of these institutional predictions, calling for limits on implied presidential powers, a broad construction of states’ reserved authority, and, most dramatically, popular participation through disciplined political parties. Rather than view these revisions as abandoning the political theory of The Federalist, we argue that Madison and Hamilton both retained Publius’s foundational normative assumptions, while revising their predictions about institutional behavior in light of the empirical evidence – precisely the proper response of an empirically oriented political scientist. In this sense, Hamilton’s and Madison’s post-ratification breach was less a retreat by either from Publius’ political theory and more a confirmation of the status of The Federalist as, in part, political science revised in light of political experience.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.