Lacan in Australia--Event: Reading Antigone

From William MacNeil, Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland:

I write to invite you to an upcoming theatrical performance in which I feature: a digital staging of Sophocles’ Antigone, delivered over two nights - Mon 3 August (Pt 1) & Monday 10 Aug (Pt 2) - from 7pm to 8:30pm. The cast is international and includes the following players: Stephanie Perera (Brisbane) as Antigone, Eva Sophie Reinhofer (Ireland/Germany) as Ismene, Camilo Salazar (Colombia) as Haemon and yours truly, William MacNeil, aka ‘Bill', as Creon, king of Thebes (who else?). Tickets are free, but you must register to receive the zoom log-on details. The link is supplied above. An online Q&A with the audience, actors and director will follow each performance. And not to fret if time zone differences preclude your attendance: the performances will be recorded, and these recordings will be made available in due course. If you liked Nolan’s The Odyssey, you’ll love this. Antigone is, of course, the play of law and does for jurisprudence what Oedipus Rex did for psychoanalysis. So, join us, for two evenings of high tragic drama, the play's themes directly addressing such heady - and still pertinent - topoi as the reach of the state, the role of the gods, the duty to family and the ethics of desire. Hope to see you there - and feel free to share this invitation with any interested others! [Email edited.--Ed.]

For more information, follow this link.

Accornero on The Chartered Agent: How the City of London Wrote the Legal Architecture of Agentic Commerce in 1555

Paul F. Accornero has published The Chartered Agent: How the City of London Wrote the Legal Architecture of Agentic Commerce in 1555. Here is the abstract.

The rise of autonomous AI shopping and procurement agents has reopened the debate on legal personhood for artificial intelligence. This paper argues that, for the domain of commerce, the debate is asking the wrong question. Commerce does not need AI persons; it needs chartered agents, and the legal template already exists. The paper traces a single institutional arc: from the civic autonomy of the City of London (1067, 1215), through the guild system's invention of collective non-human legal actors, to the chartering of the Muscovy Company on February 6, 1555, the first major English chartered joint-stock company. That charter solved a problem structurally identical to the one autonomous AI agents pose today: how to let a non-human construct transact, hold assets, bear obligations, and absorb liability on behalf of human principals operating in an environment that exceeds individual human capacity. The paper then connects this history to the Shopper Schism, the author's framework describing the structural disaggregation of the consumer function (retained by humans) from the shopper function (delegated to algorithms), and shows that the joint-stock company and the algorithmic shopper are two instances of the same 1 delegation architecture, applied first to the supply side of commerce and now, for the first time, to the demand side. Reviewing the legal record, including Thaler v Comptroller-General [2023] UKSC 49, Moffatt v Air Canada (2024), the CFTC enforcement action against Ooki DAO, and the Wyoming, Tennessee, and Utah DAO statutes, the paper shows that courts consistently refuse to invent AI personhood while legislatures are quietly converging on the chartered-company architecture. It concludes with a Chartered Agent framework for agentic commerce and a research agenda spanning management, law, and economic history.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

DeLoach on Antigone, Autonomy, and Higher Lawlessness

Andrew R. DeLoach, Trinity Law School, is publishing Antigone, Autonomy, and Higher Lawlessness in Law, Culture, and the Humanities. Here is the abstract.

The first surviving references to unwritten law and to autonomy come from Sophocles' Antigone. Yet legal readings of the tragedy routinely focus on the conflict between natural law and legal positivism. These readings typically assume the truth of Antigone's claim that unwritten laws require her defiance of Creon's decree. Likewise, they rarely ask whether her final argument is consistent with that claim. Antigone first appeals to the unwritten law of the gods-a Higher Law superseding a human decree. But then she changes her normative approach. Accused of acting autonomously (by her own rules), she abandons the Higher Law and appeals instead to a law she has made for herself. And it appears her claim was always rooted in autonomy. Unexplored but implied by the tragedy is the danger that appeals to Higher Law in contemporary adjudication may encourage claims based in autonomy, amounting to "Higher Lawlessness.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Call for Applications: Michele Bratcher Goodwin Fellowship in Law and Society

From the Law and Society Association:

The Law and Society Association is excited to continue the work of the Michele Bratcher Goodwin Fellowship in Law and Society, an initiative designed to deepen graduate student engagement in the Association’s work and Global Meeting planning, while offering valuable professional development and mentorship opportunities. We are now accepting applications for two graduate student fellows to begin a two-year term during Fall 2026. This is a unique opportunity to gain hands-on experience in academic conference planning, strengthen your service portfolio, and receive mentorship from senior members of the LSA community. Program Benefits and Goals Gain direct experience in academic conference planning. Serve as full members of the Program Committee. Build leadership skills and develop as future LSA leaders. Receive mentorship from senior LSA members and staff. Contribute to the continuity and institutional memory of the Program Committee by mentoring incoming fellows during your second year. Receive a $2,000 annual stipend Receive up to $750 to help offset travel to the Global Meeting on Law and Society Eligibility Advanced PhD or JD students who have completed coursework in law and society or related fields. Prior engagement with LSA (e.g., Annual Meeting attendance, CRN participation) is preferred. Applicants should be available to serve a two-year term beginning in Fall 2026. Fellow Responsibilities Collaborate with the Program Committee and LSA staff on Global Meeting on Law and Society planning. Participate in Program Committee meetings and support key planning decisions. Review submissions and assist in panel formation. In their second year, help mentor and onboard new Fellows. Application Process Fellows will be selected through a competitive application process reviewed by the LSA President, Program Chair(s), and Executive Officer. Applications are due by August 24th, 12PM Eastern (US). Please upload a combined pdf that includes an updated CV and a letter of interest. Please include contact information for two faculty members at the end of your letter of interest. For questions, please contact lsa@lawandsociety.org.

Gilly on The Corporate Villainy of Tom Sawyer: Manufactured Scarcity, the Ethics of Attention, and the Literary Prehistory of Dark Patterns

Travis Gilly, Real Safety AI Foundation, has published The Corporate Villainy of Tom Sawyer: Manufactured Scarcity, the Ethics of Attention, and the Literary Prehistory of Dark Patterns. Here is the abstract.

The whitewashing scene in Mark Twain's The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876) is conventionally received in one of two ways: as a comic illustration of the malleability of value, the reading made canonical in behavioral economics by Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2006), or as a celebration of the boyish individualist, the reading carried into popular culture by works such as Rush's 1981 song of the same name. This paper proposes a third reading. It argues that the scene is the earliest structurally complete literary rendering of the design logic now catalogued under the heading of dark patterns: manufactured scarcity, engineered desire, and the extraction of value from a manipulated audience. On this reading Tom is not a charming rascal but the prototype of the engagement designer who optimizes a system against the people inside it. The paper distinguishes two ethics of gamification, the earned, in which an activity is genuinely made worth doing and the designer participates in it, and the engineered, in which desire for access to a hollow good is manufactured and the designer abstains, and it proposes the designer's own abstention, the refusal to consume the product, as a diagnostic of the engineered kind. Locating the reading within the ethics of attention and persuasive design (Fogg, 2003; Verbeek, 2011; Williams, 2018) and the dark patterns literature (Brignull, 2010; Mathur et al., 2019), it contends that the fence is not a quaint antecedent but a working model of contemporary attention capture, and that the uniformly admiring reception of Tom is itself evidence of how thoroughly the culture has naturalized the extractor as hero. It closes on the irony that Twain, who coined the term Gilded Age and named the capitalist as the oppressor, narrated the con as cleverness and never marked it as harm.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Call For Papers, 27th International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law

From Anne Wagner, research Associate Professor, Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale (CGU Calais)

Call for Papers – 27th International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law (IRSL 2027)

The Faculty of Law and Administration at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków is pleased to host the 27th International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law (IRSL) from 30 June – 2 July 2027.

Theme:
Methodology of Semiotics of Law: How and Why We Do It the Way We Do and How Can We Do It Better?

This congress invites scholars to reflect on the methodologies that shape research in the semiotics of law, exploring both established practices and innovative directions for future inquiry. Contributions are welcome on a broad range of topics, including methodological foundations, interdisciplinarity, quantitative and qualitative approaches, relationships with legal theory and sociology, the impact of semiotics of law on legal institutions, and methodological challenges in ongoing research.

📅 Important Dates

• Abstract submission deadline: 15 January 2027
• Notification of acceptance: 15 February 2027
• Congress dates: 30 June – 2 July 2027

📍 Venue
Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

📄 Submissions should include:

• Title of the proposed paper
• Abstract (up to 300 words)
• Five keywords
• Author information (affiliation and official email)

Selected papers will be considered for publication in a Special Issue of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law or in an edited volume.

For full details and submission information, please visit:
https://link.springer.com/journal/11196/updates/52934494

We warmly encourage researchers, academics, and practitioners interested in the semiotics of law to join us in Kraków for this important international gathering.

 

Available Soon From NYU Press: Law, Narrative, Narratology: Interdisciplinary Essays (Greta Olson and Simon Stern, editors)

Soon available for purchase: Law, Narrative, Narratology: Interdisciplinary Essays (Greta Olson and Simon Stern, eds., New York University Press, 2026). Due in August.

Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.

Explores the diverse applications of narrative in law beyond the courtroom, from client-lawyer interactions to legal decisions Once regarded by law professors as serving an ornamental purpose in legal argumentation, narrative has gained an increasingly prominent role in legal scholarship. Yet while scholars have examined the many functions and effects of narrative in legal decisions, courtroom arguments, and the stories we tell about the law, research on law and narrative has generally limited its focus to the most overtly noticeable place for narrative in legal writing—the factual material presented in trials. Law, Narrative, Narratology explores legal narrative in a variety of contexts, including pre-trial litigation, trial argument-framing, legal decisions, human rights law, media reports on court cases, and work advocating for legal change. Taking a comparative approach to the intersections of law, narrative, and narratology, contributors consider various “narrators” of law to make sense of areas of legal argumentation beyond the current scope of narratological-legal research. By examining topics ranging from the distinction between a story’s narrative and its discourse to the use of narrative perspective, the essays in this volume illuminate the techniques legal actors use to craft stories, as well as the narrative arcs their interlocutors inhabit. Editors Greta Olson and Simon Stern have cultivated a collection of essays by global legal and narrative scholars, allowing the volume and its contributors to assess an array of narratological issues across national and international boundaries, and civil and criminal law contexts. Offering a fresh analysis of narrative’s uses in the law, Law, Narrative, and Narratology provides a needed expansion of the study of narrative across the justice system.

 

Portuondo on What Personhood Means

Laura Portuondo, University of Houston Law Center, has published What Personhood Means at 124 Mich. L. Rev. 1303(2026). Here is the abstract.

What would it mean for the Supreme Court to recognize the constitutional personhood of prenatal life? Many assume the answer is clear: a nationwide abortion ban. Professor Mary Ziegler’s new history of the prenatal personhood movement, Personhood: The New Civil War over Reproduction disrupts this assumption. Ziegler shows how antiabortion advocates, who have long agreed that prenatal life should have rights, have never agreed about what exactly those rights are or what it would look like to enforce them. By illustrating the vagueness of personhood arguments, Personhood reveals a new path to resist them: specific doctrinal analysis of what personhood entails. This Review engages in the concrete doctrinal analysis that Personhood invites. Such analysis reveals serious problems with a wide range of claims about what personhood requires. While personhood advocates assert that recognizing prenatal personhood would mandate meaningful protection of prenatal life under the Fourteenth Amendment, the reality is that contemporary Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence extends little meaningful protection to most people. Few liberty and equality protections, that is, follow from the status of personhood. The doctrinal weakness of personhood arguments reveals a subtle unifying thread in the fractious movement history that Ziegler documents: all personhood arguments are calls for constitutional change. Contemporary personhood advocates seek to extend protections to prenatal life that are—and are likely to remain—unavailable to women, people of color, and other vulnerable Americans. Calls for prenatal personhood should thus be understood as calls to entrench a deeply unequal constitutional future.

Download the book review from SSRN at the link.

Ablavsky on State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: A History

Gregory Ablavsky, Stanford Law School, is publishing State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: A History in volume 133 of the Virginia Law Review. Here is the abstract.

In Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta (2022), the Supreme Court dismantled the long-standing black-letter principle that states lack criminal jurisdiction in Indian country absent congressional authorization by embracing a revisionist historical account emphasizing inherent state sovereignty. The consequences have been predictable: intense uncertainty and ongoing litigation. Oklahoma’s highest courts, for instance, have repeatedly endorsed inherent state jurisdiction over Native people within Indian country, employing Castro-Huerta to distinguish considerable contrary federal law and precedent. The challenge, especially given the current history-minded judiciary, is that the claim that states have never asserted inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indian country is too simplistic and easily disproven, making it tempting to toss out the old rules. But the revisionist claim, advanced by some scholars and embraced by Justice Thomas, that states enjoyed expansive criminal jurisdiction, is also wrong. This Article attempts to offer a more rigorous legal history, moving beyond the handful of Supreme Court decisions to survey every identifiable state and federal case on inherent state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. It depicts four distinct periods: an initial headlong assault on federal authority (1787–1834) ; an era of "great confusion" in which states pressed on the many uncertainties of federal Indian law (1835–1886) ; the jurisdictional chaos of the allotment era (1880s–1930s); and a period of relative statutory stability (1948–2022) that Castro-Huerta has now abruptly terminated. What this history shows above all is contestation—a cat-and-mouse game in which states seized on ambiguities to claim authority, only to be periodically rebuffed by the federal courts. But the mere existence of past conflict does not support broader state jurisdiction in Indian country. Rather, every conventional method of legal and constitutional interpretation undercuts the argument that such jurisdiction was ever meaningfully positive law. There are also strong normative reasons for skepticism, since state claims of authority were rarely motivated by public safety but were instead tools to facilitate Native dispossession and erode tribal self-governance. By recounting these complexities, the Article challenges the current legal instability that threatens the foundations of modern tribal sovereignty.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Green on What the Declaration Didn't Do

Jonathan Green, University of Florida College of Law, is publishing What the Declaration Didn't Do in volume 101 of the Notre Dame Law Review. Here is the abstract.

What did the Declaration of Independence do? Today, the Declaration figures in our "constitutional memory" as the text that created the United States, and that set out the essential principles that define us as Americans. But when the Declaration first appeared, neither of those claims was self-evident. Whether the Declaration actually created thirteen "Free and Independent States" on July 4, 1776, turned on whether, before 1776, Britain's American colonies had their own constitutional rights against the Crown--that is, corporate rights that were conceptually severable from the rights of their English contemporaries. Because that question was essentially insoluble, the Declaration's legal effects weren't clear in 1776. By extension, whether there were an independent, self-directing American "People"--one that could corporately agree to a set of shared principles and announce them in the Declaration--wasn't clear either. Bringing the Declaration's initial indeterminacy back into view, I argue, illustrates how our memories of the past sometimes diverge from our history. We can choose to be ruled by myths, if we want. But we shouldn't fool ourselves into conflating the past we'd prefer with the one we actually have. 

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Spitzer on The Historic Regulation of "Unusual" Weapons

Robert J Spitzer, SUNY Cortland; College of William & Mary School of Law, has published The Historic Regulation of “Unusual” Weapons. Here is the abstract.

Is the AR-15 assault-type rifle an “unusual” gun? This might seem an amorphous or subjective question, but considerable effort has been expended to address a question very similar to this: namely, whether assault weapons are in “common use” in America today. The prodigious debate over this otherwise arcane and indisputably ambiguous question has become central to court determinations of whether civilian possession and use of assault weapons and other guns is or is not protected under the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms. This “common use” standard appeared in the Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling in D.C. v. Heller, the case that established a right of citizens to have guns for personal self-defense under the Second Amendment. In overturning the District of Columbia’s then-strict law, the court concluded that handgun possession should be protected because such guns were in “common use” as they were “overwhelmingly chosen by American society” for self-protection. The Heller court plucked the “common use” phrase from a 1939 Supreme Court case, U.S. v. Miller. An examination of America’s history of weapons regulations reveals that efforts to restrict “unusual” weapons is nothing new. This paper explores a variety of old weapons laws that imposed an array of restrictions on certain unusual types or categories of weapons, precisely on the grounds that they posed a threat to public safety and good order, or were of little use for conventional weapons-related activities. The old types of weapons and related technologies examined here include trap guns, punt/pivot/swivel guns, consideration of ghost guns, and switchblades. This analysis will shed important light on the contemporary legal and political struggle over modern weapons restrictions.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Smith and Chang on Stravinsky's National Anthem

Michael L. Smith, University of Oklahoma College of Law, and Yoo Jung Chang, Quad City Symphony Orchestra, have published Stravinsky's National Anthem.

In January 1944, famed composer Igor Stravinsky was scheduled to conduct the Boston Symphony Orchestra in performing his controversial arrangement of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Before the performance took place, the police arrived in Stravinsky’s dressing room and informed him that his arrangement violated a Massachusetts law against altering the national anthem. Faced with the prospect of a criminal violation, and with the police already removing the offending arrangement from the music stands, Stravinsky opted to conduct the traditional version of the anthem. This Article takes a deep dive into Stravinsky’s distinctive anthem arrangement, surveying its development, performance, and reception. Along the way, we dig into Massachusetts’s anthem restriction—a 1917 law that remains on the books to this day. In doing so, we address the parallels between the law’s wartime development and its wartime enforcement against Stravinsky. We argue that Stravinsky’s run-in with the police was unwarranted, both because Stravinsky’s arrangement did not violate the statute, and because the statute itself ran afoul of the First Amendment. Our historical investigation and analysis shed light on modern issues, including the phenomenon of patriotic outrage, the role of moral panic in the development and enforcement of the law, and the dangers of leaving unconstitutional zombie laws on the books.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Hoffheimer on Home of the Brave, Land of the Free: The Star-Spangled Banner's Contested History

Michael H. Hoffheimer, University of Mississippi School of Law, is publishing Home of the Brave, Land of the Free: The Star-Spangled Banner's Contested History in volume 2 of the Nebraska Journal of Advancing Justice (Spring 2026).

This Essay reviews the history of the composition, revision, and reception of The Star-Spangled Banner, It documents how generations of Americans have contested multiple aspects of the song that would become the national anthem from its musical sources to its title, meaning, and standards of performance. Controversies over the song's symbolic value peaked during the struggle to abolish slavery, the movement for civil rights, and protests by athletes taking the knee in response to continuing repression and abuse of African Americans. Drawing on abolitionist literature, the autobiography of Frederick Douglass, songs by Lead Belly, and speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., the Essay shows that the phrase "land of the free" provoked emotional reactions that veered from dismissing the words as hypocritical to embracing them as aspirational.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Mahardhika on The Spirit Before Law: A Philosophical Reconstuction of Javanese Spirits as Sacral Social Control

Jimmy Mahardhika, Inspired Research Collective, has published The Spirit Before Law: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Javanese Spirits as Sacral Social Control. Here is the abstract.

Javanese spirits function as pre-juridical institutions of sacral social control. Their philosophical significance lies in the claim that normativity can be topographical: place itself can command before law speaks. In the Javanese spirit-world, authority is not only spoken by elders, written into rules, or centralised in institutions; it is distributed across houses, graves, trees, watersources, village boundaries, forests, mountains, ritual sites, and zones felt as angker. Dhanyang, cikal-bakal, punden, ancestral guardians, and village rituals organise conduct by transforming space into obligation, ancestry into authority, ecological boundaries into moral limits, invisible sanction into self-regulation, and sacred atmosphere into social compliance. The method is structural-philosophical reconstruction rather than empirical genealogy: the central question is not what Javanese spirits are believed to be, but what they do as structures of normativity. Internal Javanese vocabularies—rasa, pamali, kualat, laku, eling-waspada, memayu hayuning bawana, and jagad cilik–jagad gedhe— ground the analysis in local categories while preserving its philosophical scope. Sacral social control is distinguished from Durkheim’s general theory of the sacred by specifying the mechanisms through which sacred force becomes operational: spatialised authority, atmospheric prohibition, ritual mediation, ecological hesitation, cultivated rasa, fear of kualat, and the threshold at which communal order becomes domination through monopoly of interpretation. The question is not whether spirits exist, but what kind of world becomes possible when land, ancestors, places, and prohibitions are experienced as watched, inherited, and dangerous.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Segarra on Tattoos and the Unreasonable Logic of Reasonable Suspicion

Curtis Segarra, University of Michigan Law School, is publishing Tattoos and the Unreasonable Logic of Reasonable Suspicion in volume 63 of the Criminal Law Bulleting. Here is the abstract.

The U.S. is a tattooed nation, with nearly a third of the population sporting at least one tattoo. Yet law enforcement regularly uses tattoos in their justification to stop, question, pat down, and briefly detain individuals under the Terry—or reasonable suspicion—doctrine, often claiming the tattoos are gang related or indicate criminal involvement. Through interviews and case examples, I argue that such practices can lead to racialized and biased policing. Even when law enforcement interpretations of tattoos do not quite amount to biased policing, they still run afoul of the original logic of Terry, the case that created the reasonable suspicion doctrine. Given the prevalence of tattoos in the U.S., this misuse of Terry goes against the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, I argue that courts should employ a bright-line rule against the use of tattoos in the law enforcement reasonable suspicion analysis. This fills a gap in the existing literature (which focuses primarily on the use of tattoos within gang databases) by arguing for a strengthening of Fourth Amendment protection for all tattooed individuals. I show that a bright-line rule would not improperly hinder police officers' ability to do their jobs and that such a rule is consistent with similar prohibitions courts have placed on the use of race within the reasonable suspicion framework. I conclude that the use of tattoos in law enforcement's reasonable suspicion analysis is ripe for abuse and must be checked by a judicial bright-line prohibition on the use of tattoos to justify an intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, thereby addressing a growing, but under-appreciated, problem developing in American policing.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Shih-Chun Steven Chien on Cultivating Sense: Cultural Change in the Prosecutor's Office

Shin-Chun Steven Chien, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, School of Law, has published Cultivating Sense: Cultural Change in the Prosecutor's Office. Here is the abstract.

Prosecutors exercise broad discretion. They are widely viewed as the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system. To date, studies on prosecutors in different jurisdictions have largely focused on how to conceptualize, manage, and eventually control the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Scholars have recently turned their attention to the importance of internal organizational management and leadership’s role in changing office culture as a means to regulate prosecutorial discretion. But we have limited empirical evidence as to how changes occur within a prosecutor’s office and what precise role organizational leaders play during this process. This Article constructs a new paradigm for the understanding of cultural change within prosecutors’ offices. It reveals a troublesome paradox about modern prosecutorial power: to transform organizational culture, prosecutors need to forge a new type of power based on what I refer to as “sense-making authority.” Meanwhile, the same power enables prosecutors to create an opaque process that bypasses organizational structure and reduces external accountability. To build my theory of cultural change, I rely on a comparative case-study approach based on ethnographic research. The research sites of the Article were a group of district attorneys’ offices led by “progressive prosecutors” across the United States and a district prosecutor’s office located in a metropolitan area of Taiwan. This Article proposes a contested cultural change model and explores ways in which the model could contribute much-needed theoretical and strategic groundings to the comparative study of prosecutorial reforms across different jurisdictions.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Toussaint on Du Bois, Afrofuturism, and Constitutional Renewal

Etienne C. Toussaint, University of South Carolina School of Law, has published After the Comet: Du Bois, Afrofuturism, and Constitutional Renewal at 101 NYU Law Review 1120 (2026). Here is the abstract.

American constitutional development has long followed cycles of crisis and restoration, resisting linear narratives of progress. This pattern is especially evident in the interplay between Black protest movements and constitutional interpretation, where transformative possibilities emerge during periods of social rupture but are later constrained by institutional restoration. This Essay argues that W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1920 speculative fiction, The Comet, offers a framework for understanding these cyclical dynamics. The short story’s three-part structure—normalcy, rupture, and restoration—reveals how genuine equality surfaces during catastrophic disruption yet proves unsustainable once hierarchical “normalcy” returns. Using interdisciplinary analysis that combines legal theory, historical inquiry, and literary criticism, this Essay traces “comet cycles” within major Black protest movements from abolition to contemporary struggles. It demonstrates that literary imagination can illuminate constitutional dynamics that conventional doctrinal analysis cannot reach. Specifically, this Essay argues that Black protest movements function both as catalysts of constitutional rupture and as interpreters of constitutional possibility during suspended moments of normalcy. Examining the abolitionist era, the Civil Rights Movement, and present-day struggles through Du Bois’s framework highlights how social movements advance foundational promises of liberty and equality while revealing the fragility of constitutional gains. Even radical critiques of constitutional legitimacy often arise because movements have taken these promises seriously, exposing the inadequacy of conventional reform. This approach offers strategic insight for contemporary movements, clarifying when transformative possibilities emerge and how restoration dynamics undermine them. By centering Black lived experiences as integral to constitutional interpretation, this Essay reframes American constitutionalism as shaped fundamentally by those historically excluded from legal discourse, yet central to its most transformative moments.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Forthcoming from Yale University Press: Sergei Antonov, Russia's Rogue Masters: Elite Criminal Trials in the Age of Reform, 1866-1884

Forthcoming from Yale University Press: Sergei Antonov, Russia’s Rogue Masters: Elite Criminal Trials in the Age of Reform, 1866-1884 (to be published July 21, 2026). Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.

In this book, lawyer and historian Sergei Antonov examines the largest and most prominent criminal cases following the landmark judicial reform of 1864 that introduced the public jury trial. Each case involved elite defendants or victims: nobles, officials, and wealthy merchants. Their crimes ranged from murder and arson to fraud, forgery, and embezzlement. Antonov argues that, far from a reluctant concession of little consequence within Russia’s autocratic regime, the new courts were a crucial instrument through which the tsar and his government maintained a fragile political and social equilibrium. The new courts punished wayward elites and admonished the rest, teaching them about the limits of permissible violence, the exercise of power, and profit seeking. For the only time in Russia’s history, powerful persons could reliably expect to go on trial for major crimes, while also expecting that trial to be fundamentally fair. Moreover, for the only time in Russian history, late imperial criminal trials exposed the hidden lives of Russia’s elites to public scrutiny and discussion. But the effects of this panoptic gaze were complex and ambiguous, and the narratives produced during the trials were unintentionally ambivalent—not only about those being prosecuted, but also about the new governing regime itself.

 

Kastner on Law and Literature

Tal Kastner, Rutegers Law School, is publishing Law and Literature in the Elgar Concise Encyclopedia of Legal Theory and Philosophy (John Linarelli, ed.) (forthcoming). Here is the abstract.

Long eluding sharp definition, the interdisciplinary project of law and literature has, in recent years, evolved, expanded and flourished. Initially coalescing around scholarship concerned with ethics, hermeneutics, and narrative, law-and-literature studies have continued to develop in richness and nuance. Work in the field mobilizes varied interpretive tools to illuminate legal concepts, practices and structures along with literary and other cultural texts. Increasingly wide-ranging, scholarly approaches span temporal, geographic, cultural and social contexts. They include analyses of legal concepts through an historical lens that situates legal practices or understandings among other literary and cultural texts, mobilization of interpretive theory, philosophy and rhetoric to consider legal expression as functions of language in culture or illuminating ideologies or conflicts, and fresh readings of literature in light of legal concepts, among other interventions. With confluences among diverse methodologies and perspectives and by engaging adjacent fields, law-and-literature scholarship variously refracts the implications of law in culture and society.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Stephenson and Murphy on In the Flow: The Case for Process-Related Functionalism

Randall Stephenson and Christopher Murphy, both of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law, have published In the Flow: The Case for Process-Relational Functionalism as Max Planck Lawcast, Episode 30. Here is the abstract.

For decades, the standard method for comparing legal systems around the world has been under fire. But what if the problem isn’t the method itself, but how we’ve been using it? On this episode of the Lawcast, Randall Stephenson argues that instead of abandoning our old tools, we need to completely rethink them. By drawing on everything from ancient philosophy to quantum physics, he reimagines law not as a static museum of rules, but as a dynamic, living web of relationships. Get ready for a fascinating conversation on how we view global law.

Download the article from SSRN at the link. Link to the podcast: https://law.mpg.de/lawcast/

Aba-Namay on Legal and Administration Traditions Across Medieval Legal Cultures

Rashed M. Aba-Namay, National Law Center, has published Legal and Administrative Traditions Across Medieval Legal Cultures: Personnel Networks and Administrative Expertise Within and Beyond Norman Sicily. Here is the abstract.

How did sophisticated legal and administrative traditions travel across political and cultural boundaries before the emergence of modern bureaucracies? This article argues that answering this question requires historians to shift their attention from institutions to the experienced officials who sustained them. The movement of legal and administrative traditions across the medieval Mediterranean remains one of the least explored problems in institutional and legal history. Although historians have reconstructed the governmental structures of medieval kingdoms in considerable detail, less attention has been devoted to explaining how mature administrative traditions themselves circulated across political communities. Norman Sicily provides an exceptional setting in which to investigate this problem. Building upon the pioneering scholarship of Jeremy Johns, Hiroshi Takayama, Annliese Nef, Alex Metcalfe, and others, this article accepts the established continuity of the Sicilian royal dīwān, its multilingual documentary culture, and its sophisticated fiscal administration, while addressing a different question: if complex systems of government depended upon highly specialized officials, how did the practical knowledge embodied in those officials circulate beyond the governments in which it had originally developed? The article proposes that administrative transmission should be investigated primarily through personnel rather than institutions alone. Institutions cannot function independently of the individuals responsible for operating them. Documentary production, fiscal administration, judicial record keeping, and governmental routine depended upon experienced officials whose accumulated knowledge, professional judgment, and institutional memory were acquired through prolonged administrative service. Administrative traditions therefore travelled not merely through offices or written regulations, but through the movement of experienced personnel capable of reproducing governmental practice in new political environments. Norman Sicily illustrates this dynamic with unusual clarity. Rather than dismantling the sophisticated administrative structures inherited from earlier Islamic rule, the Norman monarchy preserved and adapted the royal dīwān, retaining its documentary culture, fiscal organization, and multilingual administrative practices. The documented career of Thomas Brun serves as the principal case study through which this methodological framework is explored. Drawing upon Jeremy Johns' reconstruction of the Sicilian dīwān together with Richard FitzNigel's Dialogus de Scaccario, the article examines Brun not as proof of the transmission of any particular institution, but as evidence that experienced administrative personnel could move between major royal governments while continuing to occupy positions requiring exceptional technical competence. The contribution of this study is methodological rather than deterministic. It does not argue that any particular legal or administrative institution passed directly from Norman Sicily to another kingdom, nor does it assume that institutional similarities necessarily demonstrate historical borrowing. Instead, it argues that questions of institutional transmission should first be investigated through documentary evidence, official careers, and personnel networks before broader conclusions concerning legal or administrative development are drawn. By distinguishing administrative continuity, personnel mobility, and institutional transmission as analytically distinct processes, this article offers a new framework for examining the circulation of legal and administrative traditions across medieval legal cultures. It further argues that the Arabic, Greek, and Latin documentary collections preserved in Palermo provide an exceptional evidentiary foundation for reconstructing the personnel networks through which governmental expertise was preserved, adapted, and circulated across the medieval world.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Anderson on The Battle for Lower Manhattan: Trinity Church versus the Bogardus Heirs

Jerry L. Anderson, Drake University Law School, has published The Battle for Lower Manhattan: Trinity Church versus the Bogardus Heirs. Here is the abstract.

The descendants of Dutch colonists fought for over two centuries to reclaim title to sixty-two acres in lower Manhattan, granted by England to Trinity Church in 1705. The battles, both physical and legal, reached a climax in the mid-1800s, when New York's highest court ruled for Trinity in a series of cases. The rulings relied on Trinity's lengthy possession of the tract, illustrating how adverse possession in early American history helped create the certainty of title necessary for economic development.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Call For Papers, Law and Cultural Production

From Amy Kellam, IALS, University of London:

A month ago, I shared the call for papers for a special section of Amicus Curiae on Law and Cultural Production. I wanted to follow up as the abstract deadline of 15 July 2026 approaches. I am particularly keen to hear from scholars working on: • Law & Cultural production in the digital environment (platform labour, cognitive capitalism, and the political economy of creative work) • Critical theories of authorship, originality, and the work as a legal category For reference, the full call encompasses the following: From the economics of creative labour to the ownership of cultural heritage, from the philosophical foundations of property to the practical realities of copyright in a digital age, law is woven into almost every dimension of cultural production. This special section invites contributions that explore these intersections from a legal perspective, whether doctrinal, historical, philosophical, or interdisciplinary. Submission requirements: 300-word abstract + institutional affiliation + short biographical note Final papers: 8,000–10,000 words (including footnotes) Abstract deadline: 15 July 2026 Final papers due: 1 December 2026 Amicus Curiae is a peer-reviewed, open access journal published by the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. If you are unsure whether your work fits, please do drop me a line. I am always happy to discuss ideas informally! If you know colleagues who might be interested, I would be very grateful if you would forward this to them. All the best, Amy

Solove on Tech: The Audacity: Big Tech and the Battle for Privacy

 Daniel Solove on the tv series The Audacity, technology, and privacy. 

Call for Applications, Visiting Fellows 2027, Institute for Interdisciplinary Legal Studies, University of Lucerne

 

Call for Applications for Visiting Fellows 2027, Institute for Interdisciplinary Legal Studies, University of Lucerne

 

The Institute for Interdisciplinary Legal Studies at the University of Lucerne invites applications for our Visiting Fellows Programme 2027.

 

The fellowship programme supports junior scholars who wish to spend a period of time in Lucerne pursuing work that overlaps with or otherwise complements scholarly activities currently being pursued at the institute. During their stay, fellows enjoy access to our specialist resources, and are invited to share and develop their ideas with our community of faculty, researchers and students.   

 

Tailored to PhD candidates and postdoctoral researchers, the programme is open to all working on interdisciplinary topics at the intersections between law, the humanities and the social sciences. Focusing on critical and theoretical approaches, the institute aims to bring together a diverse group of scholars who read and think widely across fields, contexts and disciplines.

 

The deadline for submissions is 30 September 2026.

 

Further details on eligibility, application process and assessment criteria are available online at www.lucernaiuris.ch.

 

Contact: steven.howe@unilu.ch

Carbado on Can You Be Black and Teach That?

Devon W. Carbado, UCLA School of Law, is publishing Can you be Black and Teach that? in the New York University Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Notwithstanding the broad literature on race and constitutional criminal procedure, scholars have rarely engaged the epistemological burdens Fourth Amendment law imposes on Black students and faculty. Those burdens derive from a fundamental and insufficiently acknowledged disjuncture: despite the rights-protecting language in the Fourth Amendment (in particular, its prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures”), Fourth Amendment law is, for Black people, a domain of existential violence. It is Fourth Amendment law that determines when and how the police may engage us in our homes, in our cars, at school, and on our streets—and it is Fourth Amendment law that produces and governs the anti-Black border between surveillance and death. This fraught and necrological feature of Fourth Amendment law sets the doctrinal terms on which Black students must learn, and Black faculty must teach, the law. In that regard, the violence Black people encounter in the context of engaging Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is against the very Black body they occupy. This Article describes that normalized epistemological environment. One might think of the account the Article provides as a pedagogy of the Black body, or more precisely, as an articulation of what the Black body can teach us about the racialized “field of pain and death” Fourth Amendment law produces. That field includes a constitutional archive that requires Black people to learn and teach law through our legally sanctioned disposability. Fourth Amendment law is thus not merely violent in its social effects; it is epistemologically violent—and legal pedagogy is one of the sites where that violence is reproduced.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Solove on Snoopers, Peepers, and Watchers: 20+ Depictions from Legend, Literature, and Film from the 1600s to Today

From Solove on Tech: Snoopers, Peepers, and Watchers: 20+ Depictions from Legend, Literature, and Film from the 1600s to Today.

Conklin on Grandma Got Run Over By a Reindeer: An Adventure in Christmas Litigation

Michael Conklin, Texas A&M University School of Law, has published Grandma Got Run Over by a Reindeer: An Adventure in Christmas Litigation. Here is the abstract.

In 1979 a novelty Christmas song titled Grandma Got Run Over by a Reindeer was released. It recounts the fictional story of how the author’s grandmother, while inebriated, was struck and killed by Santa’s sleigh. Much less known is a follow-up song called Grandpa’s Gonna Sue the Pants Off of Santa. This song walks through the aftermath where grandma’s surviving spouse goes through the litigation process seeking compensation from Santa. The lyrics elicit discussion on numerous pressing legal issues. This Essay is a lighthearted look at what this song can teach us about the law. Though Grandpa’s litigation experience may not have brought him comfort and joy, it did gift us a sleigh full of legal insight. This Christmas season, may all your legal studies be merry and bright!

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Capers on Silencing as Blackening

I. Bennett Capers, Fordham University School of Law, has published Silencing as Blackening at 114 Georgetown Law Journal 813 (2026). Here is the abstract.

We are so accustomed to seeing defendants sit silently at criminal trials while their lawyers speak that we hardly question it. Or we tell ourselves this silence is for their own protection, part of their privilege against self-incrimination and the rules we have created for their own benefit. But what if we've gotten everything wrong? What if encouraging defendants to remain silent does not inure to their benefit at all, but to the State's? And what if this silencing is tied to race? "Silencing as Blackening" tells a fuller story about silent defendants. One, that this silence is rarely voluntary, but instead the result of a host of rules and decisions that encourage, coerce, and even compel silence. Two, although we have come to take defendants sitting silently as normal, in fact this silence is of recent origin. Three, although we claim this silence benefits defendants, the real beneficiary seems to be the State. Four, this silencing of defendants has a racial history, and today has race effects, such that we should recognize that silencing functions as a type of blackening. Rather than silencing defendants, and in effect blackening them, "Silencing as Blackening" argues we should carve out space for defendants to speak freely. And carve out space for us to listen. It argues that listening to defendants can help us rethink our entire criminal system. More ambitiously still, it argues that, just maybe, listening to defendants can help reduce racial and other biases. Can help undo race. And can help us let race go.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Upcoming Webinar: Taxation, Racial Capitalism, and the International Rule of Law: From Colonial Slavery to Global Governance

From Professor Paolo Farah, University of Tulsa School of Law: Upcoming Webinar: Taxation, Racial Capitalism, and the International Rule of Law: From Colonial Slavery to Global Governance

Taxation, Racial Capitalism, and the International Rule of Law: From Colonial Slavery to Global Governance Wednesday, July 22, 2026 12:00–1:30 PM EST Online This webinar brings into dialogue two important recent books: The Human Toll: Taxation and Slavery in Colonial America by Anthony C. Infanti (University of Pittsburgh School of Law) Racial Capitalism and International Tax Law: The Story of Global Jim Crow by Steven A. Dean (Boston University School of Law) The discussion will explore how legal and fiscal systems have historically contributed to structures of domination, exclusion, and racialized inequality, from the fiscal architecture of colonial America to the contemporary global tax order. By placing these works in conversation, the webinar examines the relationship between taxation, racial capitalism, historical injustice, and the rule of law, while reflecting on the capacity of legal institutions to address past and present inequalities. The event will be chaired by Paolo Davide Farah (The University of Tulsa College of Law), who will serve as moderator and discussant. Carliss N. Chatman (SMU Dedman School of Law) will also serve as discussant. The conversation may be of particular interest to scholars working in taxation, international law, comparative law, legal history, civil rights, critical legal studies, race and the law, socio-economics, political economy, international human rights, and related fields. Participation is free and open to all. Registration: https://lnkd.in/dMhpmbda Additional information: https://lnkd.in/dqAu24sr I would be most grateful if you could share this announcement with any colleagues who may have an interest in these topics. With best wishes, Paolo Paolo Davide Farah Chair, ESIL Interest Group on European and International Rule of Law Professor Paolo Davide FARAH, PhD University of Tulsa, College of Law 3120 East Fourth Place Tulsa, OK 74104 https://paolofarah.com/ https://paolofarah.wordpress.com/ papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=629289

Savage on Slavery and the Myth of Religious Liberty

Audra Savage, Wake Forest University School of Law, has published Slavery and the Myth of Religious Liberty at 51 BYU Law Review 1363. Here is the abstract.

This is a story about two ships. One is semi-mythical. The other is half-forgotten but brutally real. The first ship is the story of early settlers who sailed from Europe to escape religious persecution and—through hard work, perseverance, and righteous rebellion—built a nation upon the fundamental freedom of religious liberty for all. The second ship represents the painful history of America, with its millions of Africans stolen from their homeland, placed in unimaginable conditions, and stripped of their language, heritage, and most significantly, their beliefs. Current religious liberty jurisprudence centers around the historical understanding of the creation and ratification of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which encapsulates the mythology of the first ship. This jurisprudence, however, seemingly ignores the second ship and the Black experience with law and religion in the country’s early history. This reveals a gap in the myth of religious liberty that has influenced the Supreme Court’s adjudication of constitutional claims related to the First Amendment Religion Clauses. This Article provides the missing gap in the Court’s religious liberty story by exploring the historical role played by law and religion in the development of slavery in America. It describes the legal and religious understandings of Africans in early colonial history, including the justification for marking Africans for enslavement. It ends with insight into the countervailing forces of establishing slavery while disestablishing religion at the time the new nation was created. By providing this missing gap in the religious liberty story, the Article ensures that the first ship is less mythical and more real, while also ensuring that the second ship is not forgotten and takes its rightful place in church-state history.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Published at ContractsProf Blog: Guest Post by Sid DeLong on Legal Fictions

Sid DeLong on Legal Fictions: A Guest Post. Published at ContractsProf Blog.

Fernandez-Lopez on Turandot and the Exhaustion of Power: Ritual, Genealogy, Sacrifice, and the Twilight of Civilizations

Edgar A. Fernandez-Lopez has published Turandot and the Exhaustion of Power: Ritual, Genealogy, Sacrifice, and the Twilight of Civilizations.

This article reinterprets Puccini's Turandot not as a fairy tale of feminine cruelty overcome by erotic persistence, but as a twilight drama of exhausted civilizational power. Recovering the libretto's overlooked Tartar genealogy, it argues that Calaf belongs symbolically to the very lineage of the "King of the Tartars" implicated in Turandot's ancestral wound, so that his crossing of the riddle-threshold is recognition rather than conquest. Through textual and musical analysis, and through comparison with Gozzi's Adelma, the study reclaims Liù-not Calaf-as the opera's moral center: a figure of concealed sovereignty whose gratuitous sacrifice, a love detached from possession, dissolves the sacrificial economy sustaining the imperial order. Situating the work alongside Wagnerian twilight, Shakespearean tragedy, and the Girardian theory of sacred violence, the article reads Turandot as a meditation on how civilizations perish spiritually before they perish materially-on how ritual and law outlive the meaning they once served.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Crowe on Pseudolaw, Folk Law, and Natural Law: How to Tell the Difference

Jonathan Crowe, University of Southern Queensland, School of Law and Justice, has published Pseudolaw, Folk Law and Natural Law: How to Tell the Difference. Here is the abstract.

Pseudolaw presents false or distorted, but superficially plausible, claims about legal doctrine. It is a dangerous and costly social phenomenon, with the potential to undermine social cohesion and the rule of law. Pseudolaw is dangerous, in part, because it is easily confused with two other phenomena that play important and legitimate, albeit widely overlooked, roles in legal processes: folk law and natural law. This chapter explicates the concepts of folk law and natural law, including their relationship to positive law and their place in legal decision-making. It distinguishes these concepts from pseudolaw, while also explaining why they tend to be conflated with it. I argue that folk law and natural law, properly understood, are crucial components of social cohesion and the rule of law; pseudolaw is harmful partly because it obscures and distorts the proper task of these notions in supplementing positive legal enactments.

Download the chapter from SSRN at the link.

Schultz on Acts of Truth: Emotions and the Validation of Legal Knowledge

Thomas Schultz, King's College London, University of Geneva, has published Acts of Truth: Emotions and the Validation of Legal Knowledge. Here is the abstract.

Legal scholarship presents itself as an exercise in reason: the scholar elucidates, weighs the sources, follows the argument, emotions left at the door. This Article argues that the pose is false, and consequentially so. Emotions shape not only the margins of scholarship-the topics we choose, the tone of our debates, the schools we form-but they also reach all the way into what we take to be legally valid and true. Building on Pierre Schlag's account of the aesthetics of law and on work in psychology and the philosophy of mind on the role of emotion in cognition, the Article reframes the validation of juristic truth as the product of two emotionally laden processes: epistemic decision-making, the "acts of truth" by which a proposition is accepted as valid, and epistemic negotiation, the agreements through which a community settles what counts as known. It then identifies emotions likely at work in each-beauty, the fear of death, the fear of exclusion, the needs for recognition and for toil; and, in negotiation, appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role-arguing that they carry ontological weight, helping to constitute law itself as an object of knowledge and argument. Why, then, do scholars so insistently deny them? The answer lies in a "normative alexithymia," a trained inability to read one's own emotions that leaves a community poorly equipped to see the lens through which it apprehends its object. The Article proceeds by suggestion rather than proof, aiming less to demonstrate these emotions than to make their workings visible. Its claim is that emotion has always accompanied reason in the making of legal knowledge-and that recognizing this is itself a condition of thinking well.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Giddens on Typographic Legality: The Source and Transmission of the Common Law (forthcoming from Edinburgh University Press)

Forthcoming from Thomas Giddens, Dundee Law School: Typographic Legality: The Source and Transmission of the Common Law (Edinburgh University Press). 

From the publisher's website: 

The typographic form of judgment stages the authoritative presence of the common law. It is in the encounter with typographic materials that legal meaning is generated, yet typographic legality—the material expression of law as visual text—is rarely examined. In this book, Thomas Giddens refocuses critical attention by studying the history of the common law’s visual technologies and unpacking the heritage, meanings and techniques of its typographic appearance. It thereby develops new methodological approaches for reading the common law’s primary materials as visual media. From the archive as a typographic theatre of jurisdiction, to early law report printing, to the mass duplication of reports and their entanglement in the project of empire, to the common law’s digital display, Typographic Legality encounters enduring questions of legal authority, media and technology in the material details of the common law’s textual form.

Thirty percent discount available with the code NEW30. 

Solove on A Century Ago, E. M. Foster's "The Machine Stops" Predicted How AI and Digital Tech Are Hollowing Us Out

From Daniel Solove's Solove on Tech:  A Century Ago, E. M. Forster's "The Machine Stops" Predicted How AI and Digital Tech Are Hollowing Us Out. 

Subscription might be required (free).

Indigenous Legal Orders, Legal Pluralism, and the Coloniality of Method Across Comparative Law, International Law, IP, and Trade Governance Webinar Now Online

News from Paolo Davide Farah, University of Tulsa College of Law: 

The webinar Indigenous Legal Orders, Legal Pluralism, and the Coloniality of Method Across Comparative Law, International Law, IP, and Trade Governance.

The webinar brought together an outstanding group of scholars to explore how Indigenous legal orders challenge dominant legal epistemologies and invite us to rethink foundational assumptions embedded within international law, comparative law, intellectual property, cultural heritage governance, technology governance, development, and global governance more broadly.

I was happy to moderate and contribute to the discussion featuring:

• Professor Chidi Oguamanam (University of Ottawa)
• Professor Elena Baylis (University of Pittsburgh School of Law)
• Professor Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci (Hofstra University School of Law)
• Professor Dana G. Jones (North Carolina Central University School of Law)

The conversation addressed a range of interconnected themes, including Indigenous knowledge systems, legal pluralism, cultural heritage and repatriation, intellectual property, governance theory, artificial intelligence, structural bias, epistemic governance, and the future of global governance in an increasingly multipolar world.

Watch the Webinar Recording

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-DGGXPwRZI

Read the Full Post-Webinar Reflection

https://paolofarah.wordpress.com/2026/06/02/indigenous-legal-orders-legal-pluralism-and-the-coloniality-of-method-in-global-governance-reflections-from-the-abila-cle-webinar/

Additional Information, Speaker Biographies, and Suggested Readings

https://paolofarah.wordpress.com/2026/04/06/abila-cle-webinar-series-indigenous-legal-orders-legal-pluralism-and-the-coloniality-of-method-in-global-governance/

I hope these materials will be of interest to those working on Indigenous rights, legal pluralism, international law, comparative law, intellectual property, cultural heritage, governance, artificial intelligence, and related fields.

With best wishes,

Paolo

https://paolofarah.com/

https://paolofarah.wordpress.com/

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=629289

Princeton University Press Sale--Fifty Percent Off Many Titles

Princeton University Press is having a fifty-percent-off sale through June 9th on most of its books. Many titles of interest, but here are a few. 

Tristan G. Brown, Laws of the Land: Fengshui and the State in Qing Dynasty China.

Indira Ghose, A Defence of Pretence: Civility and the Theatre in Early Modern England.

Lynn Hunt: The Invention of Pornography.

Peter Manseau, The Jefferson Bible: A Biography.

Mazzone on The Unitary Executive and the Decisions of 1789 and 1861

Jason Mazzone, Univesity of Illinois College of Law, has published The Unitary Executive and the Decisions of 1789 and 1861 at 59 UC Davis Law Review Online 313 (2026). Here is the abstract.

Debates over the constitutional power of the President to remove executive officers are almost as old as the Republic itself. These debates continue today in the academic literature — with a vast body of writing on the constitutional basis (if any) for a presidential removal power, its scope, and the authority (if any) of Congress to regulate the power — and at the Supreme Court, which has decided a series of removal cases in recent years, and which has some removal cases on its current docket. Virtually every discussion (regardless of the conclusion reached) of the power of the President to remove executive officers invokes the so-called Decision of 1789. This Essay does also. But it focuses additionally on another important decision: that of 1861. In that year, the states that had seceded from the Union adopted their own permanent constitution. The Constitution of the Confederate States mimicked and repeated (with modifications) many of the provisions of the federal Constitution. It also included something the federal Constitution had not: a specific provision specifying the scope of the powers of the President to remove executive officers. Unusual though it might seem to turn for guidance to the Confederate Constitution — a charter written and ratified by traitors — the exercise has some payoff. It helps us identify some possible conceptions of presidential removal authority (under the federal Constitution) and to assess the relative merits of alternatives.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Hyland on "It Ends With a Lawsuit": Blake Lively v. Justin Boldoni A Mock Trial: Sexual Harassment and Defamation

William Hyland, Vernis & Bowling Law Firm, has published "It Ends With A Lawsuit": Blake Lively V. Justin Baldoni A Mock Trial: Sexual Harassment And Defamation at 32 University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 12 (2026). Here is the abstract.

It Ends With Us, adapted from Colleen Hoover’s best-selling novel about a couple in love caught in a cycle of domestic abuse, grossed more than $351 million globally upon its release in 2024. However, rumors of a feud between the co-stars took center stage. After the film debuted, Blake Lively filed a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (CRD) against Baldoni and his associates. Lively, among other legal claims, alleged sexual harassment, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Baldoni denied all allegations and filed his own defamation suit against Lively. A trial is tentatively set for May 18, 2026, in New York Federal court. This article attempts to analyze what a “mock” trial of the case would look like in Federal court, analyzing the legal allegations on both sides, the burden of proof necessary to prove the various claims, including defamation and sexual harassment, affirmative defenses, the major witnesses to be called, possible opening arguments for both sides, jury instructions, and a potential jury verdict.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Solove on Selling Privacy: A Collection of Ads for Privacy

Daniel Solove has published "Selling Privacy: A Collection of Ads for Privacy" on his Solove on Tech substack. Read the essay here.

Solove on Dangerous Oracles: Minority Report, and AI Predictions

Daniel Solove, George Washington University Law School, has published Dangerous Oracles: Minority Report, Philip K. Dick, and AI Predictions at his Substack. Here is the first paragraph of his essay.

AI predictions (or more generally known as algorithmic predictions), are becoming increasingly common. As applied to human behavior, AI predictions are deeply problematic. It’s hard to imagine a discussion about AI predictions of human behavior that doesn’t reference Minority Report. The 2002 movie by Stephen Spielberg adapts a 1956 story, “The Minority Report” by Philip K. Dick. Both of these works contribute significantly to the debate about the ethics of AI predictions of human behavior.

Download the entire essay at the link.

Little on Protecting Black Creativity: Rap Lyrics as Misused Evidence and the Case for Intellectual Property Law Reform

Shathera Little, Protecting Black Creativity: Rap Lyrics as Misused Evidence and the Case for Intellectual Property Law Reform. Here is the abstract.

This paper examines the growing use of rap lyrics as evidence in criminal proceedings and argues that such practices reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Black creative expression. Drawing on Critical Race Theory, this paper demonstrates how courts disproportionately interpret rap lyrics as literal confessions rather than artistic works, reinforcing racial bias and undermining fair trial principles. The analysis further contends that this mischaracterization exposes a gap within U.S. intellectual property law, which fails to adequately protect the contextual and expressive nature of lyrical content when it is removed from its artistic framework and repurposed as evidence. By treating rap lyrics differently from other forms of creative expression, courts effectively erode both First Amendment protections and the underlying principles of copyright law. This paper proposes a re-evaluation of evidentiary standards and calls for intellectual property law reform that recognizes rap lyrics as protected creative works, requiring courts to account for artistic context before admitting such material as evidence. In doing so, it advances a broader framework for protecting Black creativity within the legal system.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Wieboldt on Ken Kersch and the New Legal History

Dennis J. Wieboldt, III, has published Ken Kersch and the New Legal History: Beyond the Internalist/Externalist Divide at 4 J. Am. Const. Hist. 27 (2026).

The death of Kenneth Ira Kersch on November 27, 2024, was devastating to the family, friends, and students of the late Boston College political scientist. So too was Kersch’s passing a tremendous loss for scholars of American constitutionalism, many of who awaited his completion of a planned, three-volume series on the subject. But over the course of his twenty-five-year career, Ken Kersch taught his students and colleagues much about the Constitution and the culture in which that creedal document was—and is—embedded. In recognition of Kersch’s contributions to the fields of political science, history, and law, this symposium therefore brings together leading and emerging scholars in all three fields to reflect on Kersch’s legacy. To introduce this symposium, this essay first describes the methodological debates that shaped scholarly thinking around the time of Kersch’s intellectual formation as a graduate student about how best to understand the conditions under which constitutional change occurs. Then, this essay explores how Kersch’s two most well-known monographs—Constructing Civil Liberties and Conservatives and the Constitution—responded to and attempted to move beyond those debates. And in concluding, this essay identifies one enduring methodological lesson of Kersch’s “new legal history”—namely, that scholars ought to foreground the “constitutional imaginations” of the legal advocates and advocacy institutions that most directly mediate judicial decision-makers’ relationships to broader social and political movements.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.