Showing posts with label Cameras In the Courtroom. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cameras In the Courtroom. Show all posts

June 7, 2018

Marrani on Space, Time, Justice: A New Book From Routledge Publishing @routledgebooks @Doubledegree

David Marrani, Dean, Institute of Law, Jersey, has published Space, Time, Justice: From Archaic Rituals to Contemporary Perspectives (Routledge, 2018). Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.
This book merges philosophical, psychoanalytical and legal perspectives to explore how spaces of justice are changing and the effect this has on the development of the administration of justice. There are as central themes: the idea of transgression as the starting point of the question of justice and its archaic anchor; the relation between spaces of justice and ritual(s); the question of use and abuse of transparency in contemporary courts; and the abolition of the judicial walls with the use of cameras in courts. It offers a comparative approach, looking at spaces of justice in both the civil and common law traditions. Presenting a theoretical and interdisciplinary study of spaces of justice, it will appeal to academics in the fields of law, criminology, sociology and architecture.

 Space, Time, Justice: From Archaic Rituals to Contemporary Perspectives (Hardback) book cover

March 30, 2015

The Law Must Not Only Be Done, But Be Seen To Be Done

Jordan M. Singer, New England Law School, is publishing Judges on Demand: The Cognitive Case for Cameras in the Courtroom in volume 115 of the Columbia Law Review Sidebar (2015). Here is the abstract.

In 2011, the federal district courts began a pilot program to record and post full-length videos from selected civil proceedings. The program was deliberately structured to preserve the quality and integrity of ongoing adjudication. Three-and-a-half years in, the program has revealed an equally important, and unanticipated, benefit: improving the quality and integrity of future adjudication. This essay describes this second benefit and explains why the pilot program should be extended beyond its scheduled sunset in July 2015.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.




May 13, 2014

Is the Day of the Courtroom Sketch Artist Coming To An End?

From the New York Times' Opinion pages, discussion of a documentary on a courtroom sketch artist and the impact of cameras in the courtroom on his career.

Below, a short bibliography on courtroom sketch artists and the law:

Burnett, M. Dallas, The Utah Federal Court's Ban on Sketching of Courtroom Scenes, 1975 BYU L. Rev. 21.

Caffrey, Denise, United States v. CBS: When Sketch Artists Are Allowed In the Courtroom, Can 
Photographers Be Far Behind? 1975 Duke L.J. 188.

Cohen, Mark C., United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.: Courtroom Sketching and the Right To Fair Trial, 10 New Eng. L. Rev. 541 (1974/1975).

Krien, Anna, Drawn Faces, The Monthly, May, 2012.


Moran, Leslie J., Every Picture Speaks a Thousand Words: Visualizing Judicial Authority in the Press, in Intersections of Law and Culture 31 (P. Gisler, S. Steinert Borella, and C. Wiedmer, eds.; Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) (Palgrave Macmillan Socio-Legal Studies).

Stecker, Naseem, The Case of the Disappearing Courtroom Sketch Artist, Michigan Bar Journal, July 2002, at 16. 

Taylor, Karen T. Forensic Art and Illustration (CRC Press, 2001).

See U.S. v. CBS, 497 F. 2d 102 (5th Circ., (1974)) (vacating orders by the lower court that prohibited a artist employed by the network from sketching courtroom scenes and prohibited the network from publishing the artwork.

An examination of the position of the various courts on sketching suggests precisely the opposite conclusion from that reached by the Estes Court. To our knowledge, no state or federal court has prohibited the publication of sketches. Of the eighty federal district courts which have written rules, only three have provided, pursuant to a suggestion in the Kaufman Committee Report, that in certain widely publicized cases the court may direct "that the names and addresses of jurors or prospective jurors not be publicly released except as required by statute,   and that no photograph be taken or sketch made of any juror within the environs of the court." ...We express no views, of course, on the wisdom or validity of such rules, but mention them only to demonstrate that virtually no courts have found it necessary to restrict the publication of sketches. It is also significant that those jurisdictions which have regulated sketching have done so in very narrowly drawn circumstances. Even if we were to determine that sketching presented a danger sufficient to warrant a prior restraint, it is basic constitutional law that the limitation can be no broader than necessary to accomplish the desired goal. ...In the matter sub judice, even though the district court was legitimately concerned with preventing prejudicial publicity from poisoning the impartial atmosphere essential to a fair trial, we conclude that the total ban on the publication of sketches is to remotely related to the danger sought to be avoided, and is, moreover, too broadly drawn to withstand constitutional scrutiny. We hold, therefore, that the portions of the district court's orders which ban the publication of sketches are unconstitutional.
Turning now to the second issue in this appeal, we further hold that in the circumstances of this case the rule which forbids in-court sketching is also invalid. In so doing, we do not question the power of the district court to issue orders regulating conduct in the courtroom. Ordinarily the trial judge has extremely broad discretion to control courtroom activity, even when the restriction touches on matters protected by the First Amendment. ...We are unwilling, however, to condone a sweeping prohibition of in-court sketching when there has been no showing whatsoever that sketching is in any way obtrusive or disruptive. As noted earlier, some districts have adopted narrowly drawn rules applicable only to highly publicized cases. Though this is not the appropriate occasion to pass on the constitutionality of more limited restrictions, we are firmly of the view that the restraint imposed by the court below is overly broad and thus invalid.