Lawrence Russell's Culture Court website discusses film, literature, and other media that have law-related themes. Check it out here.
Love it. Samuel Brexit: Waiting For Article 50. Not Endgame Yet.
This paper argues that the central object of constitutional interpretation is the Constitution, which is an intentional lawmaking act rather than a text floating free in the world, and that the point of such interpretation is primarily to understand the meaning that those who made the Constitution intended to convey by promulgating the text in question. The paper develops these claims by way of a critique of Cass Sunstein’s recent argument that there is nothing that interpretation just is, contending that he misunderstands the way that intention works in language use in general and that the alternatives to intentionalism that he outlines each fail. The radical interpretive choice for which he argues is ruled out by the nature of the Constitution. The final part of the paper considers the various ways in which one might understand the Constitution as an object requiring interpretation and outlines the significance that this understanding has for interpretive practice.The full text is not available for download from SSRN.
Lawyers’ commodification of personal identity is nothing new. For generations now, white male lawyers have benefitted from positive racial and gender stereotypes regarding their competence and loyalty to clients and firms to secure job offers, promotions and elevated status within the profession. Yet the concept of identity capital – the value one derives from one’s personal identity – warrants attention for two related reasons. While prevalent, lawyers’ use of identity capital has historically been implicit. As explicit and visible use of identity capital grows, however, lawyers must reckon with the meaning of and consequences of using identity capital in their practice. In addition, because women and minority lawyers are increasingly criticized for undermining professional standards by actively using identity capital or by passively allowing its commodification, fairness dictates that the profession comes to terms with the relationship between merit and capital. This essay examines the commodification of women and minority lawyers’ personal identity in the context of the ongoing commodification of lawyers’ personal identity more generally. Specifically, it explores several qualities of identity capital that ought to inform both the decision-making of individual lawyers who either actively deploy it or passively tolerate its commodification by others in representing clients and of the profession as it assesses the use of identity capital by its members: inevitable and avoidable uses of identity capital, the desirability of lawyers’ commodification of personal identity, active and passive uses of identity capital, the impact of identity capital exchanges on third parties, the interplay of merit and identity capital and the appropriate terms of identity capital transactions.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
Gregory: Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention.
Holmes: To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.
Gregory: The dog did nothing in the night-time.
Holmes: That was the curious incident.
“Estragon: We've lost our rights?"Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot, Act I.
"Vladimir: We got rid of them.”