Baumgartner on The Meaning of "Reasonable": Evidence From a Corpus-Linguistic Study @UZH_ch @kneer @kevin_tobia @CambridgeUP

Lucien Baumgartner and Markus Kneer, both of the University of Zurich, Institute of Philosophy, are publishing The Meaning of ‘Reasonable’: Evidence From a Corpus-Linguistic Study in The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence (Kevin P. Tobia, ed., Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming). Here is the abstract.

The reasonable person standard is key to both Criminal Law and Torts. What does and does not count as reasonable behavior and decision-making is frequently deter- mined by lay jurors. Hence, laypeople’s understanding of the term must be considered, especially whether they use it predominately in an evaluative fashion. In this corpus study based on supervised machine learning models, we investigate whether laypeople use the expression ‘reasonable’ mainly as a descriptive, an evaluative, or merely a value-associated term. We find that ‘reasonable’ is predicted to be an evaluative term in the majority of cases. This supports prescriptive accounts, and challenges descriptive and hybrid accounts of the term—at least given the way we operationalize the latter. Interestingly, other expressions often used interchangeably in jury instructions (e.g. ‘careful,’ ‘ordinary,’ ‘prudent,’ etc), however, are predicted to be descriptive. This indicates a discrepancy between the intended use of the term ‘reasonable’ and the understanding lay jurors might bring into the court room.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Gould and Kelly Asking Who's Afraid of Imaginary Claims? Common Misunderstandings of the Origin of the Action for Pure Psychiatric Injury in Negligence 1888-1943 @OxfordLawFac

Imogen Gould, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, and Catherine Kelly, University of Bristol, have published Who’s Afraid of Imaginary Claims? Common Misunderstandings of the Origin of the Action for Pure Psychiatric Injury in Negligence 1888-1943 at 138 Law Quarterly Review 58 (2022). Here is the abstract.

Discusses, with reference to case law, common misconceptions surrounding the origins and development of the negligence action for pure psychiatric injury between 1888 and 1943, and argues that fear of imaginary or fraudulent claims was not a characteristic of early rulings. Note: Funding Information: Our research was funded by a British Academy / Leverhulme Trust Small Grant, and we are grateful for this support. Declaration of Interests: None to declare.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Stern on From Clapham to Salina: Locating the Reasonable Man @ArsScripta

Simon Stern, University of Toronto School of Law, has published From Clapham to Salina: Locating the Reasonable Man in Law & Literature (2023). Here is the abstract.

“The man on the Clapham omnibus” is an often cited but poorly understood name for the standard of reasonable care in tort. It originated in a 1903 decision in which this formula was used not to articulate a legal standard but to describe an average person whose views have no legal significance. This figure finds a cousin in another personification, as “the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn-mower in his shirt sleeves.” Both formulations have complex histories that help to underscore their inaptness as descriptors for the standard they are used to represent. These two examples also help to show, more generally, why a personified standard (“the reasonable person”) tends to introduce problems that do not arise with a more abstract one (“reasonableness,” “reasonable care”). Many critics have shown that the “reasonableness” standard is susceptible to problems of bias and framing. Personifying the standard invites the inappropriate use of individuated figures with particular features (e.g., a bus rider from a London suburb) that only worsen these problems. This article traces the history of these two standards, tries to explain how they moved from descriptive to normative use, and then turns to problems with personified standards more generally, showing how some superficially appealing reasons for using a personified standard prove to be unpersuasive.

Here is a link to the online publication.

Goold on the Lost Tort of Moral Rights Invasion @harvard_law

Patrick Russell Goold, Harvard Law School, is publishing The Lost Tort of Moral Rights Invasion in the Akron Law review. Here is the abstract.

Moral rights are often portrayed as an unwelcome import into U.S. law. During the nineteenth century, European lawmakers, influenced by personality theories of authorship, began granting authors rights of attribution and integrity. However, while these rights proliferated in Europe and international copyright treaties, they were not adopted in the United States. According to a common historical narrative, U.S. courts and lawmakers resisted moral rights because they were deemed incompatible with the copyright tradition of treating expressive works as alienable property. What little moral rights U.S. law provides today is thus seen as a necessary evil, grudgingly accepted, simply to comply with international obligations. This Article presents a history of moral rights protection that challenges, to a degree, that common historical narrative. The Article tracks how American courts adjudicated attribution and integrity disputes during the twentieth century. Doing so not only reveals that the American judiciary was more sympathetic to these claims than commonly appreciated, but, even more surprisingly, came close to developing a tort of moral rights invasion. While copyright historians know that courts have long provided proxy protection for moral rights under preexisting common law causes of action (e.g., defamation, unfair competition, privacy, etc.), what is not widely known is how frequently courts were willing to protect attribution and integrity interests directly under the banner of moral rights. This Article tells the story of how courts in the mid-twentieth century, applying state law, increasingly articulated a "sui generis tort" of moral rights invasion. It then proceeds to question why the moral rights tort stagnated and was forgotten about in the late twentieth century.

Download the article from SSRN at the link. Cross-posted to Media Law Prof Blog.

Torts In "The Great Gatsby"

Robin L. West, Georgetown University Law Center, has published Gatsby and Tort. Here is the abstract.

The Great Gatsby is filled with potential tort claims, from drunken or reckless driving to assault and battery. In a pivotal passage Nick Carraway, the narrator of The Great Gatsby, judges Daisy and Tom as “careless people,” who “destroy creatures and leave others to clean up the mess.” The carelessness, negligence, and recklessness portrayed by Fitzgerald’s characters shows an absence of due care, long regarded as the foundation for tort law. Although there are torts, tortfeasors, and tortious behavior aplenty in The Great Gatsby, the novel is void of even a mention of tort law. Why? The first part of this piece discusses tort law during Gatsby’s decade -- the beginning of the “era of automobility” -- and explains tort law’s absence from the novel: Tort law is absent from The Great Gatsby, in part, because tort law itself was dysfunctional and could not provide meaningful access to the legal system. Tort victims of automobile accidents were largely unable to access legal avenues, and recovery was hindered by a host of rules, prominently the contributory negligence system. The piece then briefly describes a reform movement, led by progressive legal realists, to replace tort recovery for automobile accidents with a no-fault compensation scheme. One consequence of that movement, I suggest, was the loss of tort law’s traditional “moral center,” the idea of the law of torts as a “law of wrongs.” The second part of the piece then discusses the costs of this change, politically and conceptually, and briefly defends traditional “wrongs” and “justice-based” tort law against compensation-minded reforms. I conclude that while the moralistic tort law of Gatsby’s era expressed plenty of blame for tortfeasors, it failed to hold them accountable, thus contributing to the death of our understanding of the law of tort as a law of wrongs -- and only partly and fitfully replaced by compensation schemes.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Misappropriation in a Hemingway Novella?

Enrique Guerra-Pujol, University of Central Florida, College of Business Administration, and Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico has published Misappropriation and The Old Man and the Sea. Here is the abstract.

We consider whether the great writer Ernest Hemingway may have committed the tort of misappropriation when he published his masterpiece “The Old Man and the Sea.” In summary, Hemingway either borrowed or stole (depending on one’s perspective) the following elements of his timeless novella: (i) the actual story itself, (ii) the “back-story” and other biographical details of the main character of the story, Santiago, as well as (iii) Santiago’s ascetic persona and physical characteristics. Although we concede that Hemingway combined these ingredients into a new and original artistic work, the question we are considering in this paper is whether Hemingway’s creative combination of such elements is enough to negate a claim of misappropriation under current U.S. or Cuban law. (We must consider Cuban law in addition to U.S. law since Hemingway lived in Havana, Cuba when he wrote and published “The Old Man and the Sea.”) That is, if Hemingway were writing “The Old Man the Sea” today, could he be liable under the common law doctrine of misappropriation or even under Cuban law?

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

George IV's "Great Matter"

Erin L. Sheley, George Washington University School of Law, is publishing Adultery, Criminality, and the Myth of English Sovereignty in volume 11 of Law, Culture, and the Humanities. Here is the abstract.

This article argues that in Britain over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the understanding of adultery as a tort was complicated by an accompanying discourse of what I will call “quasi-criminality.” Specifically — while formally trivialized — adultery remained linked to a threat to British kingship. The tension between the weight of relevant monarchical history and the absence of contemporary criminal enforcement created a new cultural narrative about adultery which attempted, itself, to serve a penal function. Examining the development of this discourse alongside the relevant law illuminates the complex social process through which public and private wrongs become distinguished — or conflated.

Download the article from SSRN at the link. 

It's Always Something: Love and Litigation At the Opera House

Sarah Lynnda Swan, Columbia University Law School, has published A New Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations: Gender and Erotic Triangles in Lumley v. Gye, in volume 35 of the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender (2012). Here is the abstract.

The tort of interference with contractual relations has many puzzling features that conflict with fundamental principles of contract and tort law. This Article considers how gender influenced the structure of the tort and gave rise to many of these anomalies. Lumley v. Gye, the English case that first established interference with contractual relations, arose from a specifically gendered dispute: two men fighting over a woman. This type of male—male—female configuration creates an erotic triangle, a common archetype in Western culture. The causes of action that served as the legal precedents for interference with contractual relations – enticement, seduction, and criminal conversation – are previous instances where the law regulated gendered triangular conflicts. Enticement prohibited a rival male from taking another man’s servant, seduction prohibited a rival male from taking another man’s daughter, and criminal conversation prohibited a rival male from taking another man’s wife. 

In Lumley v. Gye, the court expanded these precedents and created a cause of action that allowed Lumley to bring an action against his male rival for essentially “taking” his contracted female employee. The gendered basis for the tort explains its most problematic aspects, including why it imposes obligations on non-contractual parties, ignores the role of the breaching promisor in causing the wrong, and treats her as the property of the original promisee. In order to remedy these problematic features, the tort should be restructured as one of mixed joint liability. Further, damages should be limited to those available in contract.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.