Smith on Originalism and the Meaning of "Twenty Dollars" @msmith750 @uidaholaw @CreightonLawRev

Michael L. Smith, University of Idaho College of Law, is publishing Originalism and the Meaning of 'Twenty Dollars' in volume 56 of the Creighton Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Originalism claims to provide answers, or at least assistance, for those hoping to interpret a Constitution filled with wide-ranging, morally loaded terminology. Originalists claim that looking to the original public meaning of the Constitution will constrain interpreters, maintain consistency and predictability in judicial decisions, and is faithful to ideals like democratic legitimacy. This essay responds with the inevitable, tough question: whether originalism can tell interpreters what the Seventh Amendment’s reference to “twenty dollars” means—both as a matter of original meaning and for interpreters today. While this appears to be an easy question, I demonstrate that rather than telling modern legal actors what “twenty dollars” means, originalism instead leads to a range of highly divergent possibilities. The original meaning of “twenty dollars”—applied today—may mean anywhere from twenty modern dollars, to a little under four hundred dollars, to just about seven thousand dollars. In doing so, I illustrate high-level debates between originalists and their critics, and how these debates tend to stray away from the needs of actual actors. Originalist appeals to construction and distinguishing semantic and legal meaning are cold comfort to the hapless attorney or judge who just wants to know what “twenty dollars” means. Moreover, if originalism cannot tell modern legal actors what “twenty dollars” means, there’s little hope that it will provide meaningful assistance in resolving questions over broader, loaded terms like “due process,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” “equal protection,” and other provisions that draw the bulk of scholarly attention and constitutional litigation.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Kent on The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era

Andrew Kent, Fordham School of Law, is publishing The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era in volume 91 of the Southern California Law Review. Here is the abstract.

This article contributes to several debates and literatures, which have not previously been all linked together: the history of the jury in the United States, the nature of U.S. imperialism and colonial governance in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and Progressive era legal reform. The story starts with the Insular Cases — landmark Supreme Court decisions from the early twentieth century holding that jury rights and some other constitutional guarantees did not apply in Puerto Rico and the Philippines until and unless Congress had taken decisive action to "incorporate" the territories into the union. The conventional wisdom among scholars is that the Supreme Court in these decisions shamefully ratified the U.S. government's discrimination and domination over the peoples of newly-acquired colonies. Racism and cultural chauvinism are blamed as primary causal factors. The article shows that Congress, the executive, the courts, and local legislatures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico granted almost every single right contained in the Constitution to the territorial inhabitants, with the exception of the jury. So while deep, institutional racism was certainly present and causally important, it is also true that U.S. governance in the territories was not a project of wholesale discrimination. Motivations, goals, and outcomes were complex. Protection of rights of local inhabitants was a key concern of U.S. policymakers. But the jury was considered a unique case, different than other rights. To understand why the jury was thought uniquely unsuited for the new U.S. colonies, this article fills out a largely overlooked history of the jury in the mainland United States during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Most histories of the jury skip from the adulation of the institution at the Founding, to the Warren-Burger Courts' decisions over 150 years later that racial and gender discrimination in jury service were unconstitutional and that the criminal petit jury was a fundamental right. It turns out that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw severe criticism of the jury by elite lawyers, the newly-created bar associations in big cities, the reformist popular press, and progressive movement leaders. Many states cut back on jury rights at the time. And the Supreme Court held then that states should not be forced to "straight jacket" themselves (in the Court's words) to the common law procedure of old England that was found in the Bill of Rights, but should be free to experiment to create more efficient criminal and civil procedure. Leaders of the anti-jury reform movement in the United States were also leading policymakers for colonial issues in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, notably William Howard Taft. Many of the same arguments against the jury were made in both contexts. Linking the anti-jury movement to the legal and political decision-making about governance of the new territories helps enrich our understanding of both.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Banks on Civil Trials in Popular Culture

Taunya Lovell Banks, University of Maryland School of Law, is publishing Civil Trials: A Film Illusion? in the Fordham Law Review. Here is the abstract.

The right to trial in civil cases is enshrined in the United States Constitution* and most state constitutions. Most people, laypersons and legal professionals alike, consider trials an essential component of American democracy. But real life civil trials are disappearing from the American legal landscape. Films, like books designed for consumption by the general public, are cultural documents that embody a society’s attitudes about and views of the law and the legal system. Courtroom films are the most easily recognizable and popular subset of films about law because they provide the stage for an examination of some aspect of a trial — juries, lawyers, litigants, laws or the legal process itself. Some legal commentators contend that legal films have the capacity to teach and encourage film audiences to think more critically about the legal system. But most trial films involve criminal cases. Thus this essay asks whether the distinction between criminal and civil films trials is important when determining the impact of the decline in real-life civil trials on American popular culture and courtroom films in particular. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.