Barrett on Felix Frankfurter, Collector of People @JohnQBarrett @StJohnsLaw @TouroLawReview

John Q. Barrett, St. John's University School of Law; Robert H. Jackson Center, is publishing Felix Frankfurter, Collector of People in volume 39 of the Touro Law Review (2024). Here is the abstract.

This essay is part of the Touro Law Review symposium issue, “The Life, Work & Legacy of Felix Frankfurter.” It grew out of Touro Law School’s April 19, 2023, Frankfurter conference, which was inspired by Brad Snyder’s publication of the biography Democratic Justice: Felix Frankfurter, the Supreme Court, and the Making of the Liberal Establishment. This essay describes how Felix Frankfurter engaged, intensely, with people—they were the treasures that he hunted down, evaluated, and collected. It considers some of Frankfurter’s most treasured people. One group is people who made Frankfurter, including Henry L. Stimson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Another group is Justice Frankfurter’s three great U.S. Supreme Court colleagues: Justices Hugo L. Black, Robert H. Jackson, and William O. Douglas. A third group is biographers who Frankfurter admired and pushed: Harlan Buddington Phillips, Mark DeWolfe Howe, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, Alexander M. Bickel, Andrew L. Kaufman, and Philip B. Kurland. Biographer Brad Snyder has, by himself collecting Frankfurter and portraying him so fully and so well, brought his people-collecting into focus. I hope that Snyder’s biography stimulates others to study Frankfurter, to recover his stolen papers, to write more about him, to publish more of his writings, and to live people-filled lives. The Touro Law Review Frankfurter symposium issue includes, in addition to my essay, this superb content: an introduction by Rodger Citron, conference organizer; a keynote address by Frankfurter biographer Brad Snyder; and essays and articles by Judge Jed S. Rakoff, R.B. Bernstein, William E. Nelson, Helen J. Knowles-Gardner, and Dalia Tsuk.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Bradley and Siegel on Madisonian Liquidation and the Originalism Debate @curtisabradley @NeilScottSiegel

Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel, both of Duke University School of Law, have published Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate as Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2019-15. Here is the abstract.

The U.S. Constitution is old, relatively brief, and very difficult to amend. In its original form, the Constitution was primarily a framework for a new national government, and for 230 years the national government has operated under that framework even as conditions have changed in ways beyond the Founders’ conceivable imaginations. The framework has survived in no small part because government institutions have themselves played an important role in helping to fill in and clarify the framework through their practices and interactions, informed by the realities of governance. Courts, the political branches, and academic commentators commonly give weight to such post-Founding governmental practice in discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers. That approach has been referred to as the “historical gloss” method of constitutional interpretation, based on language that Justice Frankfurter used to describe the concept in his concurrence in the Youngstown steel seizure case. Some originalist commentators, however, have advanced a potentially competing approach to crediting post-Founding practice, which they refer to as “liquidation,” an idea that they ascribe to James Madison and certain other members of the Founding generation. To date, there has not been any systematic effort to compare gloss and liquidation, even though the differences between them bear on the constitutionality of a range of governmental practices relating to both domestic and foreign affairs in the fields of constitutional law and federal courts. This Article fills that gap in the literature. We first provide an account of what must be shown in order to establish historical gloss. Our account focuses on longstanding governmental practices that have proven to be stable—that is, practices that have operated for a significant amount of time without generating continued inter-branch contestation. We then consider the extent to which the liquidation concept differs from that of gloss and whether those differences render liquidation more or less normatively attractive than gloss. We argue that a narrow account of liquidation, offered by Professor Caleb Nelson, most clearly distinguishes liquidation from gloss, but that it does so in ways that are normatively problematic. We further argue that a broader account of liquidation, recently offered by Professor William Baude, responds to those normative concerns by diminishing the distinction between liquidation and gloss, but that significant differences remain that continue to raise normative problems for liquidation. Finally, we question whether either scholar’s account of liquidation is properly attributed to Madison.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Green on Constitutional Truthmakers @olemisslaw

Christopher R. Green, University of Mississippi School of Law, has published Constitutional Truthmakers. Here is the abstract.

Many disputes in constitutional theory — in particular, disputes over forms of originalism and non-originalism — would be far clearer if they employed two distinctions that philosophers have drawn repeatedly in dealing with the nature of reality. First, we should distinguish constitutional epistemology from constitutional ontology. Constitutional epistemology (together with epistemically-freighted constitutional pragmatics) tells us who decides questions of constitutional interpretation: the distribution of interpretive authority between government and citizens, between and within branches of government, and for all of these interpreters, the distribution of such authority over time. It tells us what burdens of proof govern different interpreters’ determinations, and what sorts of evidence might satisfy those burdens. Akin to the Erie/Hanna regime, such “procedural” matters of constitutional epistemology and pragmatics could be changed radically even if the underlying “substance” of constitutional interpretation — what makes claims about the Constitution true or false — stays the same, and vice-versa. Attention to this epistemic-ontological distinction undermines or complicates recent arguments against originalism by Richard Fallon, Daniel Farber, Martin Flaherty, Helen Irving, Andrew Koppelman, Suzanna Sherry, and David Strauss, as well as a classic argument by Justice Jackson, but also raises trouble for arguments for originalism by the late Justice Scalia and Lawrence Solum. Epistemic vices of either a fixed-meaning or a common-law Constitution cannot undermine a constitutional theory’s ontological virtue — if it possesses it — of accurately representing our actual Constitution, and epistemic virtues cannot compensate for the ontological vice of wrongly identifying the Constitution itself. Second, as a precursor to assessing constitutional theories’ ontological virtues, we should classify forms of originalism or non-originalism based on their constitutional truthmakers. Do they have any at all? Do they have more than one? Pragmatists deny the existence of any truthmaker external to the practice of judging, while pluralists point to more than one. Truthmakerless constitutional theories like those of Judge Posner, Eric Segall or the early Felix Frankfurter cannot vindicate “wrong the day it was decided” (WTDIWD) data from the Court itself, and irreducibly plural constitutional theories like those of Philip Bobbitt cannot vindicate such data in cases where constitutional modes conflict. An integrated constitutional truthmaker like that proposed by the early Richard Fallon, which sets out a criterion for picking winning and losing constitutional arguments then different modes clash, has a distinct ontological advantage over pragmatist or irreducibly plural constitutional theories. Even a theory merely positing an unknown proper commensuration of conflicting constitutional arguments into answers for particular cases — that is, a reducible pluralism — can vindicate WTDIWD data in a way pragmatism and Bobbitism cannot. Single-truthmaker forms of living constitutionalism are thus ontologically preferable to no-truthmaker or multiple-truthmaker forms. We can then ask (as I do and will do in earlier and future work) whether that single truthmaker matches, or does not match, the “this Constitution” to which Article VI refers, and to which, on a naïve view of our current practices, current officeholders swear an oath.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Holmesian Constructions

Brad Snyder, University of Wisconsin Law School, has published The House that Built Holmes at 30 Law & History Review 661 (2012). Here is the abstract.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. became the first modern judge to attain iconic status. G. Edward White, the preeminent Holmes scholar of his generation, has argued that Holmes's canonization began with the "dramatic upsurge in the amount of commentary" in the late 1920s by reformers who appreciated his "modernist epistemology" and that Holmes and Brandeis achieved "the status of professional and cultural icons in the decade of the 1930s." This Article argues that Holmes's canonization began a decade earlier because of his association with a group of young progressives at the House of the Truth. During the 1910s, Felix Frankfurter, Walter Lippmann, and other progressives turned a Dupont Circle rowhouse into a salon, invited Washington establishment figures to frequent dinner and cocktail parties, and adopted Holmes as the House's hero. They canonized Holmes to attack the Court's anti-labor decisions. Holmes participated in his own canonization to further his ambitions of elite recognition. At age seventy, he was frustrated on the Court and considered retirement. He wrote for what Laurence Baum has described as a discrete judicial audience at the House of Truth. Holmes's canonization matters because it exemplifies canonization as political instrumentalism. The House wanted constitutional change; Holmes wanted recognition.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.