Digital Messing Around

In his column in the January 23rd New York Times, Stanley Fish suggests that parsing humanities texts using computers may be fun, but it can also lead us to find more than we were looking for.

All In the Family

The New York Times' Dave Itzkoff discusses incest on tv in three current HBO series, Boardwalk Empire, Game of Thrones, and Bored To Death. (Hmmm, talk about keeping it in the family). And by the way, what is that language they're speaking on Game of Thrones?

Law and Communications Theory

Mark Greenberg, UCLA School of Law and Department of Philosophy, has published Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication in Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (A. Marmor & S. Soames eds.; Oxford University Press, 2011).

According to a view – really a family of related views – that has considerable currency at the moment, philosophy of language and linguistics have a direct bearing on the content of the law. I call this view the communicative-content theory of law or, for short, the communication theory. According to the communication theorists, the study of language and communication reveals that the full linguistic meaning of an utterance is what the speaker or author communicates by the utterance – call it communicative content – which may go well beyond the literal meaning of the words. (On the standard understanding, communicative content is constituted by the content of certain specific communicative intentions of the speaker.) The communication theorists conclude that a statute's contribution to the content of the law is its communicative content. In this chapter, I grant many of the assumptions of the communication theorists and then argue that there are many candidates for a statute’s contribution to the content of the law, including different linguistic and mental contents. The study of language can be important in helping us to make and clarify such distinctions, but beyond this information-providing role, it has nothing to say about which, if any, of these candidates constitutes a statute’s contribution to the law. The communication theory therefore lacks the resources to say what any statute’s contribution is. Ultimately, I suggest that trying to understand legislation on the model of communication is misguided because legislation and legislative systems have purposes that have no parallel in the case of communication and that may be better served if a statute’s contribution to the content of the law is not constituted by what is communicated by the legislature.

Download the text from SSRN at the link.

Things Are Looking Up: The US Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries

Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, CUNY School of Law, and Samuel Thumma, Perkins Coie, have published Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, in volume 94 of the Marquette Law Review (2010). Here is the abstract.

This Article examines the Court’s use of dictionaries in the first decade of the twenty-first century, building on previous research by Professor Kirchmeier and Judge Thumma regarding the Supreme Court’s history of using dictionaries: Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 51 (2001).

During Supreme Court Terms 2000-2001 through 2009-2010, the Justices have referenced dictionary definitions to define nearly 300 words or phrases. Yet the Court has never expressly explained the proper role and use of the dictionary in American jurisprudence. The Article studies the frequency and the approach the Justices have taken to citing dictionaries in the new century, and it considers the Court’s lack of a reasoned process for selecting or using dictionaries.

Part I examines the frequency of dictionary use in the new century as compared to past use, comparing the different Justices with respect to their dictionary usage and the dictionaries most frequently cited by the Court. Part II addresses the stages of dictionary use, from the initial decision to use a dictionary to define a word to the selection of the dictionary and the choice of definitions. Part III examines some recent cases that illustrate the approaches taken in using dictionaries to define terms from various sources, including the United States Constitution, statutes, and prior cases. The Article includes three comprehensive appendices that compile information from the twenty-first century cases listing: (1) the terms defined by the Court with references to the cases; (2) the Justices who have used a dictionary in opinions (along with their frequency of use and which dictionaries are used); and (3) the dictionaries used by the Court. These appendices, when combined with the authors’ previous articles examining the Supreme Court’s dictionary use through the twentieth century, provide a comprehensive compilation of the use of dictionaries since the Court began.

The Article concludes that, in the twenty-first century, the Court continues to use dictionaries at a high rate with little guidance for parties, lawyers or others regarding when to turn to dictionaries, which dictionaries to use, and how to use dictionaries. Although the authors are able to deduce several principles from the Court’s history, to date, the United States Supreme Court has issued no definitive decision squarely addressing the proper use of the dictionary. The ongoing usage of dictionaries by the United States Supreme Court and other courts continues to demonstrate the need for such guidance.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Of Deism and Douglas Firs

Jessie Hill, Case Western Reserve School of Law, has published Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in Meaning over Time, in volume 59 of Duke Law Journal (2010). Here is the abstract.

Although the Supreme Court turned away an Establishment Clause challenge to the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the issues raised by that case are not going away anytime soon. Legal controversies over facially religious government speech have become one of the most regular and prominent features of Establishment Clause jurisprudence – and indeed, a second-round challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance is currently percolating, which is likely to result in resolution by the Supreme Court.

That resolution will depend on an understanding of the social meaning of the practice at issue. This Article therefore addresses the constitutional analysis of “ceremonial deism” – brief official religious references such as the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the national motto “In God We Trust,” and the city names Corpus Christi and St. Louis. Courts have generally stated in holdings and dicta that ceremonial deism is constitutional because such phrases have lost their religious meaning through passage of time or rote repetition. To examine this claim, this Article draws on one particular branch of linguistic theory, known as speech act theory, as it applies to the problem of change in meaning over time. Because speech act theory is particularly useful for analysis of social meaning, I argue that some insights about the problem of ceremonial deism may be found there, lending depth to a problem that has gone almost entirely untheorized by those who have espoused it so far. Finally, I consider the implications of this analysis for the constitutionality of such official religious references. Ultimately, while recognizing that meaning can change over time in some instances, I argue that courts should be skeptical of this claim and should instead adopt a rebuttable presumption of enduring religious meaning when confronted with constitutional challenges to instances of ceremonial deism.

Download the Article from SSRN here.

Law and Linguistics

Andrei Marmor, USC Gould School of Law, has published "What Does the Law Say? Semantics and Pragmatics in Statutory Language," forthcoming in Analisi e Diritto. Here is the abstract.

The content of communication in a given speech situation often goes beyond what the speaker has explicitly said. The main purpose of this essay is to explore this aspect of linguistic communication in the legal context. The paper begins with a general outline of the dividing lines between semantics and pragmatics, laying out the main distinctions that need to be employed. Next, the paper suggests that the pragmatic aspects of statutory language differ in some important ways from the pragmatics of an ordinary conversation. The paper explains some of these differences which make the understanding of legal language somewhat problematic. Finally, the paper points toward some solutions, based on the distinction between content that is semantically implicated by an utterance and content that is implicated conversationally.

Download the paper from SSRN here.

Rhetoric in Child Custody Decision Making

Linda L. Berger, Mercer University School of Law, has published "How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: An Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes." Here is the abstract.

We live in a time of radically changing conceptions of family and of the relationships possible between children and parents. Though undergoing "a sea-change," family law remains tethered to culturally embedded stories and symbols. While so bound, family law will fail to serve individual families and a society whose family structures diverge sharply by education, race, class, and income.

This article advances a critical rhetorical analysis of the interaction of metaphor and narrative within the specific context of child custody disputes. Its goal is to begin to examine how these embedded knowledge structures affect judicial decision making generally; more specifically, the article's aim is to help advocates make room for difference and diversity in the lives of families.

The rhetorical analysis indicates that the best interests of the child standard fails to explain child custody outcomes, and it suggests that the cognitive setting for custody disputes - cluttered with outmoded metaphors, simplistic images, and unexamined narratives - interferes with the ability of judges to attend to complex and radical transformations of parent and child relationships. The article proposes that practicing lawyers and scholars use rhetorical analysis first to uncover the symbols and stories that affect judicial decision making and then to construct arguments that may overcome deeply rooted constraints, help individual clients, and persuade policy makers.

Download the paper from SSRN here.

Linguistics and Law: Spanish-Language Radio, Law, and Politics

Ernesto Hernandez Lopez, Chapman School of Law, has published "Law and Popular Culture: Inter-American Explorations into Columbian Slang and Spanish Language Radio in the U.S." in volume 19 of Berkeley La Raza Journal (2007). Here is the abstract.

This article argues that critical analysis of popular culture themes benefits legal scholarship by providing distinct cross-border perspectives and illuminating popular resistance efforts to hegemonic forces. This examination occurs in an Inter-American context, characterized by a south-north dynamic and migration's transnational influence. In these dynamics, there is significant popular resistance and anti-subordination to hegemonic forces. Legal scholarship often overlooks this by focusing on formal legal texts and processes. This resistance is visible within popular culture, as part of “hidden transcripts.”

This article makes two claims about popular culture's relevance, one methodological/theoretical claim and one substantive claim. First, observing how popular culture reflects societal interpretations of the law and politics greatly benefits the scholarly objectives of international research by promoting an exchange across national borders with an appreciation for different perspectives. Second, critically exploring popular culture illuminates how resistance and anti-subordination efforts often exercised by popular sectors, civil society, or Southern countries may be represented in this culture. As evidence of this, Colombian slang and Spanish radio in the U.S during 2006 immigration demonstrations are examined as two popular culture examples. This article incorporates theoretical innovations from law and popular culture scholarship, Latin American cultural studies such as Néstor García Canclini's work, James Scott's “arts of resistance” and “hidden transcripts,” and post-colonial theory.

Download the entire article from SSRN here.

Linguistics and Trademark Law

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Chicago-Kent College of Law, has published "What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law," in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE MARKS, J. Ginsburg, L. Bently, J. Davis, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007. Here is the abstract.

This contribution to an inter-disciplinary book on Trademarks and Brands responds to the work of Alan Durant, a linguist who (in his chapter of the book) provides legal scholars with both a rich understanding of how linguists view terms that are part of the basic argot of trademark law and a potentially vital explanation of the different social functions that word marks might serve. The Response explains why linguistics should matter to trademark law, but also why trademark law might on occasion ignore the precise reality of consumer understanding as might be provided by linguistics. I suggest that, while trademark law should not become beholden to linguistics, the lessons of Durant's linguistic analysis are to some extent already accommodated in the practice of trademark law, and could be important guides in the further development of a number of legal principles. In particular, I explain how trademark law does in large part take into consideration Durant's observation that legal analysis would comport more with the reality of how words function if it focused on marks as they are used. The Chapter also argues that Durant's exploration of the concepts of “distinctiveness” and “descriptiveness”, as understood by lawyers and linguists, respectively, should reinforce important lessons for legal scholars about the complex policy prescriptions embodied in those concepts. Finally, I argue that particular insights developed by Durant from the field of linguistics may prove valuable in illuminating several points of contention in contemporary trademark law. In particular, Durant stresses that determining whether a defendant's use has evoked the source-identifying aspect of plaintiff's mark, as opposed to the descriptive properties of that term, can only be done by analyzing the “discourse 'setting' in which interpretations are constructed.” Thus, although the type of use should be relevant to assessing infringement, any analysis of use type must be highly contextualized. This insight should inform the choice of doctrinal vehicles by which trademark law establishes limits on the scope of protection.

Download the paper from SSRN here.