June 10, 2015

Testamentary Proceedings In Spanish East Florida in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries

M. C. Mirow, Florida International University (FIU) College of Law, has published Testamentary Proceedings in Spanish East Florida, 1783-1821 in Canon Law and Common Law in Honor of R. H. Helmholz 281-301 (Troy L. Harris ed.; Berkeley: The Robbins Collections, 2015). Here is the abstract.
The East Florida Papers in the Library of Congress reveal a great deal about law, legal institutions, legal practice, and legality in colonial Florida during the second Spanish period from 1783 to 1821. This contribution provides an initial study of the 372 testamentary proceedings related to 168 decedents recorded in these papers. It describes these cases and discusses the dossier of one case to illustrate the administrative and legal work done by Spanish officials to distribute a decedent's property.

Proceedings include individual claims for debts against estates; sets of documents related to the administration of estates such as wills, inventories, birth records, and marriage records; and a variety of petitions dealing with administration and the distribution of property. The materials provide a window into will making, family life and structure, commerce, women, and accidental and suspicious deaths. Numerous petitions sought the disposition, transfer, and manumission of slaves. The contribution concludes with a description and analysis of the documents related to the estate of Pedro Dimarache, a Corsican carpenter who died testate in St. Augustine in 1792.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Law In Its Space

Forthcoming from Routledge Publishing:

Leif Dahlberg, Spacing Law and Politics: The Constitution and Representation of the Juridical (2016). Here is a description of the contents from the publisher's website.
Examining the inherent spatiality of law, both theoretically and as social practice, this book presents a genealogical account of the emergence and the development of the juridical. In an analysis that stretches from ancient Greece, through late antiquity and early modern and modern Europe, and on to the contemporary courtroom, it considers legal and philosophical texts, artistic and literary works, as well as judicial practices, in order to elicit and document a series of critical moments in the history of juridical space. Offering a more nuanced understanding of law than that found in traditional philosophical, political or social accounts of legal history, Dahlberg forges a critical account of the intimate relations between law and politics that shows how juridical space is determined and conditioned in ways that are integral to the very functioning – and malfunctioning – of law.

Thinking About Law Spatially

New from Routledge Publishing:

Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere (2015).


Here is a description of the contents from the publisher's website.



There can be no justice that is not spatial. Against a recent tendency to despatialise law, matter, bodies and even space itself, this book insists on spatialising them, arguing that there can be neither law nor justice that are not articulated through and in space.
Spatial Justice presents a new theory and a radical application of the material connection between space – in the geographical as well as sociological and philosophical sense – and the law – in the broadest sense that includes written and oral law, but also embodied social and political norms. More specifically, it argues that spatial justice is the struggle of various bodies – human, natural, non-organic, technological – to occupy a certain space at a certain time. Seen in this way, spatial justice is the most radical offspring of the spatial turn, since, as this book demonstrates, spatial justice can be found in the core of most contemporary legal and political issues – issues such as geopolitical conflicts, environmental issues, animality, colonisation, droning, the cyberspace and so on. In order to ague this, the book employs the lawscape, as the tautology between law and space, and the concept of atmosphere in its geological, political, aesthetic, legal and biological dimension.
Written by a leading theorist in the area, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere forges a new interdisciplinary understanding of space and law, while offering a fresh approach to current geopolitical, spatiolegal and ecological issues.

Women In Support of Legal Aid, 1863-1945

Felice Batlan, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law, has published Introduction: Women and Justice for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid, 1863-1945, in Women and Justice for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid, 1863-1945 (F. Batlan, Cambridge University Press, 2015). Here is the abstract.
Challenging our assumptions about the history of the legal profession and the development of free legal aid, this book reveals that 19th-century women's organizations first offered legal assistance to poor women and that women lay lawyers provided such assistance. By the early 20th century, however, male lawyers founded their own legal aid societies, intentionally excluding women and narrowing the services provided. These different models of legal aid produced conflicting understandings of expertise, the rule of law, and the meaning of justice for the poor.
The full text is not available from SSRN.

Legal Theorists On the Spanish Succession

Frederik Dhondt, Research Foundation Flanders, Department of Interdisciplinary Study of Law, Private Law and Business Law, Legal History Institute, is publishing History in Legal Doctrine. Vattel and Réal De Curban on the Spanish Succession in Rechtsgeschiedenis op nieuwe wegen: Legal History, moving in new directions (D. De ruysscher, B. Deseure, K. Capelle, M. Colette, & G. Van Assche, eds.; Antwerp: Maklu, 2015). Here is the abstract.
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/1714) counts as a continent- and even world-spanning confrontation among the main European powers. Its long shadow hung over diplomacy for almost three decades until a new world conflagration arose in 1740. The war remains a subject of controversy in diplomatic history, and has been of paramount importance to contemporary eighteenth-century journalists, historians, philosophers and legal scholars. "La dernière guerre" counted as an anti-norm, a situation never to return to, and a permanent deterrent. Yet, as time progressed another conflicts dominated the world stage, the conflict became an object of legal writing, as it seemingly lost much of its contentiousness. Emer de Vattel (1717-1767), author of the much-acclaimed Droit des gens (Leiden: 1757) and abbot Réal de Curban (1682-1752), whose Science du Gouvernement (Paris: les libraires associés, 1764) covers the law of nations as well, took the war as an object to illustrate diverse themata of the law of nations: treaties, ius ad bellum, embassies or alliances. The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate how Vattel, writing from a specific Swiss and German perspective, took a different strand of argumentation from that of Réal de Curban, who repeated at several instances the French crown's point of view. Although both authors' use of historical material evokes strict objectivity, they continued the war in their selective use of exempla. Whereas Réal has fallen into relative oblivion, Vattel counts among the classics of International Law. Consequently, the image of the war in doctrine tends to be one-sided. Incoherences and contradictions in Vattel's work are not uncommon. The War of the Spanish Succession can serve as an example of the gulf between doctrinal tradition and practical legal argumentation, or of the instrumental use of history in two distinct elaborations of a shared natural law-framework. Classifying Vattel as a "Tier I"-author and Réal as inferior is not a neutral operation.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

June 9, 2015

Joseph N. Welch and Tailgunner Joe

On this day in 1954, Army lawyer Joseph N. Welch fired back at U. S. Senator Joseph "Tailgunner Joe" McCarthy when Senator McCarthy abruptly attacked Mr. Welch's young aide Fred Fisher for being a member of the National Lawyers Guild, a group which the Senator linked to the Communist Party. The attack came during a hearing before the Army-McCarthy hearings. Said Mr. Welch passionately, "Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty or your recklessness....If there is a God in heaven, it [the attack on Mr. Fisher] will do neither you nor your cause any good." He famously asked Mr. McCarthy, "Have you no sense of decency, sir? At long last, have you left no sense of decency?'' 

The audience applauded Mr. Welch, and the dam cracked; others finally began to resist the Senator's power grab and vicious insistence that Communists were to be found everywhere, particularly in the U.S. government. The hearings ended a few weeks later, but blacklisting and the damage it caused went on for years.


More here from the New York Times.

Joseph Welch later appeared in the film Anatomy of a Murder in the small but important part of Judge Weaver and as himself in a number of documentaries. Fred Fisher went on to become a partner at the firm of Hale and Dorr (now Wilmer Hale) in New York and serve as President of the Massachusetts Bar Association. The Senate voted to condemn Senator McCarthy in December of 1954, and he died in 1957, from the effects of alcoholism. William Proxmire won his Senate seat in a special election.

Selected bibliography:

Thomas P. Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture (Columbia University Press, 2003).

A. Fried, McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History (Oxford University Press, 1997).

Brenda Murphy, Congressional Theatre: Dramatizing McCarthyism on Stage, Film, and Television (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton University Press, 1998).

The Rule of Law and Magna Carta

R. George Wright, Indiana University School of Law, has published The Magna Carta and the Contemporary Rule of Law Problem as Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-29. Here is the abstract.
This Article seizes upon the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta to draw attention to important problems associated with the contemporary rule of law. In particular, the Article discusses the rule of law as a systematically undersupplied public good. The Article then notes the insufficiency of standard incentive-based responses to rule of law problems. The Article considers finally the idea of ‘faithfulness’ in the law, and the role of civic and personal virtues in appropriately sustaining the rule of law.
Download the text of the article from SSRN at the link.

Supreme Court Celebrity

Richard L. Hasen, University of California, Irvine, has published Essay: Celebrity Justice: Supreme Court Edition as UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-61. Here is the abstract.
It is not your imagination. Supreme Court Justices are in the news more than ever, whether they are selling books, testifying before Congress, addressing a Federalist Society, or American Constitution Society event, or just talking to a Muppet on Sesame Street. The number of books about the Court and particular Justices continues to grow. Websites are now devoted to tracking the Justices’ movements as they crisscross the country (and the world) speaking to various audiences. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is even promoted on T-shirts as the “Notorious R.B.G.,” a riff on the name of famous rap artist Notorious B.I.G. She will soon be the topic of a biopic staring Natalie Portman.

That Supreme Court Justices have become celebrities is not news. Indeed, Justices’ public statements about same-sex marriage or Bush v. Gore often get extensive coverage, and extrajudicial comments on issues in pending cases sometimes lead to (ignored) calls for judicial recusal. However, until now no one has quantified the increase in the number of publicly reported events and interviews done by Justices overall and which Justices engage most reported extrajudicial speech.

Using an original dataset of reported instances of Supreme Court Justice extrajudicial appearances and interviews from 1960 to 2014, I find that the amount of reported extrajudicial speech has increased dramatically, especially in the past decade. From 1960-1969, research identified 196 publicly-reported appearances or interviews by all the Justices combined. This number fell by half (to 95) in the 1970s. From 2005-2014 it rose to 880, a nine-fold fold increase over the 1970s. The data show close to a doubling of the number of reported appearances from the 1970s to the 1980s and from the 1980s to 1990s, and then more than doubling of the number of reported appearances from the 1990s to the 2000s. While a small part of that discrepancy between old and new rates of appearances may be due to research limitations as to older news sources, most of the discrepancy appears due to the great increase in the number of reported public appearances by Justices, driven in part by the swelled number of media outlets looking to interview and report on the Justices.

Further, not all Justices are created equal when it comes to Celebrity Justice. John Marshall Harlan, had a mere 4 reported appearances or interviews from 1960 until he left the Court in 1971. Five Justices had over 175 reported appearances or interviews: Stephen Breyer (250), Ginsburg (206), Anthony Kennedy (179), Scalia (199), and Clarence Thomas (192). Dividing the number of appearances by the number of years a Justice was on the Court from 1960 until 2014 yields a “Celebrity Index.” In that Index, Justice Sonia Sotomayor is the highest scoring celebrity Justice, with a score of 13.8 annual reported appearances, followed by Justice Breyer, with a score of 12.5. Nine of the top ten Justices in the Index are current Supreme Court Justices. Finally, not all types of appearances are the same. Some Justices are much more likely to give interviews than others. Justice Sotomayor has given the largest percentage of interviews, and Justice Kennedy the smallest.

This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the evidence of the rise of Celebrity Justices and the variations among Justices. Part II discusses methodological concerns. Part III briefly reflects on the normative question whether the rise of the Celebrity Justice is good or bad. I argue that the answer is mixed, but the trend of public appearances and interviews likely will continue to grow in coming years thanks to a drastically changed media landscape and a politicized Court.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

June 8, 2015

The Language of Race In "New York Times v. Sullivan"

Carlo A. Pedrioli, Barry University, has published New York Times v. Sullivan and the Rhetorics of Race: A Look at the Briefs, Oral Arguments, and Opinions at 7 Georgetown Journal of Law and Modern Critical Race Perspectives 109 (2015). Here is the abstract.
Given the strife of the Civil Rights Movement that surrounded the case, this article looks back at the use of race in New York Times v. Sullivan. Specifically, the article examines how the advocates, led by Herbert Wechsler for the Times, I. H. Wachtel, William Rogers, and Samuel Pierce for the four ministers, and Roland Nachman for Sullivan, dealt with race in their rhetorics to the Court, both in their merits briefs and their oral arguments, and also how the justices used race in their opinions. Although Justice William Brennan did not explicitly focus on race in his opinion for the Court, the racial context that framed the case was hard to ignore, and Brennan, in ultimately resolving the case without remanding it to the Alabama courts for further proceedings, did not completely ignore race. Additionally, Justice Hugo Black, a native of Alabama, discussed race explicitly and at more length in his concurring opinion, and Justice Arthur Goldberg briefly mentioned race. Overall, the article aims to provide a better understanding of some of the rhetorical choices that may be available to legal advocates and members of the bench regarding complex topics like race.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Mercy and Law

Daniel Peixoto Murata, University of Sao Paulo, has published Can Javert Forgive Valjean? - The Myth of Merciful Law. Here is the abstract.
I intend in this paper to discuss the complex relation between the ideas of mercy and law. First, I will attempt to present an account of how mercy works and the possibility of distinguishing it from forgiveness, for then explain why by its own nature mercy is incompatible with law. Secondly, I will depict law as an argumentative practice regarding the interpretation of rights, and how rights by their very structure aren’t receptive to mercy’s logics. Finally, I will briefly say why I believe that even if merciful law is a myth, law can still claim legitimacy in an unjust world.
Download the article from SSRN at the link. "A shorter and simpler version of this essay appeared at the Glasgow University Law Society Law Review 2014-2015, as “A Dworkinian Approach to Law and Mercy”."--Author.

Academic Novels For Summer 2015

Ms. Mentor (the academic etiquette-ish alter ego of Emily Toth, Professor of English at Louisiana State University) has published her annual list of academic novels for the Chronicle of Higher Education.  A number of them are wonderfully criminologically inclined. Enjoy!

A Blog On Legal Translation

Of interest: this blog, devoted to legal translation. It's called From Words to Deeds. Check it out here.

Protest As Performance


 


Lucy Finchett-Maddock is publishing Protest, Property and the Commons: Performances of Law and Resistance with Routledge (the publication date is given as 2016). Here is a description of the contents from the publisher's website.
Protest, Property and the Commons: Performances of Law and Resistance examines the occupation of space as a mode of resistance. Drawing on the phenomena of social centres, as radical political communities that use the space of squatted, rented, or owned property, the book considers how such communities offer an alternative form of law to that of the state. It then goes on to address the relationship between this form of law and recent protest phenomena, such as the Occupy movement. How does the performance of an alternative law enact a ‘commons’? How and why is this manifested in the legal occupation of space? And what does this relationship between space and the commons indicate about the criminalisation of the occupation of space? Contributing to an ongoing re-imagination of the law of property, Protest, Property and the Commons will be of interest to anyone concerned with the role of law in political protest.

Leon Petrazycki's Scholarship

Roger Cotterrell, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, has published Leon Petrazycki and Contemporary Socio-Legal Studies at 11 International Journal of Law in Context 1 (2015). Here is the abstract.
The work of the Polish-Russian scholar Leon Petrażycki from the early decades of the twentieth century holds a strikingly paradoxical position in the literature of juristic and socio-legal scholarship: on the one hand, lauded as a supremely valuable contribution to knowledge about the nature of law and, on the other, widely neglected and little known. This article asks how far Petrażycki’s theories, expressed in writings by and about him available to an international readership, can provide insight for contemporary socio-legal studies – not as historical background but as living ideas. How far can his work speak to current issues and inform current debates? What obstacles stand in the way of this? Why have few international scholars engaged with his theories despite their rigour and originality? The article starts from this last issue before addressing the others. It argues that Petrażycki’s radical legal theory offers strikingly distinctive resources for rethinking issues about the role of law in multicultural societies, the nature of developing transnational law, and the significance of law as an aspect or expression of culture.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

A New Book On Legal Theory From R. H. Helmholz


New from Harvard University Press: R. H. Helmholz, Natural Law In Court: A History of Legal Theory In Practice (2015).  Here is a description of the contents from the publisher's website.

The theory of natural law grounds human laws in the universal truths of God’s creation. Until very recently, lawyers in the Western tradition studied natural law as part of their training, and the task of the judicial system was to put its tenets into concrete form, building an edifice of positive law on natural law’s foundations. Although much has been written about natural law in theory, surprisingly little has been said about how it has shaped legal practice. Natural Law in Court asks how lawyers and judges made and interpreted natural law arguments in England, Europe, and the United States, from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the American Civil War. R. H. Helmholz sees a remarkable consistency in how English, Continental, and early American jurisprudence understood and applied natural law in cases ranging from family law and inheritance to criminal and commercial law. Despite differences in their judicial systems, natural law was treated across the board as the source of positive law, not its rival. The idea that no person should be condemned without a day in court, or that penalties should be proportional to the crime committed, or that self-preservation confers the right to protect oneself against attacks are valuable legal rules that originate in natural law. From a historical perspective, Helmholz concludes, natural law has advanced the cause of justice.




Cover: Natural Law in Court in HARDCOVER


Storytelling, the Jewish Legal System, and "The Jazz Singer"

Levi Cooper, Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law, is publishing Jewish Law, Hasidic Lore, and Hollywood Legend: The Cantor, the Mystic, and the Jurist in volume 2 of Critical Analysis of Law (Fall 2015). Here is the abstract.
Cantor Yossele Rosenblatt (1882-1933) was offered an opportunity that would make any performer swoon: a star role in the ground-breaking film The Jazz Singer (1927). Yet Rosenblatt refused this artistic opportunity of the lifetime. This paper contextualises Rosenblatt’s baffling decision, by exploring one possible relationship between art and law; in this case – the art of storytelling and the Jewish legal system. The study demonstrates where the two pursuits tread separate, unlinked paths to a common end. This vector is refracted through the lens of performance of prayers outside of the religious synagogue service; specifically the propriety of cantorial concerts that presented prayers from the High Holy Day liturgy. This issue appears in Jewish legal writing and in storytelling – each modality using its own tools to tackle the trend. It is noted that legal systems without effective enforcement mechanisms – such as Jewish law in the late modern period – could use arts as compensatory media for achieving societal order. More significantly, however, arts are not umbilically connected to law; each cultural creation independently strives to fashion society.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

June 5, 2015

Exploring Legal Issues Through Comics and Graphic Novels

Thomas Giddens' new book Graphic Justice: Intersections of Comics and Law (Routledge, 2015) is now available. Here's a description of its contents from the publisher's website.

The intersections of law and contemporary culture are vital for comprehending the meaning and significance of law in today’s world. Far from being unsophisticated mass entertainment, comics and graphic fiction both imbue our contemporary culture, and are themselves imbued, with the concerns of law and justice. Accordingly, and spanning a wide variety of approaches and topics from an international array of contributors, Graphic Justice draws comics and graphic fiction into the range of critical resources available to the academic study of law. The first book to do this, Graphic Justice broadens our understanding of law and justice as part of our human world—a world that is inhabited not simply by legal concepts and institutions alone, but also by narratives, stories, fantasies, images, and other cultural articulations of human meaning. Engaging with key legal issues (including copyright, education, legal ethics, biomedical regulation, and legal personhood) and exploring critical issues in criminal justice and perspectives on international rights, law and justice—all through engagement with comics and graphic fiction—the collection showcases the vast breadth of potential that the medium holds. Graphic Justice will be of interest to academics and postgraduate students in: cultural legal studies; law and the image; law, narrative and literature; law and popular culture; cultural criminology; as well as cultural and comics studies more generally.

The book includes such essays as Dr. David Keane and Dr. Jeremie Gilbert's work on how graphic novels explore human rights issues.  It's based on a conference which Dr. Giddens organized last year.

Check out Dr. Giddens' blog Graphic Justice here.

June 4, 2015

Star Wars As a Window Into the Psychopathic Mind


J. Wesley Judd discusses the use of Star Wars to study psychological disorders in an article for Pacific Standard. Lando Calrissian as a gambling addict? Well, that's certainly one possibility. Darth Vader as a sufferer from PTSD, or someone with borderline personality disorder? There I have to disagree. The guy just wants to rule the world--or the universe. Or else he's a Gray Eminence. ;) Nothing difficult to understand there--move along, move along--most of us run into his type all the time. IMHO, he doesn't have a personality disorder. He's ambitious and he knows what people with personality disorders want to hear. Now, the Emperor--there's someone with a personality disorder. More about the use of Star Wars for such purposes in a paper by Ryan C. W. Hall and Susan Hatters Friedman, Psychopathology in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: the use of Star Wars' Dark Side in Teaching, 10 Academic Psychiatry 1 (May 2015) (subscription may be required).

Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Democracy, and the Rule of Law

Cesare Pinelli, Sapienza University of Rome, has published Machiavelli, Guicciardini and the 'Governo Largo' at 28 Ratio Juris 267 (2015). Here is the abstract.
Niccolò Machiavelli's support for what he calls governo largo, or popular government, is usually contrasted with the diffidence towards it of Francesco Guicciardini, the Florentine aristocrat. The article argues that both these authors grounded their vision on Polybius' theory of “mixed government,” though adapting it in different directions. In examining this difference, the article reaches the conclusion that it concerns far less the degree of popular participation in political decision‐making and government than the value that Machiavelli and Guicciardini respectively ascribe to it in comparison with that of safety‐liberty (or legal certainty). In this respect, their theories may be viewed as anticipating the tensions between democracy and the rule of law, the co‐presence of which provides the essential foundation of the structure of present‐day constitutional democracies.
The full text is not available from SSRN.

Machiavelli and Modern Constitutionalism

Mortimer Newlin Stead Sellers, University of Baltimer School of Law, has published Niccolò Machiavelli: Father of Modern Constitutionalism at 28 Ratio Juris 216 (2015). Here is the abstract.
Niccolò Machiavelli is the father of modern constitutionalism. Constitutionalism began anew in the modern world with the study of the ancient republics and it was Machiavelli who inaugurated this revived science of politics. Five hundred years after the composition of Il Principe and the Discorsi we are still working out the implications of applying reason to the structures of law and government in pursuit of justice and the common good. Modern constitutionalism and ancient republicanism share three central beliefs: first, that government should serve justice and the common good; second, that government should do so through known and stable laws; third, that these will best be secured through the checks and balances of a well‐designed constitution. Machiavelli took the theories and experiences of republican Rome and applied them to his own era. This application of reason to constitutional design transformed the politics of emergent modernity and reconfigured government throughout the world.

The full text is not available from SSRN.

June 3, 2015

Spinoza and Legal Theory

Hans Gribnau, Tilburg University, Fiscal Institute and the Center for Company Law, Leiden University, is publishing The Power of Law: Spinoza's Contribution to Legal Theory in Spinoza and Law (A. Santos Campos, ed., forthcoming). Here is the abstract.
In seventeenth century, the constitutional idea of the rule of law was recalibrated in the Republic of the United Provinces. Spinoza was one of the major figures in the Low Countries theorising about the optimal state and its constitutional foundations. He designs a dynamic system of checks and balances in the distribution of powers.

Spinoza’s naturalistic and descriptive approach of the relationship between law and power shows that the exercise of state power on that basis - within the constitutional constraints – may be formally almost unlimited, but, indeed, materially there are limits. The ability of government to regulate society has its limits which are inherent in the existence of the state.

Legal positivism can welcome Spinoza as a kindred spirit – although by no means unconditionally. Indeed, effectiveness is a constitutive requirement for positive law. However, effectiveness implies that citizens comply with the (civil) law not only for fear of reprisals, but also out of respect for commonwealth’s authority. Therefore, notwithstanding the conceptual separation between law and morality, positive law has to take into account the interests and moral convictions of the people.

Finally, Spinoza gives an answer to the key question of political philosophy, viz. the issue of sovereignty. Only a government that embodies the unity of the cooperating citizens has the exclusive (absolute) power to determine the bonum commune. Hence, government should permanently create a substantial loyalty of its citizens, on the one hand, but citizens must actively support the state because of their interest in the existence of the state, on the other hand.

In addition, citizen’s criticism of the political order should be based on obedience to the law. As a rule, obedience to the law should not be dependent on the substantive agreement with the law, which actually would undermine the democratic order. Otherwise, the legal order degenerates into a civil war.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Henry Brougham and Legal Ethics

Michael S. Ariens, St. Mary's University School of Law, has published Brougham's Ghost in volume 35 of North Illinois University Law Review (2015). Here is the abstract.
In defending Queen Caroline in the House of Lords, Henry Brougham declared, “[a]n advocate, by the sacred duty of his connection with his client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and none other.” Brougham’s ethic of advocacy has been cited repeatedly as stating the American lawyer’s duty of zealous representation of a client. It has often been called the “classic statement” of zealous representation and representing the “traditional view of the lawyer’s role.”

This essay challenges these conclusions. Brougham’s rhetoric was neither a classic statement of the duty of loyalty to a client, nor did it represent a traditional view within the American legal profession. It was consciously rejected in nearly all writings of American lawyers for most of American history, and was not explicitly embraced until the 1970s. Reminding lawyers of the duty of zealous representation was promoted in the 1960s in part to solidify the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Criminal Procedure revolution, for only zealous lawyers could protect the rights of the criminally accused. Brougham’s ethic of advocacy was used to provide a historical justification for a revived zeal in criminal defense practice, an effort to make those lawyers more professional. This justification was transformed in the 1970s by two events: first, the American legal profession became enmeshed in a professionalism crisis as a consequence of the Watergate affair. Second, that professionalism crisis was exacerbated by a fear of diminishing economic prospects for American lawyers.

This essay is divided into three parts. First, it offers a full assessment of Brougham’s representation of Queen Caroline. Second, it traces the published and negative reaction of American lawyers to Brougham’s statement of the duty of zealous representation from the 1840s on. Third, the essay explains why the consistent rejection of Brougham by American lawyers became the “classic statement” of the duty of the advocate beginning in the 1970s.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Georges Simenon, the Novelist

John Banville celebrates Georges Simenon as a writer, not just a crime novelist, for the New York Review of Books, here. Which crime writers, in your opinion, are just plain good novelists? Patricia Highsmith? P. D. James? Scott Turow?

May 31, 2015

Free From Routledge In Honor Of Magna Carta's Anniversary

In honor of Magna Carta's 800th anniversary, Routledge/Taylor & Francis is offering free access to a selection of interesting articles downloads and discounts on purchases, many of which are in the law and humanities category. Check out the offers here; they include Brunilda Pali's Art for Social Change, Luis Gomez Romero's D. H. Lawrence's Plural Jurisprudence, and Timothy D. Peters' "The Force" as Law, among other interesting titles.

Tip of the beret to Eoin O'Dell for the tweet.

May 28, 2015

Supreme Court Justices In Pop Culture

Slate columnist Dahlia Lithwick and her guests discuss the suddenly expanding cottage industry of biopics and other entertainment focusing on Supreme Court Justices, including Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, on episode 18 of Slate's podcast Amicus. More here.

But interest in the Justices, or in the Supreme Court generally, as fodder for pop images, isn't new. Consider John Grisham's thriller The Pelican Brief (1992; filmed 1993 with Julia Roberts and Denzel Washington). The Justices turn up in scenes from The People Vs. Larry Flynt (1996), Recount (2008), and Gideon's Trumpet (1980), as well as any number of other films. At least two scholars, Maxwell Bloomfield, and Laura Ray, have examined the image of the Justices in pop culture; their work is quite instructive. Cites below.


Maxwell Bloomfield, The Supreme Court in American Popular Culture, 4 Journal of American Culture 1 (Winter 1981).

Laura Ray, Judicial Fictions: Images of Supreme Court Justices in the Novel, Drama, and Film, 39 Arizona Law Review 151 (1997).



Law and the Body

Theodore Bennett, University of Western Australia, has published Cuts and Criminality: Body Alteration in Legal Discourse (Ashgate, 2015). Here is a description of the contents from the publisher's website.

This book investigates how and why the criminal law differentiates between different types of body alterations, with particular reference to how they are conceptualised within legal discourse. By drawing connections between types of body alteration that have traditionally been considered separately and discretely, the book allows analytical conclusions to be made about the law's treatment of the general category of 'body alteration' rather than merely about specific types of body alteration. Taking legal discourse as its analytical focus, the author critically examines a number of case studies to determine the techniques and processes by which some body alterations are discursively constructed as legitimate and legally approved, and by which other body alterations are discursively constructed as illegitimate and legally sanctioned. Specifically, the body alterations that are addressed include sadomasochistic injuries; female genital modification and male circumcision; cosmetic surgery, body modification and healthy limb amputation; and sex reassignment surgery and genital 'normalisation' surgery. International in scope, the discursive analysis in the book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of socio-legal and cultural studies.

May 27, 2015

An Interesting Blog About Mystery and Crime Fiction

Check out Tipping My Fedora, an interesting blog devoted to "mystery, crime and suspense in all media" and run by someone named Sergio. 

Deliberately mysterious?

Tip of the beret to Doug Coulson.

Privacy, Security, and Literature

Daniel Solove (George Washington University Law School) is compiling a list of privacy and security related novels. His first five selections?

Franz Kafka, The Trial (published in 1925 in German, first English translation published in 1937).

George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (or 1984) (published 1949).

Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932).

Herman Melville, Billy Budd (first published 1924, but written in 1888-1891, and left unfinished at Melville's death).

Heinrich Böll, The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum (published in 1974, first English translation 1974).

Professor Solove invites you to email suggestions to him or to post them in the comments section.

A Work From Jordan Abel

Conceptual writer Jordan Abel's poem Warpath appears here. More about the origins of the work (texts are entirely from the public domain) at a Nostrum Remedium post here.

Constitutional History and National Identity In Canada


Eric M. Adams, University of Alberta Faculty of Law, is publishing Canadian Constitutional Identities in volume 38 of the Dalhousie Law Journal. Here is the abstract.
Constitutions are stories nations tell about themselves. Despite the famous declaration in the Constitution Act, 1867 that the “Provinces of Canada…Desire…a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom,” most of Canada’s constitutional history can be understood as the search for a distinctly Canadian constitutional identity. Canadians have always looked to their constitutional instruments to both reflect and produce a particular vision of the nation and its citizens. This article focuses on the search for Canada’s constitutional identity during its first century as a nation, from Confederation until the 1960s. Drawing on a varied array of sources and voices, this article argues that the powerful yearning for identity operated as a driving force in Canadian constitutional law, politics, and culture in an era before the catalytic arrival of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Download the text of the article from SSRN at the link.

A Review of Richard Dawson's "Justice As Attunement"

Jack L. Sammons, Mercer School of Law, has published The Virtuous Circle of Justice: Richard Dawson's 'Justice as Attunement. Transforming Constitutions in Law, Literature, Economics, and the Rest of Life', in volume 11 of No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice (2014). Here is the abstract.
This is my review of Richard Dawson's, Justice as Attunement. Here, from the introduction to the review, is a description of the book and of the review. "Although he does not express it in these terms, in approaching justice through attunement Richard Dawson is thinking of justice as a certain form of truth, a way of thinking about it far from common for our time although it may have been common in times past. In doing this, he is trying to make our language reveal that which we have used to conceal for a very long time, and the challenge of this, if not impossible, is certainly daunting. This book then is an act of courage, and to read it well I think you must read it as such. There is no way to say in propositional terms what he wants to say. What he must do instead, if he is to be true to this form of justice, is to offer readers of this alphabetical lexicon not ordinary definitions, but performative ones: carefully chosen unsettling experiences of the words one might wish to use if propositional terms were possible, experiences that, as he puts it, can 'transform' these words and, in doing so, 'transform' his readers in their understanding of justice. In a culture wedded to 'It is what it is!' Dawson, with each word he explores, gently insists: 'No, it isn't'. All this is to say that this is a very difficult book to review. Its form is as a lexicon of twenty-four words, most of which are central to the work of James Boyd White, and also central for Dawson for an 'attunement' to justice. Analogous uses of each word are explored through carefully selected literary, legal, philosophical, political, historical, economic, and other texts in order to determine the word's role in this attunement. Now, doing this as a lexicon is certainly interesting and creative, but it is also straightforward enough. The way in which each entry works, the way each relates to the others, the way each works upon us, and the way all this relates to justice, however, is quite another matter."
Download the text of the review from SSRN at the link.

Legal Historians, Legal Philosophers, and Common Ground

Charles L. Barzun, University of Virginia School of Law, and Dan Priel, York University, Osgoode Hall Law School, have published Jurisprudence and (Its) History in volume 101 of the Virginia Law Review (2015). Here is the abstract.
It is not obvious that philosophers and historians of law should take much interest in the scholarly enterprises of the other. Many legal philosophers understand their task as one of clarifying the meaning of such familiar legal concepts as “right,” “duty,” or “law” by offering analyses of them that purport to be general, abstract, and timeless. Meanwhile, historians tend to be suspicious of speculative claims ungrounded in fact and so often prefer to focus on the concrete, particular features of actual legal regimes.

But surface appearances can deceive. Unlike some other areas of philosophy, the subject matter of jurisprudence is at least partially (if not entirely) a social phenomenon. For this reason, legal philosophers since at least H.L.A. Hart have recognized their task to be a “hermeneutic” one — one which aims to discern or make explicit the “self-understanding” of legal actors. At the same time, legal historians aim not simply to record legal rules that existed at some given point in history, but to unearth the meaning that actual people have attached to law. Perhaps, then, philosophical and historical inquiries about law share the same ultimate scholarly goal and subject matter.

This essay serves as the Introduction to a symposium in the Virginia Law Review that explores just this possibility. Its purpose is both to highlight some of the themes common to the symposium’s essays and comments, and, more ambitiously, to suggest that these papers show how philosophers and historians of law might bring their respective disciplinary methods to bear in answering the same kind of question. In particular, both methods are useful for answering questions about what best explains the endurance or disappearance of an idea, theory, or set of concerns in legal thought or practice. Our claim is not that legal historians and philosophers of law should agree in the answers they give to such questions. They will and should often disagree. Rather, our goal is to show how scholars from the two disciplines may plausibly be seen as joining issue in a productive debate, rather than simply talking past one another.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

The Basics of Narrative

Harold Anthony Lloyd, Wake Forest University School of Law, has published Narrative in Law and Life: Some Frequently Asked Questions in The Second Draft (Fall 2015). Here is the abstract.
This article briefly addresses the following questions: Why should we study narrative? Does narrative have a basic overarching form or forms? How does framing drive narrative? How do concepts drive narrative? What can we do when we lack the necessary concepts for the narrative we need to tell? Are there basic storylines that repeat? Are there basic character types that we reuse? Can narrative drive the results of a Supreme Court case? Can narrative drive transactional practice? How does narrative's importance underscore the importance of an education in the humanities?

Download the text from SSRN at the link.

May 26, 2015

The Scholarship of Andrew Taslitz

Susan A. Bandes, DePaul University College of Law, has published Taz and Empathy in volume 58 of the Howard Law Journal (2015). Here is the abstract.
This article, written for the Taslitz Galaxy Conference at Howard Law School celebrating the life and work of Andrew Taslitz (Taz), will explore the elusive concept of empathy, the notion of empathic divides, and the challenges of empathic accuracy, and will discuss Taz’s scholarship as an ongoing project of bridging empathic divides. Taz's project took many interrelated forms. One primary focus was on the dynamics of cognitive bias and self-deception, drawing on psychology, neuroscience and related disciplines. Taz’s scholarship keeps coming back to the question of the barriers to understanding the narrowness of one’s own perspective, and the barriers to grasping the different frameworks employed by others. It focuses, to take a few examples, on racial blindsight, gender bias, status quo bias, tunnel vision, the bias against the poor, harmful rape narratives, and the self-deception that can lead to date rape. Another primary focus is on identifying institutional reforms that will aid in overcoming these barriers. Empathy, along with respect for the dignity of others (another of his scholarly themes) were not only a primary focus of Taz's scholarship, but also the hallmarks of his relationships with others. He was the rare person whose scholarship and life were of a piece.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

From Dracula To Blade Runner

Sarah Marshall discusses the history and influence of Bram Stoker's Dracula here for Lapham's Quarterly.   Ms. Marshall compares the Dracula story and the immigrant narrative, but I think it also prefigures the alien invasion narrative, in which the invader takes on the coloration and the habits of the locals and blends in so successfully that they believe they cannot defeat him.

After his emigration on the doomed Demeter, Dracula terrorizes the novel’s narrators not just by his predation of their women, but by his mastery of English accent and mannerisms, and his accrual of English property. Yet he has made this desire for complete absorption into English life clear from the beginning: in one of the book’s most telling and oddly poignant moments, Jonathan Harker enters Dracula’s study and finds him “lying on the sofa, reading, of all things in the world, and English Bradshaw’s Guide”—a railway timetable.

Dracula’s obsession with mastering even the most inconsequential habits of English life, and his almost solicitous insistence on his own incompetence as a counterfeit Englishman, tinges his villainy with something both more complicated and more commonplace than horror: Dracula is a supernatural potboiler, but it is also an immigrant’s story. In Dracula’s desire to master his adopted tongue, we can find evidence of his sinister dissembly, but we can also, if we wish to, envision a rather more endearing figure, and a deeply human one. Stoker’s Count is a man casting off the caul of an inhospitable homeland, seeking acceptance in a new country by following its demands, and becoming—as the saying would later go—more English than the English.
Surely this kind of "dissembly" as Ms. Marshall puts it is the stuff of enduring sf terror, as we find it in such films as The Thing, I Married a Monster From Outer Space, and Invasion of the Body Snatchers, and their various remakes, as well as works by Philip K. Dick and other masters, in which we cannot tell the "real humans" from the android "imposters."  Keep watching the skies, the ships, the pods, the replicants, your dreams...

David Hoffman and American Legal Ethics

Michael S. Ariens, St. Mary's University School of Law, has published Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American Legal Ethics, in volume 67 of the Arkansas Law Review (2014). Here is the abstract.
David Hoffman was a successful Baltimore lawyer who wrote the first study of American law in 1817 and authored the first maxims of American legal ethics. Yet for more than a century after his death, Hoffman was a forgotten figure to American lawyers. Beginning in the late 1970s, Hoffman was re-discovered, and his writings on legal ethics have been favorably cited.

How and why was Hoffman “lost” to American law for over a century, and why he was “found”? Hoffman was lost to history because his view of ethics was premised on republican virtue, specifically the concept of honor. A lawyer acted honorably if his actions were morally sanctioned. Thus, Hoffman concluded a lawyer should refuse to plead the statute of limitations because, though legal, such action was dishonorable. When Hoffman wrote his maxims of legal ethics, the concept of honor was being displaced by individualism. The test of lawyer behavior became private conscience rather than public honor. This turn was accompanied by a second shift, in which lawyers accepted that legal ethics differed from public morality. Though an “officer of the court,” the lawyer’s foremost duty was to serve his client’s private interests, and the lawyer was not morally accountable to the public for the client’s goals. One consequence of these changes was the profession’s agreement that lawyers owed a duty to their clients to plead all legal claims and defenses. This vision left Hoffman behind.

Hoffman was found in response to a crisis within the modern American legal profession. By the late 1970s, many lawyers feared that the liberal ideal of the lawyer as a morally neutral, zealous agent (or “hired-gun”) effectuating a client’s goals ignored the lawyer’s duties to the public. This crisis was exacerbated by two events: Watergate, in which lawyers blindly followed the demands of their client, the President, to society’s detriment, and the ABA’s decision in 1978 to replace its 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility, because the Code embraced the “fiction” that ethical issues were “matters of ethics rather than law.” Because Hoffman concluded a lawyer’s duty to a client was limited by his duties to society, he was used as a relevant, historical example of an ethics of advocacy contrary to the “standard conception” of liberal neutrality. Hoffman was a touchstone justifying an ethics of virtue, of lawyers serving the ends of justice, not merely serving their client’s goals.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Creating Racial Identity In Early New Orleans

Kenneth R. Aslakson, Associate Professor of History at Union College, has published Making Race in the Courtroom: The Legal Construction of Three Races In Early New Orleans (NYU Press). Here is a description of the book's contents from the publisher's website.


No American city’s history better illustrates both the possibilities for alternative racial models and the role of the law in shaping racial identity than New Orleans, Louisiana, which prior to the Civil War was home to America’s most privileged community of people of African descent. In the eyes of the law, New Orleans’s free people of color did not belong to the same race as enslaved Africans and African-Americans. While slaves were “negroes,” free people of color were gens de couleur libre, creoles of color, or simply creoles. New Orleans’s creoles of color remained legally and culturally distinct from “negroes” throughout most of the nineteenth century until state mandated segregation lumped together descendants of slaves with descendants of free people of color.
 
Much of the recent scholarship on New Orleans examines what race relations in the antebellum period looked as well as why antebellum Louisiana’s gens de couleur enjoyed rights and privileges denied to free blacks throughout most of the United States. This book, however, is less concerned with the what and why questions than with how people of color, acting within institutions of power, shaped those institutions in ways beyond their control. As its title suggests, Making Race in the Courtroom argues that race is best understood not as a category, but as a process. It seeks to demonstrate the role of free people of African-descent, interacting within the courts, in this process.

Gandhi, Mindfulness, and Law

Nehal A. Patel, University of Michigan, Dearborn, has published Why Lawyers Fear Love: Mohandas Gandhi's Significance to the Mindfulness in Law Movement. Here is the abstract.
Although mindfulness has gained the attention of the legal community, there are only a handful of scholarly law articles on mindfulness. The literature effectively documents the Mindfulness in Law movement, but there has been minimal effort to situate the movement into the broader history of non-Western ideas in the legal academy and profession. Similarly, there has been little recent scholarship offering a critique of the American legal system through the insights of mindfulness. In this Article, I attempt to fill these gaps by situating the Mindfulness in Law movement into the history of modern education’s western-dominated world-view. With this approach, I hope to unearth some of the deep challenges facing a mindful revolution in law that are yet to be widely discussed. In Part I, I introduce the current mindfulness movement in American society. In Part II, I summarize the current Mindfulness in Law movement and the treatment of “Eastern” thought in modern education. I also describe the three levels of change discussed in academic literature: individual, interpersonal, and structural change. In Part III, I discuss how Mohandas Gandhi exemplifies all three levels of change. In Part IV, I offer critical appreciation of the Mindfulness in Law movement by highlighting Gandhi’s insights on structural reform. I conclude that a mindful application of Gandhi’s thought suggests that satyagraha be incorporated into a constitutional framework, thus making legally protected speech out of forms of public-state dialogue that are traditionally ‘extra-legal’ and used disproportionately by marginalized populations.
\ Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Magna Carta and the Proportionality Principle

Craig S. Lerner, George Mason University School of Law, is publishing Does the Magna Carta Embody a Proportionality Principle? in volume 25 of the George Mason University Civil Rights Journal (2015). Here is the abstract.
American scholars often argue that the Magna Carta embodies a “proportionality principle” mandating that the punishment fit the crime. This principle, according to a familiar narrative, found expression centuries later in the English Bill of Rights, which was reproduced another century later in the American Bill of Rights. Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have claimed the authority of the Magna Carta when infusing the Eighth Amendment with a proportionality principle not immediately evident from its text.

This Essay explores and questions the narrative. The argument that the Magna Carta embodies a proportionality principle seizes upon three Chapters (20 to 22) that provide that a penalty not exceed “the degree of the offense.” Yet these sections exclusively concern the Norman practice of amercements — a penalty imposed for a litany of administrative offenses that were almost never of a criminal nature. Furthermore, given the prevalence of violent crime and the widespread acceptance of cruel punishment, it is implausible to project humanitarian motives onto the authors of Chapters 20 to 22. The Essay concludes with broader reflections on the uses made of the Magna Carta in this year, the 800th anniversary of its sealing. Like virtually every legal document in recorded history, the Magna Carta embodies at some level a proportionality principle. But as jurists purport to extract more meaningful and specific lessons from the Magna Carta on this and other points, their arguments lapse into poor scholarship and hopeless anachronism.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Legacy

Paul Schiff Berman, George Washington University Law School, has published Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Interaction of Legal Systems in The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg in (Scott Dodson, ed.; Cambridge University Press, 2015). Here is the abstract.
The idea of legal pluralism is that law must always negotiate situations when multiple communities and legal authorities seek to regulate the same act or actor. These overlapping jurisdictional assertions may occur because of federalism, or because disputes often cross territorial borders, or because of complicated inter-jurisdictional arrangements, as with Indian tribes in the United States. In all of these situations, judges must develop strategies for determining how best to balance the competing claims of multiple communities: does the law of one community triumph, does the law of the other community triumph, or is there some hybrid solution available?

This Essay surveys some of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s key writings on the interaction of legal systems, both in law journals and in judicial opinions. This analysis reveals a consistent theme in Ginsburg’s jurisprudence. Across a variety of substantive legal areas, Ginsburg often chooses a path that provides maximum play among the legal systems at issue. Beginning with her earliest scholarly writings, she has tended to oppose doctrines allowing one legal system to block another from adjudicating a dispute, and throughout her later career Ginsburg likewise tends to reject bright-line rules that choose one legal system over another. Instead, she often seems to prefer procedural arrangements that seek accommodation and flexibility in order to ensure that multiple legal systems and a variety of norms and processes are respected. These principles also carry over to Ginsburg’s views about international and transnational law. A committed internationalist, Ginsburg advocates the importance of seeking wisdom from others. This non-dogmatic, deferential approach to plural legal systems characterizes much of her jurisprudence on inter-systemic conflicts, though interestingly such deference does not always apply with as much force in Ginsburg’s opinions concerning tribal communities.

By taking stock of Ginsburg’s navigation of legal pluralism in a set of representative writings, we can better theorize her contribution to a jurisprudential approach that seeks ongoing negotiation in an interlocking world of multiple jurisdictions and multiple legal norms. Just as important, this discussion provides an initial case study for thinking more broadly about possible judicial responses to the reality of legal pluralism.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

May 21, 2015

A Deadly Affair

Alexis Coe on the first successful use of the insanity defense in U.S. law, by a U.S. Congressman, no less, after he stood trial for murdering his wife's lover. Read her account here of Daniel Sickles' killing of Philip Barton Key (son of Francis Scott Key) in Lapham's Quarterly. More about the case here at the website Murder by Gaslight.





The lady in question: Teresa Bagioli Sickles (1836-1867). Her mother was the daughter of librettist Lorenzo Da Ponte. She and General Sickles married when she was a teenager and he was in his early thirties.

Selected bibliography:

Brandt, Nat,  The Congressman Who Got Away With Murder (Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press, 1991).

Keneally, Thomas,  American Scoundrel: The Life of the Notorious Civil War General Dan Sickles (NY: Doubleday, 2002).

Also see:

Extended bibliography available here.




May 20, 2015

Sexual Violence, and Game of Thrones

The Washington Post's Alyssa Rosenberg discusses the shocking wedding night rape of character Sansa Stark on the May 17, 2015 episode of HBO's popular show Game of Thrones, and explains why she considers it part of the show's more encompassing narrative of violence and sexual control.

More coverage of the episode and viewer reaction here from the Christian Science Monitor.

Law and Culture Conference Call For Papers: Deadline Extended Until June 30, 2015

The Call for Papers of the Law and Culture Conference, to be held September 10-11 of this year, is open until June 30. More here.

A Symposium On Narrative & Metaphor In the Law

At Stanford Law School, January 30, 2016, a Symposium on Narrative & Metaphor in the Law.

Scheduled speakers are Linda L. Berger (UNLV, Las Vegas, Law School), Peter Brooks (Princeton), Raymond W. Gibbs (UC Santa Cruz), Michael Hanne (University of Auckland, New Zealand), Lawrence Joseph (St. John's University School of Law), Dahlia Lithwick (Slate Magazine), Bernadette Meyler (Stanford Law School), Greta Olson (University of Giessen), Roberto H. Potter (University of Central Florida), L. David Ritchie (Portland State University), Lawrence Rosen (Princeton University), Michael R. Smith (University of Wyoming College of Law), Kathryn M. Stanchi (Temple University School of Law), Simon Stern (University of Toronto Faculty of Law and Department of English), Meredith Wallis (Stanford University), Robert Weisberg (Stanford University), and Katharine Young (Boston College Law School).


Read more about the event here at its dedicated website.

Legal Realism As the Basis For a Law School Curriculum

Robert Rubinson, University of Baltimore School of Law, has published The Holmes School of Law: A Proposal to Reform Legal Education Through Realism at 35 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice 33 (2015).
This article proposes the formation of a new law school, the Holmes School of Law. The curriculum of the Holmes School would draw upon legal realism, particularly as articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes. The proposed curriculum would focus on educating students about “law in fact” — how law is actually experienced. It rejects the idea that legal education should be about reading cases written by judges who not only bring their own biases and cultural understandings to their role, but who also ignore law as experienced, which, in the end, is what law is. This disconnect is especially troubling because virtually all legal education ignores law as experienced by low-income people. The article concludes with responses to anticipated objections to the proposal.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Holmes, Emerson, and Agonism

Allen Mendenhall, Auburn University, has published Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Is the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist: A Brief and Belated Response to Stanley Cavell at 6 Faulkner Law Review 197 (2014). Here is the abstract.
This essay investigates the relationship between Ralph Waldo Emerson and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the context of the common law. Holmes’s Emersonian writings, in particular his dissents, fall within the theoretical framework of agonism, which Harold Bloom refers to as a revisionary and Emersonian “program.” Agonism as a political and aesthetic theory maintains that sites of contestation can be productive rather than destructive; it suggests that confrontational relationships can be at once mutually offsetting and generative. Drawing from the Greek word for an athletic competition, agonism applied to rhetoric underscores the importance of mutuality to conflict: writers struggling against other writers understand and admire, yet seek creatively to outdo and overcome, their competition. The common-law system substantiates this theory insofar as every case answers an anterior case and creates a succession of precedents marked by strong judges and justices struggling against their predecessors. I submit that Emerson and Holmes were both pragmatic champions of descendent agonism, the former in the American literary tradition and the latter in the American common-law tradition that is distinct from its British precursor.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

A Long Time Ago, In a Jurisprudence Far, Far Away

Cass Sunstein, Harvard Law School, is publishing How Star Wars Illuminates Constitutional Law in the Michigan Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Human beings often see coherence and planned design when neither exists. This is so in movies, literature, history, economics, and psychoanalysis – and constitutional law. Contrary to the repeated claims of George Lucas, its principal author, the Star Wars series was hardly planned in advance; it involved a great deal of improvisation and surprise, even to Lucas himself. Serendipity and happenstance, sometimes in the forms of eruptions of new thinking, play a pervasive and overlooked role in the creative imagination, certainly in single-authored works, and even more in multi-authored ones extending over time.

Serendipity imposes serious demands on the search for coherence in art, literature, history, and law. That search leads many people (including Lucas) to misdescribe the nature of their own creativity and authorship. The misdescription appears to respond to a serious human need for sense-making and pattern-finding, but it is a significant obstacle to understanding and critical reflection. Whether Jedi or Sith, many authors of constitutional law are a lot like the author of Star Wars, disguising the essential nature of their own creative processes. 

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

May 19, 2015

Breaking It Bad In a Law Review

In the New Mexico Law Review, Spring 2015:

New Mexico Law Review Current Issue

Spring 2015, Vol. 45, No. 2

Front Matter
Professional Articles

Discussion here from the Wall Street Journal.

Speaking and Silence: Boy Scouts v. Dale

Mae Kuykendall, Michigan State University College of Law, is publishing Evaluating the Sociology of First Amendment Silence in volume 42 of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly (2015). Here is the abstract.
The First Amendment expressive associational freedom analysis of the 2000 mid-culture-wars case of Boy Scouts v. Dale adopts an understanding of conventions permitting, or mandating, silence and frames them as a basis for constitutional supervision of customs of silence and speech. The holding in Dale allowed the Scouts to exclude openly gay scout masters, despite a New Jersey statute barring such discrimination from a “public accommodation.” The Court explained that organizational rights to exclude an openly gay Scout, whose presence speaks where silence is preferred, would enrich discourse by enabling organizations to claim a shield of silence with which to strengthen the freedom of speech and association that flourishes in voluntary associations. The silence principle, embraced at the time by legal commentators as a win for free speech and the construction of identity, had the dichotomous effect of engendering more elite speech, as among academics, but silencing non-elite speech, that is, among young men excluded from a group that their peer group could join without identity-based barriers. The effect of the teaching by the Court was to affirm a preference for speech and identity silos, in which customs of silencing enjoyed immunity from unwanted messages and in which certain persons could be deemed inherently unwelcome embodiments of a breach of silence. This Article revisits Dale to explore the implications of Dale for civic engagement — for maintaining open civic space for contact and speech as a First Amendment value. Awarding a shield against contact with contrary views and identities disables policy-makers from supporting principles that, on empirical examination, may enrich discourse and enhance overall civic space. The failure of the Court to engage with a sociology of civic space will be examined for its import for the meeting point between social customs of control and the aspiration of the First Amendment to an engaged, expressive citizenry and to the dissemination of knowledge.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.  Cross-posted to Media Law Prof Blog.

Defining "Funny", Protecting Speech