Davoli on Florida Man

Joanmarie Davoli, Barry University School of Law, has published Florida Man. Here is the abstract.

Zephaniah Kingsley was the original Florida Man. Married to a woman from West Africa whom he had purchased as a slave, he prospered economically as a plantation owner and slave trader in Spanish Florida. When Florida was ceded to the United States, Kingsley served on the Legislative Council charged with developing the laws of the Territory of Florida for its transformation into a State. His proposals for laws to protect the rights of free blacks were dismissed as personal quirks. Kingsley's marriage, his lifestyle, and his views of slavery and freedom alienated him from both abolitionists and pro-slavery contingencies alike, and his writings have been historically portrayed as very Florida Man: eccentric, irrational, and shocking. Yet analyzing his papers from a scholarly perspective reveals that Kingsley was promoting a slave system more akin to Ancient Rome-a system that was not based upon race-than to 19th Century America. Indeed, he defends many of his ideas as stemming from the systems of slavery developed under the Spanish Code. Although unaware of the ancient legal roots of his own proposals, Kingsley's suggestions that slaves have legal protections as well as options for entrepreneurship and freedom through self-purchase were soundly rejected by his contemporaries. Had anyone taken Florida Man Zephaniah Kingsley seriously, Roman Law could have offered a model for both the peaceful elimination of slavery as well as recognizing equal rights for all races.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Extended Deadline for Call For Papers; Festschrift in Honor of Professor Lenora Ledwon

Professors Christine Corcos (LSU Law) and Christian Lee Gonzalez-Rivera (STU Law) are delighted to invite abstract submissions (or full drafts, if ready) for a festschrift of essays and articles in honor of Professor Lenora Ledwon. We are extending the deadline to submit abstracts (or drafts) to November 15, 2026.

We invite pieces reflecting on any aspect of her work as well as original pieces unrelated to the latter. The central theme, however, is that of Law and Literature, both specifically as a jurisprudential approach and, more generally, as that boundless intersection between law, literature, and pop culture. Any reflection, then, on the relationship between any two of these three is welcome. This is a rare and wonderful occasion for senior and young professors in the field to publish jointly. Specific topics we especially welcome include: law, literature, and religion; law, literature, and philosophy; law, literature, and gender; and law, literature, and race. 

The contributions will be published as a book, whether as a special volume of the St. Thomas Law Review or with an academic publisher, anywhere between Fall of 2027 and Spring of 2028. The pieces should range between 10,000 and 25,000 words, but we will accept longer submissions. Again, the extended deadline to submit abstracts (or ready drafts) to secure a place is November 15, 2026. For submissions and any other questions, please contact Professors Corcos (ccorcos@lsu.edu) and Gonzalez-Rivera (cgonzalezrivera@stu.edu).

Berresford on A Pumpkin Patch, a Typewriter, and Richard Nixon: The Hiss-Chambers Espionage Case

John W. Berresford, Independent, has published A Pumpkin Patch, A Typewriter, and Richard Nixon: The Hiss-Chambers Espionage Case. Here is the abstract.

This is a history of one of the most famous trials in American history. It was also a political circus and a personal tragedy for the litigants. The article takes the reader through Congressional hearings in 1948, a libel suit, grand jury proceedings, two criminal jury trials, and appeals that ended only in the 1980s. In the end, it was proved that a drearily correct diplomat named Alger Hiss had been spying for the Soviet Union for years and that warnings about his and similar crimes had been ignored for too long. Hiss's chief accuser, Whittaker Chambers, was a strange and fascinating genius who originally was believed only by a freshman Representative named Richard Nixon. The personalities, public punches and counter punches, litigation strategies, evidence, legal rulings, and courtroom advocacy of both sides are examined in detail. Also described are what did not come out in the trials and the political impact of all this, as well as elite and public opinion about who was telling the truth.

Download the article from SSRN at the link. The text is taken from the author's podcasts [Ed.]

Cronan on Judges Removing Judges

Liam Edward Cronan, Boston University School of Law; Ropes & Gray LLP, has published Judges Removing Judges in volume 75 of the Cleveland State Law Review (2027). Here is the abstract.

This Article offers new historical evidence to a timely constitutional question: when, and how, can a federal judge be removed from office? Federal judges are widely assumed to hold office for life, removable only by impeachment. But a minority of sources have suggested that the historical meaning of "good behavior" under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which was adopted directly from English law, permits removal by a far more obscure means: a civil trial brought by a writ of scire facias. This interpretation has been starkly criticized, however, based on the absence of any case in which an English judge was removed after the early eighteenth century, when the use of "good behavior" became widespread and statutes first authorized judicial removal by England's legislature. But the same cannot be said for judges in British-ruled Ireland. Not long after the ratification of Article III, a series of Irish judges who held office during good behavior under the authority of English law engaged in misconduct-from publishing libelous articles to embezzling court fees-and faced removal proceedings. By analyzing the long-neglected records of their removal proceedings, this Article reveals that existing debate over judicial removal has overlooked a significant body of historical evidence: statements preserved in the record of these removal proceedings, and corroborated by English legal treatises and American founding-era sources, suggest that many leading political and legal authorities of the time believed removal for misbehavior could be achieved by several means, including by trial. As federal judicial tenure continues to face challenges, this history carries significant practical stakes. It adds a new perspective to unresolved debates over the power of judicial removal, complicates the assumption that the words "good behavior," as adopted by the U.S. Constitution, limit removal to impeachment, and offers a deeper understanding of the protections and limits of federal judicial office.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.