Ori J. Herstein, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty of Law; King's College London, Dickson Poon School of Law, is publishing Justifying Standing to Give Reasons: Hypocrisy, Minding Your Own Business, and Knowing One’s Place in Philosophers' Imprint (Forthcoming). Here is the abstract.
Numerous everyday practices exhibit the normative structure of “standing”: forbidding certain interventions in the affairs of others and permitting ignoring such interventions. This normative structure turns on facts about the person intervening and not on facts determinative of the validity of her intervention. When valid, directives count as reasons to do as they direct. When interventions take the form of directives, standing practices may permit excluding those directives from one’s practical deliberations, regardless of the directives’ validity or normative weight. Standing practices are, therefore, puzzling – forbidding the giving of genuine reasons and, if given, permitting disregarding such reasons. What (pro tanto) justifies standing practices are the values they protect which, depending on the particular practice, include privacy, autonomy, independence, valuable relationships, and equal respect. These values count in favor of standing’s duty against certain interventions and, when these duties of non-intervention are breached, the values underpinning those duties count in favor of standing’s permission to discount or exclude those interventions from one’s practical deliberations – the normative weight of those interventions notwithstanding.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
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