March 22, 2017

Call for Papers, Law and Culture Conference 2017, St. Mary's University, Twickenham

From Thom Giddens, Co-Director, Centre for Law and Culture, St. Mary's University








Centre for Law and Culture

St Mary’s University Twickenham


Law and Culture Conference 2017
7th–8th September 2017


Call for papers: The Significance of Anarchy in Relation To Law, Culture, and Theory


What does it mean to break the world? What is legitimate resistance to state power? When does authority spill over into repression? What happens when a sovereign loses control? What is an anarchic act? Is anarchic thought possible? What is anarchy’s
relationship to chaos and disorder? What is its relationship to order and regulation? How are such concepts representedif they can bein legal, social, political, moral, and critical philosophies?
Can anarchy be a duty?

The Law and Culture Conference 2017 aims to stimulate a topical discussion that crosses disciplinary, geographic, academic, and conceptual boundaries (inter alia), on the significance of anarchy  in relation to law, culture, and theory.
Here are some indicative themes; do not let them limit you: Anarchies of the State
·         Power, power structures, authority, authoritarianism,
(il)legitimate authority; despotism, barbarism, war, propaganda, totalitarianism; ideologies of anarchism, or the de-centralisation or the minimal State
·         States of disorder and/or disorganization; lawlessness and misrule; the state of nature
·         Statelessness, refugee crises, anti-statism; international regulation and governance; permeable boundaries; the internet, digital media, information exchange

Anarchies of the Subject
·         Absolute freedom of the individual; social breakdown, lack and/or failure of accountability; leaderless-ness, alienation, self-determination, individual responsibility
·         Grassroots; voluntary association; social regulation; self-governing societies; modes of non- recognition or rejection of authority; resisting oppression; vulnerability
·         Revolution, sabotage, assassination, riot, mutiny, protest, rebellion, direct action, self- empowerment; intersections between legal, moral, and political obligation
·         Aggression, violence, self-defence, non-violence/pacifism

Anarchies of Thought
·         Nihilism, chaos, anti-structuralism; post-fact, post-reality, post-truth; liberalism, democracy, Trumpism/Brexit; the death of ‘left-right’ politics, the rise of nationalism
·         Coercion, compulsion, reasons, normativity, resistance, practical reason (including both individual and collective/social methodologies of decision-making)
·         Hierarchy (including intersectional hierarchies such as the state, religion, monarchy, patriarchy, economy, sex, race, sexual orientation), and anti-hierarchical philosophies
·         The art and literature of anarchy, punk culture, alternative, radical cultures, art as/and anarchic knowledge


Submission information

·         Please submit proposals via email to thomas.giddens@stmarys.ac.uk by 14 May 2017.
·         We welcome proposals for traditional papers and panels, as well as more anarchic suggestions: performances, experimentations, artistries, sense-events, inter alia, et cetera, in anarchia
·         Paper proposals: 250 word abstract and a 50 word biography (by default papers will be 20 minutes in length, with additional time for questions).
·         Panel proposals: 150 panel abstract (including indicative timings; default is 90 minutes), 250 word abstracts for individual papers, and a 50 word biography for each presenter.
·         Proposals for alternative formats, or anarchic sessions: 250 word abstract (including indicative timings) and a 50 word biography for each participant

About the Centre for Law and Culture

The Centre for Law and Culture is an interdisciplinary hub for research at the intersections of law, justice, and the humanities, engaging legal study that spans topics and themes from across critical and cultural legal studies and thereby incubating and promoting the crossing and challenging of legal boundaries.

Location: St. Mary’s University, Twickenham, London TW1 4SX (http://www.stmarys.ac.uk/contact/location-maps.htm).

Please contact: Dr Thom Giddens thomas.giddens@stmarys.ac.uk Dr Judith Bourne judith.bourne@stmarys.ac.uk

Registration:


There is an anticipated £100 registration fee (plus booking), which will cover both days and include dinner. Cheaper packages will be available, e.g. for single-day attendance.

March 21, 2017

Colin Dexter (1930-2017) Passes Away

Colin Dexter, creator of the Inspector Morse novels, has died, aged 86. Here is more from The Guardian.

Mr. Dexter wrote thirteen Morse novels, the first appearing in 1975 (Last Bus To Woodstock) and the last, in which Inspector Morse dies, appearing in 1999 (The Remorseful Day). Inspector Morse and his friends and colleagues came to the screen beginning in 1988 (ITV) with the late John Thaw as Endeavour Morse (we don't learn his first name until extremely late in the series). Two spin-off series followed: Lewis, starring Kevin Whately, who had played Sergeant Lewis in the original series (2006-2015), and Endeavour, starring Shaun Evans as a young Sergeant Morse (2012--).

Order of Inspector Morse books.

A short bibliography on Colin Dexter's Inspector Morse

Simon Barker, Period Detective Drama and the limits of contemporary Nostalgia: "Inspector Morse" and the strange case of a lost England

Helen Davis, Inspector Morse and the Business of Crime 

Lyn Thomas, In Love With Inspector More: Feminist Subculture and Quality Television

Stijn Reijnders, Watching the Detectives: Inside the Guilty Landscapes of Inspector Morse, Baantjer and Wallander


Cyras and Lachmayer on Visualization of Hajime Yoshino's Logical Jurisprudence

Vytautas Cyras, Vilnius University, and Friedrich Lachmayer, University of Innsbruck, have published Visualization of Hajime Yoshino's Logical Jurisprudence, at Trends and Communities of Legal Informatics: Proceedings of the 20th International Legal Informatics Symposium (IRIS) 2017 349 (E. Schweighofer, F. Kummer, W. Hoetzendorfer, and C. Sorge, eds., OCG, Vienna, 2017). Here is the abstract.
Hajime Yoshino’s Logical Jurisprudence (LJ) is an important concept in legal informatics. Yoshino aims for a logic-based systematization in the legal domain. He focuses on legal reasoning and systematization. Inevitably, embracing law as a whole brings us to Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. In sum, three issues are important in LJ: logic, Kelsen and legal informatics. In this paper we aim to visualize the architecture of LJ. We suggest expanding this with legal ontologies and words. The granularity of word-phrase-sentence-text is about different methods which apply to different units.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Sherwin on What Authorizes the Image? The Visual Economy of Post-Secular Jurisprudence @RKSherwin

Richard K. Sherwin, New York Law School, is publishing What Authorizes the Image? The Visual Economy of Post-Secular Jurisprudence in Law and the Visual: Transitions and Transformations (University of Toronto Press, 2017). Here is the abstract.
In law’s visual economy our commitment to justice grows out of a renewed encounter with an interior libidinal source whose ongoing collective investment binds us to the nomos in which we live. We experience this corporeal bond in paintings, films, and video images on screens large and small. In the ethically inflected aesthetic of post-secular jurisprudence, justice is to law as beauty is to art. As distant as an abstract expressionist canvas, as close as any neighbor, or indeed any screen on which the neighbor becomes real to us. That is where we behold the source and instantiation of law’s judgment and authority.
Download the essay at the link.

Tamanaha on the Combination of Formalism and Realism

Brian Z. Tamanaha, Washington University, St. Louis, School of Law, has published The Combination of Formalism and Realism as Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-03-01. Here is the abstract.
For several generations now, legal scholars in the United States have framed debates about law and judging in terms of formalism-versus-realism. This entrenched framework is grounded in a widely accepted historical account. In this essay, I dismantle this antithesis and reconstruct their relationship. When properly understood, they go together. The first half of the essay shows that the conventional historical narrative is incorrect. Realism about law and judging has long been present in the American legal tradition. This discussion covers the views of Langdell, James Fitzjames Stephen, and other nineteenth and twentieth century jurists. The second half of the essay explains why systematic rule formalism is necessary, why realism is inevitable, and how they go together. The legal system would not work absent formalism, realism is parasitic on formalism, and realism reflects the ameliorating presence of human judgments within formalistic systems. The formalism-versus-realism framework does not allow this relationship to be expressed as a coherent bundle of views about law and judging, and should be discarded.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

March 20, 2017

Lubin on Custom in the Vedic Ritual Codes as an Emergent Legal Principle @TimothyLubin

Timothy Lubin, Washington and Lee School of Law, has published Custom in the Vedic Ritual Codes as an Emergent Legal Principle at 136 Journal of the American Oriental Society 669 (2016). Here is the abstract.
The degree to which the early dharma literature was an extrapolation from the earlier ritual codes can be seen from a number of shared features of form and content. One of these that has not received more than passing notice is the fact that the Dharmaśāstric principle of regarding customary norms as a valid basis of dharma, both in general (sadācāra, śiṣṭācāra) and in limited spheres (deśācāra, grāmadharma, kuladharma, etc.), has its origins in ritual rules in the śrautasūtras and gṛhyasūtras. Passages from the Baudhāyanaśrautasūtra and numerous gṛhyasūtras show that already in these rulebooks established practices of particular social groups were accepted as a valid authority in certain contexts where explicit textual warrant was lacking, and that a further distinction was there made between the general norms of experts and the valid particular norms of locality or social group.
Donwload the article from SSRN at the link.

A New Book Celebrates Comic Book Superheroes Who Battled Adolf Hitler

Mark Fertig's new book Take That, Adolf!: The Fighting Comic Books of the Second World War (Fantagraphics Books, 2017) features over 500 covers of superhero comic books published between 1941 and 1945 showing those who took on Adolf Hitler. Those who defeated Hitler in print included Captain America, Wonder Woman, and others.





Yeager on Stuffed Deer and the Grammar of Mistakes

Daniel B.Yeager, California Western School of Law, has published Stuffed Deer and the Grammar of Mistakes. Here is the abstract.
Impossible attempts were first officially recognized as non-criminal in 1864, the idea being that a person whose anti-social bent poses no appreciable risk of harm is no criminal. To reassure myself the subject doesn’t “smell of the lamp,” I tapped “impossibility” into Westlaw, which designated nearly 1500 criminal cases as on point, 900 or so more recent than 1999. Impossible attempts thus turn out to be not merely a professorial hobby horse, but instead, expressive of a non-trivial tension between risk-taking and harm-causing within the very real world of criminal litigation. Although it is now hornbook that impossible attempts are punishable as crimes, there remains a sense of a non-trivial difference between failing at larceny by picking the empty pocket of a passerby on a sidewalk and by picking the empty pocket of a mannequin in a department store. What remains up in the air is what accounts for that difference. Here I hope to decode the impossibility defense by “hounding down the minutiae” of what it means to make a mistake. I am certainly not the first to insist that the impossibility defense lives on. I am, however, the first to base such a claim on the grammar or criteria of mistakes, which can get us closer to the bottom of what makes attempts impossible and why it matters. Extant impossibility cases and scholarship take mistakes as a given. But what is a mistake? Is the answer too obvious to mention? Within the stock hypotheticals of impossible attempts, a man shoots a tree stump or a corpse, each mistaken for a live person, or administers a live person an innocuous substance mistaken for poison. These stick-figure hypotheticals pose whether attempted murder has occurred. But because it is stipulated that each action owes to mistake, we are told so little about what happened that of course the question is hard to answer. Any chance of making sense of the hypotheticals is stymied by an absence both of facts and any concern for what can count as a mistake. My contribution here to the considerable work of others is therefore to locate the impossibility defense within an actual context of human action and concern.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Rappaport and McGinnis on The Constitution and the Language of the Law

Michael B. Rappaport, University of San Diego School of Law, and John O. McGinnis, Northwestern University, Pritzker School of Law, have published The Constitution and the Language of the Law, as San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 17-262. Here is the abstract.
There has been a long-standing debate over whether the Constitution is written in ordinary or legal language. Yet no article has offered a framework for determining the nature of the Constitution’s language, let alone systematically canvassed the evidence. This article fills the gap. First, it shows that a distinctive legal language exists. This language in the Constitution includes terms, like Letters of Marque and Reprisal, that are patently technical, and terms, like good behavior, that are latently so in that they have both an ordinary and legal meaning but are better interpreted according to the latter. It also includes legal interpretive rules such as those that tell readers when to understand a term in its legal sense or its ordinary meaning sense. The article shows how to determine whether a document is written in the language of the law. The most important factor is the language of the document itself. The pervasive presence of technical legal terms provides strong evidence that a document is written in the language of the law, because ordinary language cannot easily account for even a small number of legal terms. The purpose of the document also counts. Insofar as it is written to inform officials of their duties, it is more likely to written in legal language, because that language allows more precision. The language of similar documents provides additional evidence. Since other constitutions at the time were written in the language of the law, that militates in favor of reading the Constitution in that same language. The article supplies strong evidence that the Constitution is written in the language of the law. The article is the first to count the legal terms in the Constitution and approximates them at a hundred. Moreover, the Constitution’s text both blocks the operation of certain legal interpretive rules and calls for the application of other such rules. Finally, the judges and legislators charged with implementing the Constitution in the early Republic frequently deployed legal interpretive rules to resolve contested issues. The Constitution’s legal language has important theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, it shows that that original methods originalism is the correct form of originalism, because the Constitution’s legal interpretive rules are crucial to cashing out its meaning. Practically, the richness of its idiom provides resources to address otherwise unresolvable interpretive questions.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Ricca on the Interplay of Space and Law: Legal Chorology

Mario Ricca, University of Parma, has published How to Make Space and Law Interplay Horizontally: From Legal Geography to Legal Chorology. Here is the abstract.
This essay addresses the thorny issue of how legal words and spatial experiences interplay. The topic is treated trough the spectrum of the subsidiarity principle and its semantic-spatial implications. This perspective allows for an immediate focus on the cognitive continuities extant between categorical and spatial frames. When a subject (public or private) is considered to be subsidiary with respect to another, then he/she/it is entitled to a substitution, which as such implies a semantic and experiential shifting. This very possibility for shifting/displacement reveals cognitive continuities between word and space in the legal realm and experience. Moving from this view, the essay proposes a different approach to the relationships between legal words and space, assumed as a division of power by contemporary Legal Geography. The method used to define this perspective is precisely “Legal Chorology.” The essay will address its theoretical and practical implications in bridging and dynamically managing the diffraction between law and space. Legal reasoning is thus enhanced by using a semiotic perspective in the analysis of human spatial experience and cognition. The topics addressed range from a discussion of the intertwining of the human activity of categorization and the perception of space, to an assessment of the consequences that a chorological view can engender for classical legal issues such as inheritance law, urban law, contract law, public assistance on behalf of subjects with disabilities, and so on.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

March 16, 2017

Kemmerer on Sources in the Meta-Theory of International Law: Hermeneutical Conversations @kemmereralex

Alexandra Kemmerer, Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, is publishing Sources in the Meta-Theory of International Law: Hermeneutical Conversations in The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Samantha Besson and Jean D'Aspremont, eds., Oxford University Press, 2017). Here is the abstract.
A meta-theoretical approach to sources opens reflexive spaces, situates theories in time and space, and allows for a contextual interpretation of sources. In this paper, drawing on the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the writings of his most perceptive readers in international law, I develop a concept of reflexive situatedness prompting a constructive contextualization of sources and their interpreters in our ‘normative pluriverse’ (D’Aspremont). Following the traces of international law’s current ‘turn to interpretation’ and a reading of international law as a ‘hermeneutical enterprise’, my assessment of the limits and potentials of Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics prepares the ground for an analysis of the writings of international lawyers who have developed theories of international legal interpretation inspired by his work — and, in particular, for a closer look at the writings of Outi Korhonen, linking her concept of situationality to an emphasis on context(s) that engages with the rhetorical dimension of Gadamer’s work. Gadamer’s conversational hermeneutics opens new perspectives for a contextual theory and praxis of international legal interpretation that brings together various disciplinary perspectives and cultural experiences, and thereby allows for a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of sources and their interpreters within their respective interpretative communities.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Lloyd on Why Originalism Cannot Work: Lessons From Logic, Scripture, and Art @LloydEsq

Harold Anthony Lloyd, Wake Forest School of Law, has published Why Originalism Cannot Work: Lessons from Logic, Scripture, and Art. Here is the abstract.
Neil Gorsuch lauds judges who purport to “apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be . . . .” It’s hard to see how such Originalism withstands scrutiny. First, using “reasonable reader” understandings rather than speaker meaning turns language and law on their heads. Audiences effectively become the speakers in ordinary speech (since reader or audience meaning prevails), and audiences (and thus the ruled) effectively become the rulers when interpreting law (since audiences’ meaning prevails). Second, since laws look forward to govern conduct, how can best legal practices keep such a backward focus? Third, words (however understood by others at the time “originally” uttered) may or may not (depending on speaker and not reader meaning) signify concepts whose meanings embrace change over time. For example, the word “planet” used by a speaker before the discovery of Uranus and Neptune may or may not include further planets depending upon what the speaker meant by “planet.” (The same applies to the inclusion or exclusion of Pluto had the speaker used the word “planet” after the discovery of Pluto but before its exclusion by current science.) Unlike the “reasonable” reader of Gorsuch’s Originalism as phrased above, speakers run the gamut from reasonable to unreasonable, from informed to uninformed, and from thoughtful to thoughtless. Fourth, to the extent a judge is principally “constrained” by a text or texts (as he may determine), by dictionaries that he chooses, and by “history” as the judge understands it, isn’t judicial activism encouraged rather than restrained? Talk of a “reasonable” reader masks the fact that there can be multiple “reasonable” conclusions of what a reasonable or unreasonable speaker meant. Is a judge not therefore left to pick definitions and applications of terms that accord with the judge’s understandings of history, understandings that may well be colored by the judge’s politics and judicial philosophy? This applies to principles as well as labels for things. Principles are also subject to multiple frames, and their terms are subject to multiple definitions therefore raising the very same questions just raised above. Finally, such Originalism doesn’t merely fail with legal texts. It also fails when applied to other texts (including sacred texts such as the Ten Commandments) and when used to interpret art (such as “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus” often attributed to Bruegel and which inspired such great ekphrasis as Auden’s “Musée Des Beaux Arts”). These further failures underscore the dysfunction of Originalism as described by Gorsuch above.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Call For Papers: Criminal Heritage: Crime, Fiction, and History, September 5, 2017, Leeds Beckett University @LeedsBeckett

Via Thom Giddens @ThomGiddens:


CRIMINAL HERITAGE: CRIME, FICTION, AND HISTORY

TUESDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 2017, LEEDS BECKETT UNIVERSITY

CALL FOR PAPERS


“The simultaneous awareness of past and present evident in historical crime fiction seems to offer a means of gaining a new perspective on the present through the past.” – John Scaggs (2005: 134)

Confirmed Keynote: Dr Heather Shore (Leeds Beckett University)
Confirmed Keynote: Frances Brody (Author)

As Michel Foucault acknowledged, crime and its investigation are uniquely tied to their social context: crime is a violation of the law, and ‘the law represents the will of the sovereign.’ When crime is narratised in the form of history, or as historical fiction, there is a fresh dynamic. The structures of the past and the present will inform its presentation, and surrounding ethical concerns.

 The past few years have seen an unprecedented rise in the production and consumption of historical crime fiction and drama. However, it is not a new phenomenon: from the revisionist histories of Edgar Allan Poe, through Josephine Tey’s The Daughter of Time, and the contemporary success of Frances Brody, Carola Dunn, and Kerry Greenwood, crime fiction has always been concerned with the past. The continued success of period crime dramas on the screen – from nostalgic detective narratives such as Foyle’s War to the BBC’s Ripper Street and renewed interest in organised criminal gangs, such as the Kray twins –  is matched by a self-referential streak in crime writing that interacts with its own generic traditions.

In addition, historical true crime narratives – mined for dramatic potential and social relevance – have come to the fore of Anglo-American culture. From the surprise popularity of Kate Summerscale’s non-fiction novels exploring Victorian and Edwardian crimes to the global success of such television productions as American Crime Story and Making a Murderer, there is more interest now than ever in historical crime as entertainment.

This interdisciplinary conference aims to explore, analyse, and debate the relationship between crime, narrative, and history. We invite proposals of 200 words for 20-minute papers relating to the conference theme. We welcome proposals for traditional presentations and those which approach the theme in an innovative way. Possible topics include but are not limited to
  • Historical crimes
  • Nostalgia
  • Crime fiction as history
  • The figure of the detective
  • The figure of the criminal
  • Gangs and underworlds
  • Morality and deviance
  • Gender, sexuality and queerness
  • Generic tropes and development – e.g. the country house
  • Haunted crimes and revelations – anniversary events, cold cases, secrecy, psychological trauma
  • Time travel
  • Medieval mysteries
  • Sensation fictions
  • The Newgate Calendar
  • Neo-Victorianism
  • The roaring 1920s
  • Pastiches, parodies and rewritings
  • Crime and history on-screen
  • Alternative histories
  • Non-fiction novels
  • National heritage and heritage in law
  • Publication technologies and reading habits

Please send abstracts and a brief biographical note to Fern Pullan and Dr Jamie Bernthal at criminalheritage@gmail.com by Friday 30 June 2017.

Husa on Exploring Imaginative Legal History: The Legalism of the House Stark in Game of Thrones @HusaJaakko

ICYMI: Via @DroitetFiction:

Jaakko Husa, University of Lapland Faculty of Law, has published Exploring Imaginative Legal History: The Legalism of the House Stark in the Game of Thrones at 20 Media & Arts Law Review 181 (2015). Here is the abstract.
This article examines George R R Martin’s imaginative historical narrative in his book series A Song of Ice and Fire. The first book of the series (A Game of Thrones) is highlighted and discussed from the points of view of legal history and applied legal theory. The article concentrates on the legal mentality of one of the noble Houses in A Game of Thrones and discusses Martin’s rich narrative in its relation to the real feudal legal history and jurisprudential frameworks it displays. Analysis focuses on the rules of succession. It will be argued that even though the House Stark’s attitude and mentality can be labelled as legalistic and surprisingly modern it can be seen as a natural part of the imaginative feudal world of A Game of Thrones. The article concludes that, by studying the legalistic attitude and mentality of the House Stark, we can also learn about the legal theoretical nature of modern legalism. Paradoxically, it is also suggested that the study of imaginative legal history deepens our understanding of ‘real’ legal history. Moreover, the author argues that analysis of imaginative legal history expands our legal mind and immerses us in alternative horizons of law.
Download the article from SSRN at the link.

March 15, 2017

Call For Papers: The 2017 ELLAK International Conference, Seoul National University, South Korea, December 13-15, 2017

From the mailbox, via Dr. Mikyung Park,  Kyonggi University







“Narrating Rights: Literary Texts and Human, Nonhuman, and Inhuman Demands”

Unpacking and dispersing rights of various kinds formerly enjoyed by a selected few has been the constant motivation behind the democratization and modernization of human society. Human rights and later civil rights have continuously been constituted and reconstituted in response to the demands of the laboring class, slaves, women, subalterns, animals, and things, expanding beyond the boundaries of class, race, nation, sexuality, gender, species and organism. Calling attention to the ways in which literary texts have narrated rights so as to inscribe these human, nonhuman, and inhuman demands, “Narrating Rights” offers opportunities to interrogate literature’s lasting contributions to questioning, reforming and practicing rights.

The interrogation is particularly pertinent in this age in which revised and dispersed rights are creating new conflicts, requiring them to be narrated differently and imaginatively so as to allow all the parties in conflict to participate in working out the conflicts. “Narrating Rights” is a double-edged task that, on one hand, reflects the singular life conditions or contexts of a human, inhuman or nonhuman being and, on the other hand, aspires to the perpetual process of rights’ universal application. In order to open a forum for literary scholars to discuss how this task has been and will be performed, and thus aims to renew the close, interactive relationship between literature and rights, ELLAK (English Language and Literature Association of Korea) invites submissions to its 2017 International Conference, which will be held in Seoul, South Korea, December 13th – 15th. Please submit your proposal (250 words) and brief CV to Dongshin Yi at ellak2017@gmail.com by May 31, 2017.

 Topics may include the following subjects but are not limited to them:
 1.   Rights discourse and narrative/ counter-narrative
2.   Animal rights and Biopolitics/ bioethics
3.   Natural rights/civil rights
4.   Gender, sexuality and rights
5.   Cultural rights and identity
6.   Rhetoric and narratology of rights
7.   Rights, (in)justice, and sovereignty
8.   Rights and mobility
9.   Border crisis and refugee rights
10.  Ecological/Posthuman rights
11.    Rights and (post)colonialism/cosmopolitanism
12.   Racial discourses and rights
13.   Rights and generational differences
14.   Rights and community
15.    Rights in cyberspace
16.   Rights and education
17.    Censorship and freedom of speech/writing