Tarar and Tarar on Constitutional Ghosts: Myth, Metaphysics, and the Afterlife of the Framers

Jalal Tarar, Independent Scholar, and Shahbaz Tara, University of London, have published Constitutional Ghosts: Myth, Metaphysics, and the Afterlife of the Framers. Here is the abstract.

This paper examines the paradoxical role of the constitutional framer in judicial reasoning. While courts invoke the figure of the framer to legitimise constitutional interpretation, they systematically exclude actual framers from interpretive authority. The framer is constructed as a mythic origin, sacralised but silenced, a legitimating figure whose historical presence is evoked to anchor doctrine, yet whose interpretive claims are denied to preserve judicial autonomy. Drawing on hermeneutics, political theology, and semiotics, the paper argues that this exclusion is not a contradiction but a structural necessity of constitutional democracy. Through case studies from the United States, Pakistan, India, Iraq, and South Africa, the paper illustrates how figures such as James Madison, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, and Albie Sachs are invoked as symbols but denied operative authority. The analysis critiques originalism by demonstrating that framers often disagreed with each other, evolved ideologically, or repudiated their own positions, rendering authorial intent an unstable foundation for legal meaning. The judiciary's refusal to yield interpretive control is shown to be essential for the law's adaptability and coherence over time. Constitutional meaning is not inherited but constructed; the framer functions as a judicial artefact, invoked rhetorically but displaced institutionally. This performative logic reveals that constitutional law sustains itself not by preserving the framer's voice but by ritualising his absence. The framer, in this sense, is a constitutional ghost, essential to the mythos of legitimacy, yet exiled from the terrain of interpretation.

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Blumenfeld on Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty: Ancient Greece and the Origins of American Federalism

Brian Blumenfeld, Independent Scholar, has published Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty: Ancient Greece and the Origins of American Federalism. Here is the abstract.

In an era when history and tradition increasingly inform the legal reasoning of judges, jurists and advocates from across the ideological spectrum, one historical theme engrained in our constitutional origins remains undeservedly obscure. Appearing throughout the original debates over the U.S. Constitution are investigations into and arguments about the federal governments (or “leagues”) of ancient Greece. A mere browse through the primary records of the founding reveals the esteem with which that era drew lessons and heeded warnings from these classical federal precedents. In laboring over how to form a more perfect union, Americans in the 1780s looked not only to their contemporaneous political conditions for viable answers, but also looked to history for how federal unions were formed, how they functioned, and why they succeeded and failed. The greatest lesson learned from Greek federalism, repeated throughout the founding era, was how the three principal federal governments of ancient Greece—the Amphictyonic Council, the Achaean League, and the Lycian League—all ultimately collapsed because their central governments were insufficiently empowered to withstand the coactive forces of domestic centrifugalism and foreign intervention. This failure, and the solutions for preventing its recurrence in America, figured prominently in the policies and polemics of the founding. Notwithstanding the prevalence of these classical references, there is no single source in the legal or historical literature that provides an adequate account of the Greek federal leagues and their role in the founding. The net outcome is that the scholar, student, jurist or advocate examining our constitutional origins is often confronted with references to Greek federalism, and yet is regrettably left without a source for adequately understanding the subject. As a corrective, this article catalogues and contextualizes the references to Greek federalism found throughout the records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers; and then reviews the constitutions and histories of the three main Greek federal leagues that appeared throughout the founding. The end result will remove the bewilderment too often evoked by the subject, and will allow the reader to effectively engage with the themes of Greek federalism when conducting constitutional and historical analysis.

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Shugerman and Handelsman on Memory Warriors, Pluralists and Abnegators in Constitu[t]ional Interpretation: An Essay on Jack Balkin's Pluralist Originalism in Memory and Authority

Jed H. Shugerman, Boston University School of Law, and Zach S. Handelsman, McGill University, Department of Political Science, have published Memory Warriors, Pluralists and Abnegators in Constitu[t]ional Interpretation: An Essay on Jack Balkin's Pluralist Originalism in Memory and Authority.

Jack Balkin’s Memory and Authority: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation brings into conversation the scholarly insights of constitutional theory, history, and the growing field of “the politics of memory,” especially the concept of the “memory entrepreneur.” Balkin appropriately connects the memory wars in American constitutional law back to Eastern European memory wars during the World Wars and their aftermath. Prompted by Balkin, we turn to Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard edited volume Twenty Years After Communism (2014), which has become even more widely influential after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and a new round of Eastern European memory wars. They propose four categories of memory entrepreneurs (“mnemonic actors”) in post-Soviet countries: “mnemonic warriors” who claim a single “true” interpretation of the past, opposed to all others who cultivate “wrong” or “false” interpretations; “mnemonic pluralists” who embrace multiple narratives and traditions; “mnemonic abnegators” who deny the significance of the past in favor of the present; and “mnemonic prospectives” who have a faith in an inevitable future (e.g., utopian Marxist historical materialists). We suggest this taxonomy may be a helpful guide for American constitutional politics. The “memory pluralist” category is perhaps the majority of American constitutional law professors, maybe even a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal and state bench, who do not give exclusive weight to history, but still give substantial weight to history (e.g., Philip Bobbit’s modalities, Balkin’s “living originalism” and his “thin originalism.”). Some “thick originalists” are more “Memory Anti-Pluralists” than “Warriors.” We reserve the category of “Memory Warrior” for those constitutional interpreters who are consciously fighting for an exclusive, comprehensive national narrative of us vs. them. These warriors include ideological originalists (especially the ones who seem to rely on a general narrative arc rather than specific historical evidence), but they also may include the “history-and-tradition” conservatives, common-good constitutionalists, and perhaps some progressive-left memory warriors who have a more exclusive interpretation of past events than pluralists do. Balkin rightly criticizes originalism for its “memory entrepreneurialism” that narrows the field of who “counts” and who is excluded, exacerbating constitutional law’s democratic deficit. We think the “memory warrior” category helps sort out the more problematic approaches, and we suggest a solution: a high burden of proof about consensus and public meaning to mitigate this democratic deficit, to reduce judicial legitimacy problems, and to slow down “warrior” judicial activism.

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Varsava and Watson on Originalism's General-Law Turn

Nina Varsava, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Bill Watson, University of Illinois College of Law, have published Originalism's General-Law Turn.

Originalists are increasingly turning to a general-law theory of constitutional rights. Under this theory, constitutional enactment declared but did not create constitutional rights. The content of those rights was, and remains, a question of general law—a species of unwritten law, commonly employed at the Founding, that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. This preoccupation with general law has precipitated a wave of scholarship developing general-law accounts of various constitutional rights. Yet the nature of general law itself remains poorly understood. This Article offers a theory of general law. Using philosophical methods to reexamine early American cases and recent work in legal history, the Article finds that general law depended on morality. To the extent that constitutional law consists of general law, identifying constitutional law calls for moral reasoning. This is not pure moral reasoning employed from an armchair but rather applied moral reasoning that accounts for customs, legal texts, institutional roles, and other social facts, all filtered through lawyers' specialized training and experience. The implications for originalism are striking. First, the general-law theory of constitutional rights requires reconceiving the core originalist principles of fixation and constraint, as general law satisfies those principles only in the sense and to the extent that morality does. Second, applying general law can be seen as either finding or making law; the distinction turns on one's view of the nature of law and is of no consequence for adjudication. Third, the theory supports an approach to adjudication that centers on moral reasoning and is consistent with a range of nonoriginalist approaches.

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Snyder on Historical Practice at the Founding

Ryan Snyder, University of Missouri School of Law, has published Historical Practice at the Founding as University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2025-55. Here is the abstract.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on historical practice—actions other than judicial decisions that implement the law after its adoption. That creates tension with the Court’s professed adherence to originalism—the view that a law’s meaning is fixed at the time of its adoption. To resolve this tension, the Court and many scholars have embraced theories such as “liquidation,” which argue that the Founders themselves used practice to update or change the law’s meaning over time. But until now, no one has systematically examined whether the Founders accepted those theories. This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of how Founding-era courts used practice to interpret legal texts. It concludes that courts did not rely on practice to revise the law’s meaning; rather, they used it to discover what the law originally meant. Courts believed that practice helped reveal original meaning for three main reasons. First, they thought that contemporaneous interpreters were more likely to understand the law’s text and purpose, which gave them valuable insight into its original meaning. Second, they believed that contemporaneous practices revealed how those interpreters understood the law. And third, they believed that contemporaneous practice was even better evidence of original meaning when it had continued unchanged over time. At the same time, courts recognized that practice was not perfect. To address that risk, they applied a rigorous screening test designed to exclude unreliable practices and give greater weight to reliable ones. This test looked at various factors—such as whether the practice started shortly after the law’s adoption and whether it reflected a good-faith effort to interpret the law—that further confirm that courts used practice only as a tool for discovering original meaning. This history has important consequences for the Supreme Court’s use of practice. First, the history suggests that the Court should refuse to rely on practice as a way of updating or changing the law’s meaning. And second, it suggests that the Court should reshape its current use of practice to better reflect the Founders’ approach.

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Upham on The "Black and Tan Conventions," Diverse Originalism, and the Fourteenth Amendment

David B. Upham, St. Thomas University; Uniersity of Dallas, is publishing The "Black and Tan Conventions," Diverse Originalism, and the Fourteenth Amendment in the Mississippi Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

This essay will highlight the contributions of the biracial "Black and Tan Conventions" that drafted state constitutions pursuant to the Reconstruction Acts of 1867. I make the following conclusions: (1) that the work of these Conventions was necessary to the making of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) that this work provides critical, if not dispositive, evidence as to that Amendment’s original meaning—especially as to what the Amendment did not prohibit—and (3) that members of the bench, bar, and academy have unjustly neglected this contribution—a neglect that has become a deafening silence among those advocating racial diversity or originalism, and the combination thereof as “diverse originalism.”

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Barbas on Originalism in Modern Free Speech History

Samantha Barbas, University of Iowa College of Law, has published Originalism in Modern Free Speech History as U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2025-13. Here is the abstract.

Contrary to what is often assumed, originalism has played an important role in our free speech history. During the 1950s, originalist interpretations of the First Amendment as prohibiting the crime of seditious libel became popular in legal argumentation, court rulings, and in popular culture more generally. The reason for the popularity of this argument was the Red Scare. Liberal lawyers, judges, and scholars deployed originalist arguments in their battles against government anticommunist measures. They argued that the original meaning of the First Amendment was the ban on punishment for criticism of the government, and that many of the government’s anticommunist measures were effectively a form of prosecution for seditious libel and unconstitutional. This essay describes the popularization of First Amendment originalist arguments in the 1950s and early 60s, culminating in New York Times v. Sullivan. It explains how originalist First Amendment arguments came to be seen as an important liberal line of defense against government anticommunist efforts. Activists, scholars, lawyers, and justices on the left mobilized in a loosely affiliated sort of First Amendment “originalist movement” in an attempt to defeat the Red Scare. Ultimately, the essay suggests that originalism is a legal and social phenomenon that is intimately intertwined with culture and politics. Originalist ideas arise from multiple sources, including interest groups, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, and ordinary citizens. The case study offers one example of how legal advocates and scholars in the mid-twentieth century deployed originalist arguments instrumentally, in response to the circumstances and perceived exigencies of their times.

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Peterson on The Fourteenth Amendment and the Venus Noire @UChicagoLaw @WMLawReview

Farah Peterson, University of Chicago Law School, has published The Fourteenth Amendment and the Vénus Noire at 66 William & Mary Law Review 191 (2024). Here is the abstract.

This Essay reflects on art to make two points. It first argues that originalism is not a promising path for progressive causes. It then argues that as the Constitution is amended, the meaning of the entire document is altered, and earlier text should be interpreted in light of what has changed.

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ICYMI: Shugerman on Removal of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, and the Limits of Unitary Originalism @jedshug @BU_Law

ICYMI: Jed H. Shugerman, Boston University School of Law, has published Removal of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, and the Limits of Unitary Originalism at 33 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 125 (2022). Here is the abstract.

This article is part of a series on Article II, questioning the unitary theory’s three pillars: the Executive Vesting Clause, the Take Care Clause (or the “Faithful Execution” clauses), and the Decision of 1789 (or more accurately, the Indecisions of 1789). “Removal of Context” focuses on the “executive power” part of the Vesting Clause: Did “executive power” imply supervision and removal in the eighteenth century? What do the unitary theorists cite to support their claim that “executive power” includes removal, and “indefeasibly” so? Unitary executive theorists rely on the English Crown in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they overlook or obscure the problems of relying on England’s limited monarchy, the era’s rise of Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown and its power to eliminate or regulate (i.e., make defeasible) royal prerogatives. There appears to be no evidence that executive removal was ever conceived as a “royal prerogative” at all, and the historical record indicates that the king did not have a general removal power at pleasure. The structure of the historical comparison has a major flaw: They concede that the Constitution explicitly limits many core royal powers, such war, peace (treaties), and the veto, so that the president is weaker than the king, but somehow Article II implies unnamed “executive powers” (like removal) that make a president stronger than a king? Moreover, there were eighteenth-century royal prerogatives related to law execution (prorogue and dissolution), but no one claims Article II “executive power” implies them. When one investigates the unitary evidence more closely and follows their sources, one finds a pattern of misinterpreting historical sources, especially Blackstone in amicus briefs and law review articles in the unitary executive scholarship. In particular, the recent brief by unitary scholars in Seila Law misinterprets Blackstone’s use of the word “disposing” of offices as removing, instead of dispensing or appointing (which are indicated by context and general usage) and then misquotes a passage from Blackstone, reversing his meaning from his uncertainty about the relevant law of offices to a certain positive claim about removal. These misreadings are more than just small or narrow errors. They obscure more significant points: Blackstone was fundamentally in favor of parliamentary supremacy, against “indefeasible” executive powers; and Blackstone never mentions removal as a royal prerogative or a general executive power, which is powerful counter-evidence to the unitary theorists’ assumptions. These errors are also a cautionary moment about originalist methods and the notion that originalism is more reliable or objective than other methods of interpretation.

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See also 

Jed H. Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Appendices on the Misuse of Historical Sources in Unitary Executive Theory, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 4359596.

Hylton on Originalism, Official History, and Perspectives versus Methodologies @BU_Law

Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of Law, has published Originalism, Official History, and Perspectives versus Methodologies as Boston Univ. School of Law Research Paper No. 23-34. Here is the abstract.

This paper addresses a well-worn topic: originalism, the theory that judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with the intent of its framers. I am interested in the real-world effects of originalism. The primary effect advanced by originalists is the tendency of the approach to constrain the discretion of judges. However, another effect of originalism that I identify is the creation of official histories, a practice that imposes a hidden tax on society. Another question I consider is whether originalism should be considered a methodology of analyzing the law or a perspective on the law. I argue that originalism is closer to a perspective than a methodology.

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Blocher and Garrett on Originalism and Historical Fact-Finding @DukeLaw @GeorgetownLJ

Joseph Blocher and Brandon L. Garrett, both of Duke University School of Law, are publishing Originalism and Historical Fact-Finding in the Georgetown Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

Historical facts are more central to constitutional litigation than ever before, given the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on originalism and other modes of interpretation that invoke historical practice and tradition. This raises a central tension. The case for originalism has rested largely on its being simultaneously fact-bound and a theory of adjudication capable of resolving questions of constitutional law. In practice, however, the historical facts central to originalism typically are not litigated in accordance with standard practices for fact-finding: introduction at trial, expert testimony, adversarial testing, deference on appeal, and so on. In the absence of the usual fact-finding protocols, many recent Supreme Court rulings have based the scope of constitutional rights on claims of historical fact—with those claims drawn primarily from amicus briefs, and involving some serious factual errors. This is significant in two broad sets of cases: those that rely on history to apply a constitutional rule (as lower courts are doing with the historical-analogical test prescribed by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen) and those that rely on history to set the content of a constitutional rule (for example in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization’s rejection of a constitutional right to abortion). The latter—which we call “declarative historical fact”—have become especially prominent in recent years. In this Article, we explore the promise and peril of treating historical fact-finding like other kinds of fact-finding in our legal system. Doing so calls into doubt originalism’s near-exclusive focus on historical fact-finding at the appellate level, informed by amicus briefs and judges’ or Justices’ own historical research. Our legal system gives trial courts primary authority over fact-finding, and many trial judges attempting to implement the Supreme Court’s originalist decisions have turned to historians as experts, holding hearings and calling for briefing at trial level. Such trial-level historical fact-finding imposes serious burdens and faces important limitations, but also has important institutional and constitutional advantages over appellate findings of historical fact. In addition to emphasizing the proper role of trial courts, our analysis suggests a more important role for Congress both in finding historical facts and in regulating appellate review of historical facts. Courts arguably owe deference—perhaps substantial deference—to congressional fact-finding, and it is not immediately apparent why historical fact-finding should be any different. Congress might also legislate standards of review for judicial fact-finding, including for historical facts used in constitutional litigation. This type of “fact-stripping,” a form of jurisdiction stripping, is consistent with congressional power over Article III courts, as we have developed in prior work. If originalism is to maintain its claim on being fact-based, it must grapple with these fundamental issues regarding the litigation of facts in our legal system. If it is not practically possible for judges develop a sound record of historical facts, then any approach to interpretation relying on such facts will not produce convincing, legitimate, or lasting interpretations of the Constitution.

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