Wheatle @seshaunawheatle on Bounded Cosmopolitanism and a Constitutional Common Law

Se-shauna Wheatle, Durham Law School, is publishing Bounded Cosmopolitanism and a Constitutional Common Law, forthcoming in the Journal of Comparative Law. Here is the abstract.

There remains deep uncertainty regarding the growing transnational nature and scope of law. This uncertainty is in part answered by, but also fuelled by, current cosmopolitan theories. Such theories -- including Jeremy Waldron’s conception of a ‘ius gentium’ as a body of principles shared by the legal world, and Neil Walker’s articulation of ‘global law’ -- are decidedly cosmopolitan in nature by articulating legal orders and systems that see the individual as part of a shared human community. While these theories make valuable contributions to legal studies, they have overreached by asserting an extensive level of transnational consensus, consensus which is not fully represented in current transnational dialogue. What is needed is a framework that balances the cosmopolitan impulse with awareness of the current experience of transnational law, and the historical and cultural limitations on transnational dialogue. With this contextual background in mind, I propose the idea of ‘bounded cosmopolitanism’, which harnesses the power of cosmopolitanism but restrains the cosmopolitan impulse through awareness of the interplay between convergence and divergence that is central to the experience of transnational law. As an instance of bounded cosmopolitanism, the article advances a cosmopolitan common law constitution, which embodies the convergent influence of common law methods and principles with the divergent elements of specific constitutional design in individual common law jurisdictions.

The full text is not available from SSRN.

Jeremy Waldron and Jus Gentium

Kevin Toh, San Francisco State University, is publiishing Legal Relativism and Jus Gentium in the APA Newsletter. Here is the abstract.

In "Partly Laws Common to All Mankind," Jeremy Waldron advocates what could be called "the doctrine of jus gentium," according to which, roughly, courts sitting in one country must give some weight in their legal deliberations to some principles that have been accepted or adopted by the legal systems of many other countries. Waldron's arguments for this doctrine raise questions and worries about exactly what the content of the doctrine is, and what justification could be offered for it. Several different versions of the doctrine come into the picture as Waldron argues for jus gentium, and while some versions are plausible, some others are not. Unfortunately, the most plausible of the versions seems to be excluded by Waldron's commitment to a Dworkinian conception of the nature of law. This paper ends up recommending that Waldron drop his commitment to that conception of the nature of law in favor of the plausible version of the doctrine of jus gentium.
This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Jeremy Waldron's work organized by the American Philosophical Association. A revised version will be published in a forthcoming issue of the APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, with Waldron's reply.

Download the full text of the essay from SSRN at the link.