Call For Papers: How To Do Things With Law: Prefiguration, Performativity, and Alternative Legalities, Law and Society Association, May 22-25, Chicago @law_soc Ben Golder @SteveIsInOtago

 

Call for Papers

How to do things with Law: Prefiguration, Performativity, and Alternative Legalities

Law and Society Association, May 22-25, 2025, in Chicago 

We - Amy Cohen (Temple University), Stephen Young (University of Otago) and Ben Golder (UNSW) - are organising a mini-conference on the above theme to take place within the 2025 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association in Chicago, to be held May 22-25th. 

Theme:

What happens when everyday actors take the law into their own hands and seek to create, or recreate, the legal worlds they inhabit? There is a long, venerable and fascinating tradition of non-legal actors seizing the means of legal imagination. These individuals and groups (sometimes even quasi-institutions) are not formally authorized to make law but they act as if they are, adopting a consciously fictive jurisdiction. 

Think, for example, of the work of peoples’ tribunals in international law - starting with the Russell Tribunal on the United State’s crimes in Vietnam in the late 1960s and through to the World Tribunal on Iraq in 2005 - that mobilise a certain (popular) understanding of international law to produce verdicts, raise popular consciousness, and critique (or maybe even redeem) international law.

Think also of the Feminist Judgments Projects (FJPs) or related exercises in critical or imaginative judgment-writing, in which legal scholars and feminist activists assume the position of judges and rewrite important appellate judicial decisions. In so doing, they seek to expose both law’s patriarchal structure but also its contingency, its hidden margin of freedom. Law, in the hands of would-be feminist judges, could always be otherwise.

Or think, in a very different political register, of those litigants (be they sovereign citizens or other individuals) who today - gathered under the sign of what mainstream legal actors pejoratively call ‘pseudolaw’ - mobilise a certain understanding of the common law and of its ancient history in order to assert a particular legal subjectivity and claim their rights. Indeed, sometimes these individuals  fashion an entire normative universe. 

These examples are neither exhaustive nor privileged instances of the phenomenon - we could add many others, from exercises of corporate self-governance (the so-called ‘Facebook Supreme Court,’ for example) to heterodox gestures of self-determination (the sovereign claims of micronations, for example).

This conference within a conference presents an opportunity to explore these phenomena, and continues discussions about ‘prefigurative legality’ (Cohen and Morgan, 2023), or other related topics. Without wishing to circumscribe those discussions, we are interested in paper proposals (which we will organise into panels) or fully-formed panels (with 3/4 papers) that address the following indicative list of topics and questions:

1.      How do we best think about this phenomenon of informal legality - as an instance of prefiguration, or performativity, or parody, or maybe through the lens of legal pluralism?

2.      What is the relationship between the informal or everyday legal claim (to rights, jurisdiction, statehood, even) and the formal structures of state or international law?

3.      Do these claims complete, compete with, or critique authorized law, or do they sit outside, beyond or underneath it?

4.      What are the political possibilities and limitations of these exercises or practices?

5.      What are historical examples of this phenomenon and what might those histories indicate about similar actions or actors today?

6.      What understanding of legal form and legal method do these practices disclose?

7.      What are the similarities and differences between supposedly left-wing invocations of law, and conservative mobilisations of law?

Process:

We invite paper (or panel) proposals for a series of interlinked panels on the above theme at the Law and Society Association 2025 Conference in Chicago, May 22-25. Our intention is to collate a series of paper (and panel) proposals into a mini-conference, crafting a conference within the wider conference setting of the LSA that sustains an intimate and intellectual conversation across the related panels. Below is the set of steps and deadlines leading up to the LSA in 2025 and what you need to do in order to participate. After the LSA, our intention is to work with participants to publish our papers as a collection in either a special edition of a scholarly journal or in the form of an edited book with a leading academic or trade publisher. Once we have the final conference-within-a-conference program we will commence initial discussions with participants (that is, well before the LSA itself) and gauge interest and ideas in future publications.

Timeline:

8.      Send abstracts, panel proposals or thoughts to stephen.young@otago.ac.nz by 15 September 2024

9.      We will notify people of acceptance or non-acceptance by 1 October 2024

10. Participants confirm participation by 7 October 2024

11. Participants/Organisers submit panels to LSA by 15 October 2024*

12. *Please note that participation in this mini-conference will “count” towards your participation limits for LSA

13. LSA: 22-25 May 2025

What to Submit?:

We are interested in receiving either paper abstracts on the above or related topics or fully-formed panels. If you wish to submit a paper abstract please include a 200 word abstract, with a title and also your institutional affiliation. If you wish to submit a fully-formed panel or series of panels, please ensure that the submission contains 3 or 4 abstracts of 200 words, with a title and institutional affiliation for each paper plus a 200 word explanation of the panel’s theme itself. We are open to receiving questions about different formats of panels (roundtables, Author-Meets-Reader sessions, etc) but we encourage people to contact us as soon as possible about this to facilitate organisation.

Please direct your questions to any of the 3 organisers at the following email addresses: b.golder@unsw.edu.au, ajcohen@temple.edu, stephen.young@otago.ac.nz. But final submission of proposals should be directed to stephen.young@otago.ac.nz

We do not have funding for this project so each participant needs to ensure their own travel to, registration at, and attendance at the LSA Chicago annual meeting. 

Mootz and Hannah on The Strange Persistence of Originalism

Francis Joseph Mootz, III, McGeorge School of Law, and Mark Hannah, Arizona State University, have published The Strange Persistence of Originalism. Here is the abstract.

Originalism has positioned itself as the au courant doctrine of legal interpretation. Proponents argue that originalism is a core element of our democratic identity and should be adopted by every judge. The originalist tenet -- that the meaning of a legal text is the ordinary meaning the text had at the time of its enactment -- purportedly provides an objective basis for judging with integrity. Despite originalists’ grandiose claims, critics have lodged many well-reasoned objections that problematize originalists’ goals and methods. Why, then, has originalism gained such widespread prominence? In this article, we offer a rhetorical analysis that explains its ascendance and strange persistence. Our thesis is that originalists do not prevail primarily by persuading others through logic or dialectical reasoning (logos) or by promoting their audience’s disposition to hear their argument (pathos). Instead, originalists bring force to their claims by establishing and projecting an ethos. They draw on ethos when claiming to be principled legal advocates who are persons of good character and wisdom. However, ethos has a broader scope than the speaker’s reputation or character exhibited in an effort to persuade. Only by acknowledging this dimension of ethos can we explain how originalists have dominated recent jurisprudential debates.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Call For Applications, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies @IALS_law @anat_rosenberg

The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies is pleased to announce a call for Academic Visitors and Visiting Artists for the 2024-25 academic year. This is part of an exciting new initiative to develop the field of Law and the Humanities at IALS under the leadership of its new Professor, Dr Anat Rosenberg.

The deadline for applications is 8th September and further particulars can be found here: 

Call for Visitors 2024-25- early-mid career 

Call for Visitors 2024-25- PhD & Postdoc

Call for Visitors 2024-25- visiting artist
 

Waldon, Condoravdi, Pustejovsky, Schneider, and Tobia on Reading Law With Linguistics: How Linguistic Theory and Data Inform Statutory Interpretation of Artifact Nouns @kevin_tobia

Brandon Waldon, Georgetown University, Cleo Condoravdi, Stanford University, James Pustejovsky, Brandeis University, Nathan Schneider, Georgetown University, and Kevin Tobia, Georgetown University Law Center; Georgetown University, Department of Philosophy, have published Reading Law with Linguistics: How Linguistic Theory and Data Inform Statutory Interpretation of Artifact Nouns. Here is the abstract.

The Supreme Court will soon decide Garland v. VanDerStok, a case concerning whether a “gun parts kit” or “ghost gun” is a “firearm” subject to regulation under the 1968 Gun Control Act. These “kits,” firearm parts that with additional finishing or combination become an operable firearm, have been used in several mass shootings. For the textualist Supreme Court the case turns on the statute’s meaning, and the briefs and lower court opinions emphasize traditional tools. This article proposes that the Court complement familiar interpretive tools like dictionaries with new ones. We apply insights from linguistic theory, report new data from ordinary language usage, and present an original survey study of ordinary Americans. This evidence supports that the gun parts kits identified by the government fit within the meaning of “firearm.” This analysis has important practical implications for VanDerStok and the regulation of unassembled and unfinished firearms. The article’s case study in the legal interpretation of artifact nouns also carries broader implications. We develop lessons for statutory interpretation theory and legal philosophy.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Boyd on Storied Pleadings: The Power of Narrative Introductions @LadyLegalWriter @GeorgiaStateLaw

Megan Boyd, Georgia State University College of Law, is publishing Storied Pleadings: The Power of Narrative Introductions as a Georgia State University College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper. Here is the abstract.

This article sits at the intersection of civil procedure, professional responsibility, and legal writing. Narratives, or stories, are essential to the human experience and thus essential to law. While storytelling has typically been reserved for motions practice and trial, lawyers are now beginning to include narrative techniques in complaints and, specifically, in complaint introductions. Narrative Introductions, which employ multiple narrative techniques to paint a more complete and persuasive picture of the plaintiff’s factual or legal contentions, seek to persuade the reader from the outset that the plaintiff’s claims are worth paying attention to. Part I of this article outlines the importance of first impressions in legal writing. Strong first impressions are created through a concept known as priming in which the writer uses narrative techniques to present a particular view of the plaintiff’s case through which all subsequent information will be filtered. Part II of this article considers Narrative Introductions in 12 complaints filed in federal and state courts across the country and demonstrates the ways the complaint drafters use narrative techniques to frame the facts and legal claims that follow. Part III of this article outlines the requirements of Rules 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and considers whether the use of Narrative Introductions is consistent with or violates those rules, using the Narrative Introductions studied as examples. Part III also considers certain Model Rules of Professional Conduct and addresses ethical issues that may arise in the use of Narrative Introductions. This article concludes by explaining why lawyers should not be concerned that well-researched and carefully written Narrative Introductions violate any procedural or ethical rules and advocating for their use more widely. Funder Statement This article was made possible by a grant from the Legal Writing Institute, the Association of Legal Writing Directors, and LexisNexis.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Turner on Resistance to Tyranny versus the Public Good: John Locke and Counter-Terror Law in the United Kingdom

Ian Turner, University of Central Lancashire Law School, has published Resistance to Tyranny versus the Public Good: John Locke and Counter-Terror Law in the United Kingdom. Here is the abstract.

John Locke was a social contract theorist. He envisaged that individuals had domiciled in a state of nature, enjoying natural rights. But because of the insecurities of the natural state, individuals transitioned to the stability of civil society, guaranteed by a sovereign. There were fetters on the sovereign, however, such as passing laws for the public good. Is modern legislation to counter terrorism for the public good? Locke also expressly granted a right of resistance on the people. But is this right terrorism? Reflecting on these principles, this study examines counter-terror statutes and determines whether Locke would support them.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Amann on Inge Viermetz, Woman Acquitted at Nuremberg @MDianeAmann @UGASchoolofLaw

Diane Marie Amann, University of Georgia School of Law, has published Inge Viermetz, Woman Acquitted at Nuremberg as University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2024-4. Here is the abstract.

Conventional narratives tend to represent the post-World War II international criminal proceedings as a men’s project, thus obscuring the many women who participated, as lawyers, journalists, analysts, interpreters, witnesses, and defendants. Indeed, two women stood trial before Nuremberg Military Tribunals. This article examines the case of the only woman found not-guilty: Inge Viermetz, who had been an administrator at Lebensborn, the Nazi SS adoption and placement agency. The article outlines the prosecution’s child-taking case against Viermetz, as well as her successful gendered self-portrayal as a conventionally feminine caregiver. With references to Professor Megan A. Fairlie, at whose memorial symposium it was presented, the article concludes by considering contemporary implications of this acquittal at Nuremberg.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Call For Submissions: American University Law Review, Spring 2025 Symposium, Law and Popular Culture @AmULRev

The American University Law Review has issued a Call For Papers for its annual symposium. Here is the call.

The American University Law Review is placing a call for submissions of original legal articles and scholarly commentaries for its forthcoming issue dedicated to pop culture and the law. Specifically, the Law Review seeks submissions analyzing the sports, media and entertainment, fashion, and social media industries and their effect on the law. However, other topics related to pop culture will be considered. The target publication date is slated for mid-2025.

Next year, the Law Review’s Spring Symposium will be held on February 7, 2025. This symposium will explore and engage with burgeoning legal issues in pop culture. Selected authors may have the opportunity to present their work as a panelist in the Symposium, but participation is not a requirement for consideration.

    More information and instructions for submission here. 

 

Long on The Gettysburg Address: Lincoln's Model Legal Argument @baldycenter @UBSchoolofLaw

Patrick J. Long, SUNY Buffalo Law School, has published The Gettysburg Address: Lincoln's Model Legal Argument at 72 Buffalo Law Review 383 (2024). Here is the abstract.

The Gettysburg Address does not appear to be a legal argument. One cannot find a rule anywhere in its few words. Nor does there seem to be any application of a rule to the facts of the case. There is a simple reason for this absence: the law in 1863 was wrong. Lincoln knew that, but he was too much the lawyer to advocate law-breaking. Instead, he used all the skills he had learned from his years in the courtroom to urge his listeners to look beyond the law’s flaws to find the truth of the Declaration’s “self-evident truth.”

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Legal Imaginaries Across the Asia-Pacific: Vernacular Laws and Literatures: Workshop, September 5, 2024 @ANU_Law @lawlithum

 From the ANU Network of Law Arts and the Humanities:

 

 

Legal Imaginaries across the Asia-Pacific: Vernacular laws and literatures

Thursday 5^th September

Phillipa Weeks Staff Library, Level 4, ANU College of Law

This event represents the first fruits of a new network that targets a specific geographic constellation and identifies, through the language of ‘the imaginary’ and ‘vernacular’, a specific set of theoretical resources. ‘Laws and literatures’ both frames the endeavour in relation to the rich field of studies in law and literature, and pluralises it in significant ways. Collaborative partners in the broader project include University of Wollongong, Hong Kong University, National University of Singapore, and University of British Columbia.

This one-day workshop would be of interest to academics and HDR students in literature, law and the humanities, legal theory, and postcolonial studies. It features new work from prominent and emerging scholars working in law and literature from right across the region -- from Australia, Aotearoa, the Pacific and Mexico to Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia – showcasing new directions with what we might call a common indicazione geografica tipica, and indicazione teorica tipica.

To find out more about the program and to register, follow the link.

For further information, contact Professor Desmond Manderson,
Australian National University College of Law / College of Arts & Social Sciences

 

Newly published: Mark D. White, The Virtues of Captain America: Modern-Day Lessons on Character from a World War II Superhero (2d ed., Wiley, 2024) @profmdwhite

 New from Wiley:

Mark D. White, The Virtues of Captain America: Modern-Day Lessons on Character from a World War II Superhero (2d. ed., 2024).

Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.

Learn how Captain America's timeless ethical code is just as relevant in the twenty-first century as it was during the 1940s

Captain America, or simply “Cap,” provides an example of the virtues that define personal excellence, as well as the ideals and principles upon which the United States of America was founded. In The Virtues of Captain America, philosopher and long-time comics fan Mark D. White shows us that this fictional superhero's “old-fashioned” moral code is exactly what we need today to restore kindness and respect in our personal and civic lives.

Presenting Captain America's personal morality within a virtue ethics framework, the book opens with an introduction to basic concepts in moral and political philosophy and addresses issues surrounding the use of fictional characters as role models. The following chapters examine Captain America in detail, exploring the individual virtues that Cap exemplifies, the qualities that describe his moral character, his particular brand of patriotism, his ongoing battle with fascism, his personal vision of the “American Dream,” his moral integrity and sense of honor, and much more.

Now in its second edition, The Virtues of Captain America is updated to include all the new developments in Captain America's saga, including new examples from the last ten years of Captain America's appearances in Marvel Comics. New coverage of the recent “Secret Empire” storyline, in which Captain America was brainwashed by the fascist organization Hydra, features new sections examining the nature of fascism and how Captain America's character and virtues were affected by the change. This edition also offers new material on Sam Wilson—formerly Captain America's partner the Falcon who recently became Captain America himself—and how his interpretation of the role compares to Steve Rogers'.

Showing how we can be better people if we pay attention to the choices made by the Sentinel of Liberty, The Virtues of Captain America:

• Examines the moral and political philosophy behind 80 years of Captain America comics and movies in a light-hearted, often humorous tone
• Demonstrates that the core principles and judgment exhibited by Captain America in the 1940s remain relevant in the twenty-first century
• Describes the basic themes of Captain America's ethics, such as courage, humility, perseverance, honesty, and loyalty
• Illustrates how Captain America stands for the basic ideals of America, not its politics or government

Requiring no background in philosophy or familiarity with the source material, the second edition of The Virtues of Captain America: Modern-Day Lessons on Character from a World War II Superhero remains a must-read for everyone wanting to make ethical decisions in complex real-world situations and tackle the personal and political issues of today with integrity and respect.

Bassok on The Absolutist Judiciary @UniofNottingham

Or Bassok, University of Nottingham, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, has published The Absolutist Judiciary. Here is the abstract.

The judicial authority to strike down constitutional amendments is not an advanced constitutional technology that merely upgrades judicial review. Rather, this authority is part of a jurisprudence of absolute truths that is antithetical to liberal democracy. Treating this authority as a mere technology stands at the core of the attempt to justify it based on fusing the ideas of two of Weimar’s great legal minds, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. Fusing Schmitt’s ideas with Kelsen’s enabled the transfer of this authority from the president, as Schmitt envisioned, to the constitutional court that Kelsen designated to serve as the guardian of the constitution. Yet, Kelsen rejected the authority to review constitutional amendments because a liberal democratic system cannot include an institution deciding on absolute truths that cannot be changed by the democratic process. Contrary to Kelsen, Schmitt believed that the constitution anchors the fundamental political core truth of the state. Yet, Schmitt rejected the idea that an inherently political function of defending the state’s fundamental political decision can be endowed to the judiciary. I agree that courts may be justified in exceptional and extreme situations to break constitutional constraints—including striking down constitutional amendments—to save democracy from the people. However, the attempt to juridify the authority of reviewing constitutional amendments under a legal doctrine necessarily leads to corruption either of constitutional law as Kelsen predicted or of the judiciary as Schmitt thought. Normalizing the exception by creating a legal doctrine that endows the judiciary with the final say that cannot be amended by any democratic means is the end of liberal democracy, even if it is the judiciary that hands down absolute truths.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Bottasso, Cerruti, Conti, and Santagata on Sailing Through History: The Legacy of Medieval Sea Trade on Migrant Perception and Extreme Right Voting @UniGenova

Anna Bottasso, Gianluca Cerruti, Maurizio Conti, and Marta Santagata, all of the University of Genoa, have publishing Sailing Through History: The Legacy of Medieval Sea Trade on Migrant Perception and Extreme Right Voting as IZA Discussion Paper No. 16996. Here is the abstract.

In this study we evaluate the role that Mediterranean Medieval trade with Africa and the Middle-East still plays today in Italian politics by shaping the attitudes towards migrants of individuals that live close to Medieval ports. Trade connections between Medieval ports and Muslim Africa and Middle East might have indeed favoured the emergence of cultural traits that helped the interaction with foreigners from different cultures, ethnicity and religion a few centuries before with respect to other areas of the country. We use a representative survey of young individuals (aged 20-35) to show that, conditionally on a rich set of geographic, historic, economic and individual controls, people living close to a Medieval port are less likely to think that migrants make Italy an unsafe place as well as to report right-wing voting attitudes. Moreover, we also find, in those areas, a lower probability of xenophobic attacks during the spike of refugees from Siria of 2015. Interestingly, right-wing parties started to attract less votes near Medieval ports only when immigration had become a very salient issue. Similarly, we find a lower probability of Jewish deportations close to Medieval ports during the Nazi occupation, the only period in Italian contemporary history when a minority group was explicitly targeted by the government. This in turn suggests that some deep-rooted cultural traits, although not observed and not clearly at work in society, can become visible when the right historical and political circumstances take place.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Emojis and the Law

What do emojis mean in text messages and email? See this article by Anna Stolley Persky for more information. 

More about emojis and the law in these articles.

Golriz Chrostowski, Getting Emojis Into Evidence Is No Laughing Matter, Bloomberg Legal Analysis, August 8, 2023.

Marcel Danesi, The Law and Emojis: Emoji Forensics, 34 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 1117 (2021). 

Eric Goldman, Emojis and the Law, 93 Washington Law Review 1227 (2018). 

Call For Papers: Fourth Annual Symposium on Popular Culture and International Law @opiniojuris

 From OpinioJuris:

It’s that time of the year again! The editorial team at Opinio Juris is pleased to announce the call for papers for our Fourth Annual Symposium on Pop Culture and International Law. 

We welcome abstracts of up to 400 words on any topic relating to international law and popular culture (film, tv, books, video games, or more–get creative!). To be considered, please submit your pitch via email to Alonso Gurmendi and Sarah Zarmsky at s.zarmsky@essex.ac.uk by Friday 1 August 2024 at 17:00 UK time. Decisions will be communicated by 16 August 2024. 

If selected, the deadline for full pieces will be Monday 14 October. The symposium will take place on Opinio Juris the week of 28 October.

We are very much looking forward to reading your submissions! 

Conklin on The Admissiblity of Rap Lyrics in Court: A Review of As We Speak

Michael Conklin, Angelo State University; Texas A&M School of Law, is publishing The Admissibility of Rap Lyrics in Court: A Review of As We Speak in the Journal of Law & Social Deviance. Here is the abstract.

The use of rap lyrics at trial is a timely issue given the current confluence of events, including the Young Thug trial, the Black Lives Matter movement, a growing “tough on crime” sentiment due to rising violent crime, the introduction of the Restoring Artistic Protection (RAP) Act in Congress, and societal debate about separating the artist from the art. This review provides a critical analysis of the 2024 documentary As We Speak: Rap Music on Trial, a film that advocates against the use of rap lyrics as evidence in criminal trials. The cinematography is beautiful, creating an aesthetically pleasing experience. And it is engagingly structured as a road movie with the guide, rapper Kemba, taking the viewer to Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York City, and London to interview rappers and legal experts. This results in a powerful documentary that has received glowing reviews from both film critics and audiences. Unfortunately, while the film’s subject is certainly a legitimate topic of discussion, the film suffers from significant shortcomings. This review will analyze how the leading study regarding rap on trial is deceptively presented, misrepresentations of the topic as a free-speech issue whereby rap lyrics are “criminalized,” ineffective attempts to analogize rappers to Shakespearian actors, and claims regarding race that are contrary to the evidence.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Forthcoming From Routledge Books: Culture, Secularization, and Democracy (Sophie van Bijsterveld and Hans-Martien ten Napel, eds., 2025)

 Forthcoming from Routledge Books:

Culture, Secularization, and Democracy: Lessons from Alexis de Tocqueville (Sophie van Bijsterveld and Hans-Martien ten Napel, eds., 2025). Here is a description of the book's contents from the publisher's website.

Following the approach developed by Alexis de Tocqueville, this volume views democracy as a cultural phenomenon. It starts from the assumption that if we are to adequately address concerns about the current state and future of modern Western democracies, we need first to tackle the cultural preconditions necessary for the functioning of a democracy. Since Tocqueville’s time, the book takes the most crucial change in the West to be ‘double secularisation’. Here, this concerns, first, the diminished influence of organised Christianity. Even though secularity was partly a product of Christianity, secularisation is highly significant in terms of the cultural underpinnings of Western democracy. Second, it involves a decreased interest in and knowledge of classical philosophy. Chapters on secularity, family life, civic life, and public spirit focus on central elements of the changed cultural foundation of democracy, exploring issues such as identity politics, the public space, and the role of human rights and natural law in a pluralistic and resilient democracy. The volume concludes with a closer look at the implications of current presentism, that is, the view that only the present counts for the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic systems. Finally, it asks if double secularisation can also offer fresh opportunities for promoting the conditions of a viable democracy. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of law and religion, constitutional law, political science, history, and philosophy.

Call For Papers: Cultural Contours of Justice: Law and Crime Narratives in Popular Imagination

Call For Papers from Dr. Dimitris Akrivos, University of Surrey, and Dr. Alexandros Antoniou, University of Essex:

I am delighted to invite contributions to our interdisciplinary Special Issue Cultural Contours of Justice: Law and Crime Narratives in Popular Imagination for Laws, a high impact factor MDPI journal.

 

🛑All articles will be Open Access so everyone can join the conversation.

🛑There is a 100% article processing fee waiver for all contributions to this Special Issue.

 

For all the fine print and submission specifics, make your way to our special issue’s exclusive page here: https://www.mdpi.com/journal/laws/special_issues/GZQ60XH7QX.

 

Should further enlightenment be required, please drop a line to Dr Dimitris Akrivos at d.akrivos@surrey.ac.uk and Dr Alexandros Antoniou at a.antoniou@essex.ac.uk.

Harris on Ida B. Wells' Train Ride in Memphis and the Dawn of Jim Crow @memlawschool

Lee Harris, University of Memphis School of Law, has published Ida B. Wells' Train Ride in Memphis and the Dawn of Jim Crow at 2 Journal of American Constitutional History 297 (2024). Here is the abstract.

Before there was Rosa Parks, Ida B. Wells and women across the United States during the late nineteenth century were challenging discriminatory practices on the public transit system of their era: the railroads. In 1881, Wells, who would eventually become a history-making anti-lynching crusader, was just 19 years old. She was readying herself to leave Holly Springs, Mississippi, her hometown, for the first time and move to Memphis for a higher-paying teaching job. She planned to commute by train to and from her new position. Developers had laid train tracks around the city, and Memphis boasted seven rail lines. In those years of her youth, before she left the South for the national stage, Ida B. Wells was a regular train commuter in Memphis. Also, at the time of her young adulthood, racial segregation was still at its embryonic stage. However, principles of segregation had been spreading incredibly fast into multiple domains, including the nascent transit system. Soon enough, her usual train commute from Memphis set the backdrop for one of her most consequential legal changes taking place in the country and the arrival of Jim Crow. Before Rosa Parks, Ida B. Wells was one of the first women in America who refused to give up her seat and made a legal challenge to the segregationist system that was emerging around the nation. Although she did not win, her actions set the stage for the next several decades of the fight against segregation and Jim Crow.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Kent on Executive Power, the Royal Prerogative, and the Founders' Presidency @andrewkent33 @FordhamLawNYC

Andrew Kent, Fordham University School of Law, has published Executive Power, the Royal Prerogative, and the Founders' Presidency at 2 Journal of American Constitutional History 403 (2024). Here is the abstract.

The original meaning of the opening clause of Article II of the Constitution--which vests "[t]he executive power ... in a President of the United States"--has been debated inconclusively for over 200 years. As originalism gains ground as an interpretive theory in U.S. courts, and the U.S. executive branch continues to read the clause very expansively, often by making claims about original meaning, an intense scholarly debate has raged in recent decades about the Clause. A cohort of influential originalist scholars read the Executive Power Clause as a broad grant of war, foreign affairs, and national security power supposedly considered "executive" in nature in the eighteenth century, defined by reference to the royal prerogative powers of the British monarchy. Other scholarship views the Clause as granting only the power to execute the law. A third approach interprets the Clause even more minimally, as a mere designation provision, not granting power at all but making clear that there would be a singular chief magistrate called the president, with power flowing from enumerations such as the Commander in Chief, Appointments, Pardons, and Treaty Clauses. This Article comprehensively reviews the British and American legal, political, and ideological backgrounds relevant to understanding the Executive Power Clause; carefully reads the text in light of interpretive conventions used in the founding era and extrinsic evidence from the Philadelphia Convention and state ratification debates; and critically evaluates the current scholarship. The wide divergence among modern scholars about the meaning of the Executive Power Clause is found to reflect real ambiguity in the text of the Constitution and the historical records. Unlike many previous scholars, who have settled on their preferred reading as the clearly correct choice, I find that there are several plausible original public meanings of the Executive Power Clause. When the new government under the Constitution became operational in 1789, the ambiguous Clause was sitting there ready to become a site of contestation. That said, the text and history I review here support at least one firm conclusion: by far the least plausible original meaning of the Executive Power Clause is the one which sees it as granting an undefined amount of British royal prerogative power to the president.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Resnik on Seeing "The Courts": Managerial Judges, Empty Courtrooms, Chaotic Courthouses, and Judicial Legitimacy from the 1980s to the 2020s @YaleLawSch

Judith Resnik, Yale Law School, has published Seeing "The Courts": Managerial Judges, Empty Courtrooms, Chaotic Courthouses, and Judicial Legitimacy from the 1980s to the 2020s as Yale Law School Public Law Research Public Law Research Paper No. 43.2. Here is the abstract.

From some perspectives, litigation looks vibrant, with front-page coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s reconsideration of its precedents and high-profile civil and criminal lawsuits against government officials. Moreover, since the 1980s, the federal judiciary has had an ambitious building program producing dozens of courthouses designed to exemplify the “solemnity, stability, integrity, rigor, and fairness” of adjudication. Such edifices underscore courts’ place in narrations of the United States. Yet the challenges of legitimating government authority, of which judicial actions are a part, have become all the more acute since Managerial Judges was published forty years ago. The world of ordinary litigation is troubled and shrinking, and the disjuncture between judges’ stated goals and their practices has become vivid. Aside from a few aggregations of tens of thousands of cases in “mega” multidistrict litigations (MDLs), filings in the federal courts have flattened and declined to about 240,000 civil cases per year. At both trial and appellate levels, significant percentages of litigants proceed without lawyers; about one-quarter of civil filings and about half of the appeals come from individuals representing themselves. Most circuits have embraced norms of limiting oral arguments and of issuing eighty-five percent of their decisions as non-precedential rulings. Those practices, rendering their work less visible, parallel the lack of transparency of the many managerial decisions at the trial level, where hours on the bench are down to about 320 per year and fewer than one of 100 civil lawsuits ends with a trial. All the while, federal courts remain relatively rich in resources and staff as compared to both state and tribal courts and to agencies. Even as filings likewise have fallen, state courts continue to have tens of millions more cases and larger segments of their dockets in which lawyerless litigants are the norm. Many judges are ill-equipped to respond to disputants with limited resources, often in family conflicts or as debtors and tenants who face resourced adversaries. Further, as the focus shifts to web-based resolution mechanisms, little attention is paid to its privatizing features. Providers of online dispute resolution (ODR) have not seen enabling public access as part of the packet of services to promote. Thus, courtroom-based adjudication is becoming increasingly rare. One possibility is that this form of statecraft is failing and the time has come to abandon its aspirations. Yet, as an heir to a political tradition grounded in the due process ideology of governments obligated to make decisions that are not arbitrary, I am not willing to give up the public service of adjudication and on courts as one of many venues to put into practice commitments of equal treatment. To legitimate decisions, judges need to preside over cases in which litigants are able to provide adequate information. This article analyzes the federal judiciary’s function as an adjudicatory institution and as an “agency” with its own programmatic agendas. During the last few decades, the federal judiciary has successfully lobbied Congress to create and finance a host of projects, including authorizing judges to centralize cases through multidistrict litigation, to select and appoint adjunct magistrate and bankruptcy judges, and to oversee the design of dozens of new courthouses. Since the 1990s, the federal judiciary has also gathered statistics on and repeatedly raised concerns about the number of self-represented litigants. Yet the judiciary has not generated structural responses, such as a national database on the many district court “pro se” projects and new mechanisms to enlist lawyering and other resources, to enable judges to make principled decisions in those cases. Likewise, while the docket is heavily dependent on the cross-litigant subsidies generated through class actions and MDLs, judges have not crafted methods to mobilize the lawyering resources in those configurations to support litigants within or to shape a robust method of overseeing implementation of the resolutions reached. To date, the federal judiciary has not instituted a mechanism to buffer against allocating adjudicatory resources largely based on litigants’ economic wherewithal. Moreover, the federal judiciary, entwined with state and tribal court adjudication, has not joined its counterparts in pressing Congress to provide new streams of funding for all kinds of courts and the people using them. Navigating the political economy of courts producing a crisis of legitimacy requires reorienting the “process due” by revising statutes, doctrine, practices, and rules to respond to an eclectic set of claimants seeking to be heard. “Management” of the people in court does not suffice.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Shanks-Dumont on The Aesthetics is International Criminal Law

Daimeon Shanks-Dumont, University of California, Berkeley, is publishing The Aesthetics is International Criminal Law in volume 37 of the Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

Randle DeFalco’s provocative book, Invisible Atrocities, argues that aesthetic perceptions condition what is considered an international crime through the deployment of a social constructivist model of norm development. However, DeFalco forecloses the more radical implications of his work by positing that aesthetic considerations remain anterior to international criminal law’s (ICL) identity; that is, the ontological status of law is understood by reference to Lon Fuller’s analytical essentialism, which insists that for law to be “law” it must conform to eight formal criteria of legality — significant deviation from these parameters and law is no longer “law,” but rather “some other, nonlegal form of rulemaking or social ordering.” The critical potential of Invisible Atrocities is frustrated because to flatten and de-historicize something like ICL (or any legal regime, for that matter), as Fuller does with his eight criteria, is to reify law as an ideal type that contradicts the hermeneutic approach to norm creation implied by the social constructivism model utilized in the rest of the book. This friendly critique of Defalco’s conceptualization of law’s identity follows the work of Pierre Schlag to argue that aesthetics are not merely an influence on law, but rather are constituted as law. This hermeneutic understanding of law as a historically-situated, contingent, and inter-subjective process of meaning creation opens a whole field of totalizing ICL critique, not least of which would be an unmasking of the ideological functions that aesthetics play in determining what (and more importantly, who) are subject to ICL’s attentions. Simply put, if aesthetic considerations are something outside of law, then legal relations that are determined in and through aesthetics may be concealed, but if aesthetics is law, no such closure is possible. Unmasking law’s aesthetic identity forces the issue. In asking why law’s aesthetic identity is used to include/exclude, define/underdetermine, proscribe/condone, or otherwise determine social reality (cui bono?), many other questions — such as the ontological status of “law” as an abstract analytical concept — drop away as rationally insoluble or otherwise uninteresting.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Bellin on Murder on the Hearsay Trail @BellinJ @WMLawSchool @TAMU_Law_Review

Jeffrey Bellin, William & Mary Law School, is publishing Murder on the Hearsay Trail in the Texas A&M Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Judges, lawyers, and law students struggle to apply American evidence law’s most distinctive feature – the hearsay prohibition. The problem is that hearsay is difficult to master and astonishingly dull. At the same time, hearsay evidence is ubiquitous and important. Every litigator has a story about a judge’s eccentric hearsay rulings; mine is the trial judge who waved his hand dismissively at hearsay objections, letting witnesses answer on the grounds that, “I want to hear it.” And the case law is littered with appellate opinions scolding trial judges for erroneous hearsay rulings while introducing errors of their own. That is just the visible aspect of the problem. Lawyers are no better at hearsay than judges. Yet for every trial, there are countless non-trial resolutions where no evidence is presented, much less ruled upon. When hearsay is involved, parties evaluate the wisdom of these dispositions (dismissals, settlements, and guilty pleas) with only a rough understanding of the evidence that would be admissible at trial. This Article attempts to remedy this unsettling state of affairs. First, to get around the dullness problem, it weaves hearsay analysis into a mystery in the spirit of a John Grisham novel. The fictional tale of intrigue and murder twists and turns while dropping clues that ultimately solve the case. Then, the Article tackles hearsay’s complexity by solving the evidentiary puzzles inherent in those clues, which represent key inflexion points in the doctrine. By explaining which clues can be presented to the jury, and how those answers evolved over time, the Article paints the modern American hearsay landscape and rehabilitates its (unfairly) reviled rules. Finally, the Article explains why – if we are going to have a hearsay prohibition – this is as good as it gets. Contrary to the complaints of a legion of critics, the current hearsay definition is the simplest of the alternatives and offers the best results.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Lind on Zensur und Fiktion: Von Fake News bis fiktionale Literatur (Censorship and Fiction: From Fake News to Fictional Literature)

Hans Lind, Yale University, has published Zensur und Fiktion: Von Fake News bis fiktionale Literatur (Censorship and Fiction: From Fake News to Fictional Literature) as Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 2024-15. Here is the abstract.

German Abstract: Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Zensur informationeller Falschnachrichten im westlichen Kulturkreis, einschließlich bewusster Lügen und Fake News. Weiterhin werden fiktionale literarische Werke und performative Kunstformen thematisiert – von Romanverbotsverfahren bis zur rechtlichen Sanktionierung von Rap und anderen autofiktionalen Literaturformen.

 

English Abstract: The handbook entry will address the censorship of counterfactual communication, including intentional lies and fake news. Furthermore, fictional literary works and performative art forms will be addressed, from banned books to the judicial sanctioning of rap/hip-hop and other auto-fictional forms of literature.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

CFP: Gikii 2024: Gikii's Existential Threat, Or Nerding Out-As-A-Service?

 From Michael Veale, Associate Professor of Law, University College London:

Please see below or at https://www.gikii.org/gikii-2024-call-for-papers/ for the CFP for Gikii London, 4-5 September 2024 at the Faculty of Laws, University College London.

Gikii’s Existential Threat, or Nerding Out–As–A–Service?

As the most powerful technologies companies in the world reorient their whole business models to automated fan-fiction production, we invite you to Gikii 2024, held at the Faculty of Laws, University College London 4-5 September 2024.

Gikii needs you. We are living in a world where most, if not all, previous Gikii papers over the last two decades are proving themselves more prediction than speculation. The arguable purpose of Gikii, using nerd culture to reason about the present and future of technology law and policy, is existentially threatened by contemporary events. Facebook is a zombie wasteland with users worshipping new shrimp-covered deities. Google has transformed from a neutral-claiming search engine to robotically telling users to drink their own urine. Far from learning the lessons from dystopian sci-fi blockbusters, today’s AI companies are actively and explicitly using them as blueprints for design.

Gikii cannot operate under these conditions. Unless you prove us wrong.

We welcome papers (for 10-12 minute presentations) at the interface/nexus/crossroads/hellportal between law, (un)popular culture and technology. The best Gikii presentations make you laugh, then make you think. Your abstract should be concise, flavourfilled and brimming with energy, bearing in mind the short presentation format Gikii favours. You can see previous presentation titles on the Gikii website for ideas.

The deadline is Friday 28 June, so we aim to give you good time to make travel arrangements.

Submit your abstract here: https://cloud.michae.lv/apps/forms/s/rSWScx7xDFeQ5QKRkYXgwMZr

 

Charles on Time and Tradition in Second Amendment Law @JacobDCharles @PeppLaw @FordhamULJ

Jacob D. Charles, Pepperdine University School of Law, has published Time and Tradition in Second Amendment Law at 51 Fordham Urban Law Journal 259 (2023). Here is the abstract.

The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment is a chronological chameleon. For one purpose, its meaning is fixed in the firmament of the Founding era. For another purpose, its language is anchored to the understanding of living Americans. One clause gets projected backwards, traced to antecedents in the 17th century. An adjacent clause gets projected forward, evolving alongside dynamic consumer preferences. Still other words or phrases are cloaked in meaning from different temporal epochs — the Long 18th Century, the Antebellum South, the Reconstruction Era, and even the Reagan Revolution. This oscillation remains unexplained in the Justices’ opinions. Why so many incompatible timelines? Only Χρόνος knows. In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Supreme Court announced a new past-bound Second Amendment test. There, the Court said that no gun regulation can be upheld unless it has an analogue in the distant past — unless, that is, “the government can demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” That historical test masks the ways that the Supreme Court’s own pronouncements refer different questions to different time periods. Lower court judges have drawn attention to how the Court’s new guidance creates a “logical inconsistency” in the time that matters and fuels “anachronism” in the Court’s doctrine. They have recognized, that is, that time takes on supreme importance, but that the relevant temporal frame is not uniform across the questions pervading Second Amendment law. Neither the Court nor commentators give any reason to refer some questions to the Founding generation and others to Gen X. This brief Essay explores the inconsistency in the current doctrine. Part I charts the different questions that the Supreme Court has divided up among different temporal epochs. Part II begins to think through how the Court could redirect or justify its practice, either by referring all questions to the same time period or explaining why the existing diversity makes sense. Whatever the pathway, the Court should justify its doctrinal treatment of time.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.

Pfeiffer and Hu on Deconstructing Code Words @ASUCollegeOfLaw @uarizonalaw @law_soc

Deirdre Pfeiffer, Arizona State College of Law, and Xiaoqian Hu, University of Arizona College of Law, are publishing Deconstructing Racial Code Words in volume 58 of Law & Society (2024). Here is the abstract.

Racism has become more covert in post-civil rights America. Yet, measures to combat it are hindered by inadequate general knowledge on what “colorblind” race talk says and does and what makes it effective. We deepen understanding of covert racism by investigating one type of discourse—racial code words, which are 1) indirect signifiers of racial or ethnic groups that contain 2) at least one positive or negative value judgment and 3) contextually implied or salient meanings. Through a thematic analysis of 734 racial code words from 97 scholarly texts, we develop an interpretive framework that explains their tropes, linguistic mechanisms, and unique roles in perpetuating racism, drawing from race, linguistic, and cultural studies. Racial code words promote tropes of White people’s respectability and privilege and Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ pathology and inferiority in efficient, adaptable, plausibly deniable, and almost always racially stratifying ways, often through euphemism, metonymy, and othering. They construct a “colorblind” discursivity and propel both “epistemic racism” (racism in knowledge) and systemic racism (racism in action). We further strengthen applications of Critical Race Theory in sociolegal studies of race by presenting a “racial meaning decoding tool” to assist legal and societal measures to detect coded racism.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Arvind and Puset on Partisan Legal Traditions in the Age of Camden and Mansfield @NDLaw

T. T. Arvind, York Law School, and Christian R. Puset, Notre Dame Law School, have published Partisan Legal Traditions in the Age of Camden and Mansfield at 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2024). Here is the abstract.

The eighteenth century is often treated by scholars as a period of juristic consensus. This article argues, in contrast, that the late eighteenth century saw the emergence of rival ‘Patriot’ and ‘Tory’ legal traditions. Through a detailed study of the jurisprudence of Lords Camden and Mansfield—who were both pillars of the law, as well as political and juristic rivals—we show that they differed systematically in their understanding of the common law. Those differences had a partisan cast: although they were not crude attempts to instrumentalise law to political ends, their political and jurisprudential commitments influenced each other and emerged from the same intellectual roots. We place these differences in the context of the fragmentation of eighteenth-century Whig politics, and argue that they have important implications for how we understand and use the common-law tradition today.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

MacLeod and Hall on Foundations of the Right of Charitable Uses @StMarys_Law @RegentLaw

Adam MacLeod, St. Mary's University Law School, and Mark David Hall, Regent University, are publishing Foundations of the Right of Charitable Uses in the Mississippi Law Journal. Here is the abstract.

In recent years, municipalities around the United States have enacted ordinances that prohibit or restrict food-sharing in public places. These ordinances make it difficult for charitable souls to share food with those most in need. In one case, a town in Arizona arrested a woman under an ordinance that prohibits sharing food in public for charitable purposes. The closest analogs to these laws are the English anti-almsgiving acts of the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. One must look that far back in history because infringements of the right of charitable uses of property are exceedingly rare. Indeed, throughout the history of our constitutional and legal tradition, the law has repeatedly and vigorously secured the right to make charitable uses of one’s property. An examination of the history and tradition of charitable uses leads to the conclusion that the right is deeply rooted in our fundamental law. This finding has widespread implications today because the right is at stake not only in the enforcement of food-sharing ordinances but also in other attempts to limit or regulate charitable activity, such as laws that constrain the freedom of charitable organizations to solicit funds, requirements that private charities serve governments’ purposes, and burdens on charities’ exercise of their right of association.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Frassetto on The Historical Regulation of Intoxicated Firearms Possession and Carry: A Response to F. Lee Francis's "Armed and Under the Influence: The Second Amendment and the Intoxicant Rule after Bruen" @MarkFrassetto

Mark Frassetto, Everytown for Gun Safety, is publishing The Historical Regulation of Intoxicated Firearms Possession and Carry: A Response to F. Lee Francis's 'Armed and Under the Influence: The Second Amendment and the Intoxicant Rule after Bruen' in volume 108 of the Marquette Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Recently, the Marquette Law Review published "Armed and Under the Influence: The Second Amendment and the Intoxicant Rule After Bruen" by Prof. F. Lee Francis. In that article, Professor Francis provocatively argues that the Second Amendment protects the right of intoxicated people to carry guns in public. Francis argues that, under the history-focused framework for deciding Second Amendment cases laid out by the Supreme Court in Bruen, there is an insufficient historical tradition to support prohibiting intoxicated people from carrying arms in public. Francis is wrong about the historical tradition. The historical tradition of regulating the intersection of guns and alcohol, the tradition of regulating intoxication and substance abuse generally, and the broader tradition of prohibiting dangerous people from possessing firearms all provide historical support for the constitutionality of modern prohibitions on intoxicated people carrying and using firearms. This article will critique Francis’s article in three ways. First, Francis fails to acknowledge the full scope of the historical regulation of intoxicated people carrying firearms, which was extensive, especially during the mid-to-late-nineteenth century, the period which is most relevant to the Second Amendment analysis of state laws. Second, Francis’s piece fails to grapple with the ubiquitous general prohibition on public intoxication, which existed during the Founding Era and for much of American history. Third, Francis’s piece fails to address the historical tradition of prohibiting firearms possession by those who, like intoxicated people, posed a danger to themselves or others. All three of these traditions provide strong support for the constitutionality of prohibiting firearms possession by intoxicated individuals.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Feliu on From the Fox to Onlyfans: The Changing Landscape of Property Law @NovaLawReview

Vicenç Feliú, Nova Southeastern College of Law, is publishing From the Fox to Onlyfans: The Changing Landscape of Property Law in the Nova Law Review. Here is the abstract.

This law review article traces the rich evolution of American Property Law from its origins in Roman Law, through the influence of English Common Law, to its current complexities in the digital age. It highlights the continuous adaptation of property concepts to the evolving socio-political landscape, from fundamental principles like ownership and possession to the protection of intangible assets. The legacy of Roman Law, emphasizing property rights and contracts, laid the foundation for legal systems worldwide. The impact of English Common Law, with its doctrines of real property and equity, shaped American legal frameworks regarding ownership, title, and dispute resolution. Historical events such as the American Revolution and industrialization spurred significant developments in property law, leading to the recognition of new rights like water rights, environmental protection, and intellectual property. In the modern era, technological advancements present unique challenges, especially in intellectual property. Copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets are crucial for safeguarding innovation in a globalized economy. Issues like digital piracy, data privacy, and artificial intelligence continue to shape property law debates, emphasizing fairness, efficiency, and innovation promotion. This article underscores the enduring legacy of legal traditions and the capacity of property law to adapt to changing circumstances. By understanding its historical foundations and ongoing developments, we gain insight into how property law safeguards individual rights, drives economic growth, and fosters innovation in the United States and globally.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Call For Papers: Washington University Law Review Symposium on the 150th Anniversity of Minor v. Happersett @WashULRev

From Hannah Keidan, Chief Diversity Editor, Law Review Lead on the Symposium, Washington University Law Review, h.f.keidan@wustl.edu

Kaitlyn Salyer, EIC, Washington University Law Review, kaitlynsalyer@wustl.edu

Susan Frelich Appleton, Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, appleton@wustl.edu

Travis Crum, Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, crum@wustl.edu

Call for Papers:

On Friday September 27, the Washington University Law Review is hosting a Symposium on the 150th anniversary of Minor v. Happersett, the case in which the Supreme Court held that women were not enfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. We're casting a wide net for potential paper topics, and they can range from Reconstruction-era history, 20th century history on women's civil/political rights, feminist theory, and post-Dobbs developments. Abstracts are due by Friday June 14. Please see below for the Call for Papers. This symposium is primarily run by the students, but Professor Susan Appleton and I are serving as faculty co-advisors, and I'd be happy to answer any questions that you may have. The 150th Anniversary of Minor v. Happersett: The Past and Future of Women's Rights Washington University School of Law September 27, 2024 Call for Papers Abstract Submission Deadline: June 14 The Washington University School of Law and the Washington University Law Review will host a Symposium centered on the 150th anniversary of the historic St. Louis case, Minor v. Happersett, on September 27, 2024. (The 150th anniversary will align with the subsequent publishing of the Law Review's Symposium edition as Volume 6 of Issue 102 the following spring.) In 1872, Virginia Minor challenged a St. Louis registrar's decision to block her from registering to vote. Minor argued the Fourteenth Amendment conferred upon her the right to vote as a "privilege" of American citizenship. In 1875, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Minor's assertion, ruling that voting was not a right of national citizenship. Despite the rejection of Minor's claim, this case remains an important historical moment in both American women's suffrage and the feminist movement at large. This Symposium will bring together scholars across many fields of law, including feminist studies, voting rights and election law, and related fields. Submissions having no direct relation to the Minor case are welcome. Papers might address topics including, but not limited to, the following: • The history and evolution of women's rights • Past or present voting rights and election law • Ballot initiatives post-Dobbs The Symposium will consist of approximately 3-4 panels over the course of one day, with the panels being created by the Law Review based on relatedness of subject matters across selected pieces. Participants will attend and serve on the panels, and will be asked to read up to a dozen papers (with special attention paid to the papers of others on their panel). The papers circulated for the Symposium are drafts, and the discussion on September 27 will include feedback. The Symposium will include a dinner the night before. There is no conference fee, and Washington University will host all of the meals on the conference date. Funding will be available to assist with travel expenses-each participant is eligible for up to $1,000 to reimburse hotel and economy-class airfare expenses. To apply, please submit an abstract of no more than 500 words to symposiums@wustllawreview.org by June 14, 2024. Submissions will be vetted by a committee of students from the Law Review, supervised by faculty advisors (listed below). Selection will be based on the originality of the abstract as well as its capacity to engage with other papers in a collaborative dialogue. Participants will also be invited to submit a paper for publication in the Washington University Law Review's Symposium edition (Issue 6 of Volume 102). The publication cycle for this edition will begin in February 2025, with publication estimated to be in the late summer of 2025. If you are interested in publishing a paper (10,000-15,000 words), please indicate your interest when you submit your abstract. Participants will be notified of their selection by early July. Drafts for distribution at the Symposium will be due on September 6. We look forward to your submissions and participation. Questions can be directed to the organizing Law Review members and their faculty advisors via the symposiums@wustllawreview.org address. Kaitlyn Salyer Editor-in-Chief Washington University Law Review kaitlynsalyer@wustl.edu Susan Frelich Appleton Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law Washington University School of Law appleton@wustl.edu Travis Crum Associate Professor of Law Washington University School of Law crum@wustl.edu ------------------------------ Travis Crum Washington University in St. Louis School of Law ------------------------------

Amor on "They Willfully Themselves Exile From Light": Exile in Space, Stage and Metatheatre in William Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream

Zied Ben Amor, University of Sousse, has published “They willfully themselves exile from light”: Exile in Space, Stage and Metatheatre in William Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream at 1 Theatre Academy 93 (2023). Here is the abstract.

Exile runs throughout William Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream. Transformed characters are exiled from the human world when they change shapes. Others are forced to leave their countries and worlds to enter magical ones. Personalities and feelings shift because of magic. Examining the dichotomy between Athens and the forest and the theatrical transformations shows that exile is geographical, emotional and spatial. Exile is also endowed with a transmigrant dimension. The study of metatheatre in the play corroborates the presence of an exilic dimension. Finally, the application of Nathaniel C. Leonard’s and Robert Weimann’s fundamental notions of platea, locus, meta-platea, and meta-locus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream enables us to reach the finding that the Spectrum of Dramatic Layering hosts exilic manifestations. The research merges semantic investigations with the semiotics of theatre. Dealing with the matter of exile both from the lenses of literary and theatrical studies offers broader perspectives to understand the play’s nuances and complexities.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.