Salib on The Bank of England and the British Constitution

Michael Salib, Bank of England, has published The Bank of England and the British Constitution as LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 10/2026. Here is the abstract.

Prompted by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Cook (2026), this article examines the constitutional position of the Bank of England within the United Kingdom's uncodified constitution. The article traces the Bank's development from its foundation in 1694 through nationalisation in 1946 and the grant of operational independence in 1997-98, showing how its constitutional significance has emerged through historical practice as well as statutory design. It argues that the Bank's enduring legal personality, sustained for more than 330 years, means that it does not merely exist within the constitution; it has become part of the constitutional fabric of the state itself. In particular, it argues that the Bank occupies a constitutionally distinctive place within the executive, as an institution of long historical standing, entrusted by Parliament with the exercise of independent expert judgement in safeguarding the value of the currency and maintaining the financial stability, while remaining accountable to Parliament and ultimately subject to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. It argues that there is a good case that the Bank of England Act 1998 bears the hallmarks of a constitutional statute, structuring the relationship between Parliament, government and the central bank. Finally, it develops a constitutional analogy between the Bank and the judiciary: institutions entrusted with the exercise of specialised expertise and independent judgement, protected from improper political interference, yet accountable within a constitutional framework ultimately established by Parliament.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.