Judges play a critical role in one of the most important states of a criminal case’s adjudication—sentencing. While there have been substantial limitations placed on the discretion judges can exercise in devising punishments, there are little to none on what judges say at such hearings when articulating their rationales for the sentences they impose on convicted defendants. This Article examines the language judges use when sentencing defendants convicted rape, sexual assault, and sexual abuse that describes victims of those crimes and the harms they have sustained, especially language that describes victims as “ruined,” “broken,” or “destroyed.” The use of such language, while apparently meant to be empathetic, only serves to uphold misogynistic understandings of rape and sexual assault and actively harms victims. Judges trying to justify harsh sentences for defendants convicted of sex crimes also engage in shaming and exploitation of victims when saying that defendants have left victims “ruined” at sentencing. In this Article I use traditional scholarly methods of reviewing and analyzing cases and legal doctrine to show why the use of such language is harmful to victims and flouts the purposes of criminal punishment. However, I also engage in autoethnographic methods, relying on my own experiences of rape and sexual assault, as well as prosecuting such cases. This Article also considers how other fields such as medicine and public health have approached destigmatizing other historically stigmatized conditions like substance use and mental illness, arguing that judges should take similar steps to destigmatize being a victim of rape and sexual assault by more carefully considering their language use at sentencing. I conclude by reflecting on the use of personal narrative in legal scholarship and in the classroom and argue that it can be a powerful tool that scholars should more openly embrace.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
March 30, 2022
Romero on How Judges "Ruin" Victims at Sentencing @MaybellRomero @TulaneLaw @GeorgetownLJ
March 28, 2022
Call for Applications: Annual Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities Graduate Student Workshop: June 15, 2022 @Law_Cult_Huma
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Hamilton on Reform, Retrench, Repeat: The Campaign Against Critical Race Theory: Through the Lens of Critical Race Theory @VivianEHamilton
The protest movement ignited by the 2020 murder of George Floyd was of a scale unprecedented in U.S. history. The movement raised the nation’s consciousness of racial injustices and spurred promises—and the beginnings—of justice-oriented reform. Reform and racial progress, however, have rarely been linear over the course of U.S. history. Instead, they typically engender resistance and retrenchment. The response to the current justice movement is no exception. One manifestation of the retrenchment has been a rush by states to enact legislation curtailing race-related education in government workplaces and in public schools, colleges, and universities. These legislative measures purport to prevent the teaching of “divisive” tenets of Critical Race Theory (CRT), an intellectual discipline that originated in the legal academy in the 1980s. The proposed bills and enacted statutes, however, will instead prevent educators, for fear of incurring threatened penalties, from teaching about the role of racism in U.S. history and engaging students in meaningful discussions about race. If they remain in place, the laws increase the chances that the next generation of students will remain uninformed of the racial history of the United States and its legacy and will thus come of age unmotivated—and unequipped—to improve upon it. This Article describes first the racial justice movement that surged after Floyd’s murder, then the resistance and retrenchment that rapidly followed. Next, it draws on CRT to place these events in historical and theoretical context. It describes the intellectual predecessors of CRT, the emergence of CRT as an intellectual and political movement, and its core insights. It explains how the insights of CRT, despite being caricatured by conservative opponents of race reform, instead explain the retrenchment and backlash to the racial justice movement—including the evolution of the ideologies that anchor it, and the use of institutions, including the law, to entrench the status quo and the racial hierarchies it comprises.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
March 26, 2022
Newly Published: James Boyd White, Let In the Light: Learning to Read St. Augustine's Confessions (Columbia University Press, 2022) @ColumbiaUP
Newly published:
James Boyd White, Let In the Light: Learning to Read St. Augustine's Confessions (Columbia University Press, 2022).
Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.
St. Augustine’s Confessions is heralded as a classic of Western culture. Yet when James Boyd White first tried to read it in translation, it seemed utterly dull. Its ideas struck him as platitudinous and its prose felt drab. It was only when he started to read the text in Latin that he began to see the originality and depth of Augustine’s work.
In Let in the Light, White invites readers to join him in a close and engaged encounter with the Confessions in which they will come to share his experience of the book’s power and profundity by reading at least some of it in Augustine’s own language. He offers an accessible guide to reading the text in Latin, line by line—even for those who have never studied the language.
Equally attuned to the resonances of individual words and the deeper currents of Augustine’s culture, Let in the Light considers how the form and nuances of the Latin text allow greater insight into the work and its author. White shows how to read Augustine’s prose with care and imagination, rewarding sustained attention and broader reflection.
Let in the Light brings new life to a classic work, guiding readers to experience the immediacy, urgency, and vitality of Augustine’s Confessions.
March 22, 2022
Forthcoming: Julie Stone Peters, Law As Performance (Oxford University Press, 2022) @OxUniPress
Tirades against legal theatrics are nearly as old as law itself, and yet so is the age-old claim that law must not merely be done: it must be "seen to be done." Law as Performance traces the history of legal performance and spectatorship through the early modern period. Viewing law as the product not merely of edicts or doctrines but of expressive action, it investigates the performances that literally created law: in civic arenas, courtrooms, judges' chambers, marketplaces, scaffolds, and streets. It examines the legal codes, learned treatises, trial reports, lawyers' manuals, execution narratives, rhetoric books, images (and more) that confronted these performances, praising their virtues or denouncing their evils. In so doing, it recovers a long, rich, and largely overlooked tradition of jurisprudential thought about law as a performance practice. This tradition not only generated an elaborate poetics and politics of legal performance. It provided western jurisprudence with a set of constitutive norms that, in working to distinguish law from theatrics, defined the very nature of law. In the crucial opposition between law and theatre, law stood for cool deliberation, by-the-book rules, and sovereign discipline. Theatre stood for deceptive artifice, entertainment, histrionics, melodrama. And yet legal performance, even at its most theatrical, also appeared fundamental to law's realization: a central mechanism for shaping legal subjects, key to persuasion, essential to deterrence, indispensable to law's power, —as it still does today.
March 21, 2022
Where Law Meets the Humanities: Special Issue of Talking Humanities
Where Law Meets The Humanities. The
contributors to this special issue of Talking
Humanities provide an important sample of how the humanities
provide a vital sensibility for cutting edge legal scholarship today. In his
contribution (The humanities and law: more intertwined than you might think),
David Sugarman explores the often uneasy and complex relationship between
law and the humanities, and the growth and development of influences from the
humanities within legal scholarship. Mara Malagodi (How legal briefs find new life in celluloid) focuses on
the relationship between law and film, and its role in enabling our
understanding of ‘justice’. Jill Marshall (The power of listening: how survivors’ voices can transform human
rights) explores the importance of narrative and storytelling in
fostering a victim-centred approach to International Human Rights Law and
International Criminal Law. Michael Thomson (From ‘heartbeats’ to bounty hunters – the legal complexities of
abortion) situates the current American challenge to the
constitutional right to abortion through a historical analysis of the
relationship between law and medicine, while connecting this to the histories
of slavery which continue to leave their imprint. The issue is introduced by Carl Stychin (Where law meets the humanities).
March 17, 2022
Call For Papers: International Conference on Law and Art in the 19th Century: Power in Images, Verona, October 19-21, 2022
The Coronation of Napoleon by Jacques-Louis David; the courthouse of the Court of Cassation in Rome; the statues of Justice or Liberty; the caricatures by the painter Honoré Daumier: these are just a few examples of the artistic representation of law, power, justice and rights in the 19th century.
Sometimes faithful reproductions of the legal values produced at the time, sometimes exaltation, transfiguration or denunciation of certain aspects of the legal system. Art, like law, is a human factor that is sometimes able to assert itself from below, from the society that produces it; at other times it comes from above, in tune with the designs of those who hold political power and who use art to put forward a certain image of power, as well as to disseminate a precise idea of the juridical. The importance of artistic images and, more specifically, of the iconographic representation of key themes and concepts of law in their various legal contexts, requires no lengthy demonstration. The evocative capacity and symbolic potential released by images has often been used in Western history to effectively express, and at the same time to reinforce, key ideas from the legal world through the strength and immediacy of an iconic message, so as to obtain the broadest possible understanding and adherence in the community of reference for the model of legal organisation in force at any given moment.
The research team set up to further study the project Images, Law and Power in the Modern Age, within the framework of the Excellence Project of the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Verona (2018-2022), is organising a conference on the theme of the artistic representation of law in the 19th century, from the French Revolution to the early twentieth century. The purpose is to investigate the ways in which, during the nineteenth century, the substantial change in the structural characteristics of the legal phenomenon, and the emergence of an alternative legal experience, corresponded to the replacement - or re-semantization - of the symbols and images traditionally expressed in the law, so that they were more suitable to convey the new concept of the juridical in society. By studying the painting, sculpture and architecture of a particular epoch, it is possible to understand and delve into the legal reality, observing law in its complexity, as well as its ability to reside within society and give it order and structure. In this sense, the nineteenth century is a complex century, which begins with the French Revolution and the great break with the social and legal order of the Ancien Régime, and with the simultaneous establishment of a new socio-political order, marked by the affirmation of bourgeois society. The century ends with the emergence of a plural and complex society, marked by the advent of positivism, Darwinism and an unprecedented technological and industrial order. The cultural, political and economic changes are intertwined - in a play of reciprocal influences - with the legal and institutional ones, and are also expressed in an extensive and coherent iconographic system, either new or repurposed, which not only serves to describe the new order but also aims to make it empathetically present to the minds and hearts of those who confront it. These were sometimes the result of a specific cultural policy expressed on an iconographic level with reference to the world of law, and sometimes the result of a series of progressive ‘adjustments’ of the iconic baggage of the past to the new situation of modernity. Art follows the movement of history and the needs of society. Taking up the simple forms of the past in neoclassicism, it at the same time felt the urgency to describe the new, perceiving a cultural and social restlessness capable of evolving rapidly at the turn of the century. Architecture, with its harmonious neoclassical geometric forms, clashed with the utilitarian architecture desired by governments and required by the prevailing era of industrialisation. Painting initially followed revolutionary suggestions, then adapted to the magniloquent exaltation of Napoleon's exploits and the monarchies during the Restoration period, before becoming a denunciation of social injustice in satirical caricatures in tandem with the rise of Impressionism and Realism. Partially different movements followed in sculpture, which asserted itself in the 19th century as a monumental representation of political power in statues of monarchs and emperors, but also as an exaltation of the rights of freedom to be made present and visible in the urban spaces of the new cities. The subjects connected with the theme of the conference are therefore multiple and concern the connection of the varied artistic world with law and thus with political power, justice, legislative power and the fundamental rights of the individual. It is also possible to question the influence of the legal phenomenon on art, exploring the relations between artists and jurists, as well as painters and rulers; or again, to analyse artistic works that oppose a given legal and political system, denouncing the abuses of power or the injustice of laws. From this point of view, the historical reconstruction of this evolution is essential to grasp its deep implications as well as to highlight caesuras and continuities with respect to previous legal experience. The contributions of the history of art, architecture, and culture in general can lead to a deeper and more conscious reading of the legal phenomenon, one which takes into account its irreducible specificity but also its vital connection with contemporary cultural and artistic manifestations. The conference, therefore, aims to analyse the theme of the artistic representation of law in the 19th century via a multidisciplinary and comparative approach, stimulating discussion and dialogue among the participants, so as to ensure the historical profundity and depth of interpretation of an topic pervasive but underestimated, that of the translation into images of the values and 'myths' of law and power. It will thus be possible, starting from the notion of the changes experienced by society and, therefore also by its law in the 19th century, to lay bare first of all the operation of the ideological configuration of the rule of law and bourgeois society, which certainly benefit significantly from recourse to images capable of constructing a shared ideal and which is also disseminated through artistic images.
The conference organisers invite all interested scholars to participate in the call by sending the title and abstract (minimum 300 words - maximum 500 words) of the proposed paper and also indicating name, surname and university of affiliation, together with a curriculum vitae (of no more than four pages). In addition, the organisers are also accepting proposals for panels, consisting of three speakers and a chair and possibly a discussant; in this case, a title and an abstract of the panel (minimum 300 and maximum 500 words) are required in addition to the abstracts of the individual papers and the curriculum vitae of each speaker, chair and discussant. The conference will be held in Italian, French and English, so proposals can be submitted in any of these languages.
Applications must be sent by 30 June 2022 to: immagini.diritto@ateneo.univr.it Proposals will be accepted by 31 July 2022. The conference will take place in Verona in October 2022, potentially in person, although we are also considering online transmission of the event (candidates who know already that they will not be able to travel to Italy are requested to indicate this, and to specify the time zone of their country).
The organisers will bear the cost of accommodation and meals for the conference participants. The conference papers will be published following successful peer review. A prerequisite for participation in the conference is the delivery of the text ready for publication (maximum limit: 60,000 characters including spaces and notes) on the date of the conference, in one of the languages used for the work.
For any further communication or information: immagini.diritto@ateneo.univr.it The Chairman of the Scientific Committee: Prof. Giovanni Rossi: giovanni.rossi@univr.it; The person in charge of the organisation: Dr Pietro Schirò: pietro.schiro@univr.it.
Haksgaard on Including Unmarried Women in the Homestead Act of 1862 @haksgaard @WayneLawReview
When Congress passed the Homestead Act of 1862 it decided to distribute land to single, unmarried women. Most Congressional members who supported including unmarried women did so because women were a necessary part of empire building—women were expected to marry, bear children, and engage in building permanent communities. Few Congressional members cared about women’s equality or the progressive goals of the women’s rights movements, although some Congressional members thought women would be incapable of successfully homesteading. This article presents the fascinating history of including unmarried women in the Homestead Act of 1862 by conducting an intensive study of the act’s statutory history, beginning in 1843. Building on the work of historians, this article analyzes how the lived experiences of female homesteaders matched up with the expectations of the Congressional members who included them, on such topics as women’s willingness and ability to homestead, women’s equality, and women’s role in marriage and reproduction. Throughout, this article explores how this statutory history can influence our understanding of antebellum unmarried women’s rights.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
March 16, 2022
Abrams on Charles Dickens' Novels in the Courts @MizzouLaw @MoBarNews
Professor Abrams authors a column, Writing it Right in the Journal of the Missouri Bar. In a variety of contexts, the column stresses the fundamentals of quality legal writing - conciseness, precision, simplicity, and clarity.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
March 11, 2022
Rosen on Early American Federal Trademark Law and the Law of Nations @zvisrosen @BrillPublishing
From 1869 to 1879, many European nations rushed to conclude bilateral treaties for trademark protection with the United States, either with the expectation of a federal law or under the first federal trademark law passed in 1870. However, in 1879 the US Supreme Court held the 1870 Act unconstitutional, throwing that system into disarray. This piece will explore these early trademark treaties, situate them in the context of developments in the law and society during this period, and explore how the Supreme Court's 1879 decision in the Trade-Mark Cases affected the course of international trademark law. This piece adapts the author's earlier scholarship on this era of U.S. trademark law to greater engage the transatlantic development of trademark law.Download the chapter from SSRN at the link.
March 10, 2022
Rosenberg on Exaggeration: Advertising, Law and Medical Quackery in Britain, c. 1840-1914 @anat_rosenberg
This article revisits the nineteenth-century debate about medical quackery in Britain, to examine its implications for the history of modern advertising. It makes two related claims. First, the prevalent view of advertising as a field prone to exaggeration, often taken as obvious, has a legal history. The circumstances of the quackery debate led to a legal elaboration and formalization of views of advertising as an epistemologically doubtful but not illegal field. Second, advertising’s status as exaggeration was part of a legally supported cultural division of labour – or legal boundary work, which carved differentiated roles for science and the market in modern Britain whereby science was increasingly defined by restraint, and the market by its lack. The analysis examines the implications, while also offering new insights on the role of law in the history of quackery, and examining untapped sources, particularly a set of libel cases that developed a legal definition of quackery.The full text is not available from SSRN.
March 7, 2022
van Domselaar on "Plain" Legal Language by Courts" Mere Clarity, an Expression of Civic Friendship or a Masquerade of Violence? @AdamLawSchool
In the Netherlands over the last decade, a range of initiatives have been launched by individual courts, mostly on their own initiative, to make court rulings more comprehensible to average citizens. At the outset, at least from the ‘internal point of view’ of legal practitioners, it might seem striking that these initiatives predominantly address the comprehensibility of legal language as an exclusively linguistic matter, independent of any jurisprudential stance as to what ‘doing law’ should consist of in this context. However, this linguistically-oriented approach is far from eccentric: it dovetails nicely with the dominant approach adopted by the plain legal language movement to make the law more comprehensible to citizens. Against the background of a language as activity view, this article analyses and evaluates the use of comprehensible legal language by courts. To do this, an integrative legal–ethical approach is employed, according to which the content and style of court rulings are inextricably linked. More specifically, the Aristotelian concept of civic friendship is introduced as having potential explanatory force for the practice of plain legal language use by Dutch courts. With reference to actual court rulings, it is argued that this concept allows us to conceive of a ‘plain’ court ruling as a potential expression of a civic-friendly attitude by the judge. In addition, the main dilemmas that civic-friendly judges will be likely to face when writing a comprehensible court ruling are identified. Finally, and on a more critical note, a fundamental concern is raised regarding the practice of plain legal language use by Dutch courts.Download the essay from SSRN at the link.
March 3, 2022
ASLCH Conference Proposal Submission Deadline Extended To March 11, 2022 @Law_Cult_Huma
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF LAW, CULTURE, AND THE HUMANITIES
TWENTY-FOURTH
Annual Conference
June 16-17, 2022
Atlanta, GEORGIA, USA
The Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture and the Humanities will be held at Emory University School of Law,
June 16-17, 2022.
We welcome humanities-oriented proposals on topics broadly related to law and
legal studies. In addition, our theme this year is:
Unsettling
Law
Law often
resides in the pull between what is settled and what is not.
Precedent guides us until it does not. Law’s stability is in constant
conversation with its own necessary responsiveness as well as with what
troubles it from outside of legal institutions. Disobediences, whether civil
or not, have the power to unsettle what is taken to be settled. And forces
like climate change pose challenges to settled law by destabilizing what may
make obedience and order possible at all. Law continually expands the range of
persons it recognizes, for better or worse, while it claims across all changes
that it serves the interests of all. Borders exclude but remain permeable, and
we argue about what is owed to others regardless of their citizenship status.
States claim sovereignty and face refusals from other sovereignties within
their borders. Even settler colonialism is a process rather than an outcome,
so what is settled and what remains open to different futures may be
contested. How do and should we imagine law in these unsettled times? What
creative forces might we bring to bear in these moments between past and
future, whether for unsettling what ought to change or stabilizing what is
endangered? How might different disciplines, methodologies, arts, literatures,
and technologies represent, reinforce, or resist unsettling law? We invite
proposals taking up that question from a variety of humanities-oriented
perspectives.
The
conference will emphasize the ASLCH tradition of
in-person conversation
while making some panels available for those who wish to participate
virtually. Rather than hosting hybrid panels, there will be one full session
dedicated to online panels each day of the conference. Virtual attendees can
view these, and there will be public viewing rooms at the conference so that
attendees can engage in conversation with each other and the virtual
panelists. We will also host three plenary sessions that will be available in
person as well as streaming online. Some of the in-person panels will be
streamed
during the sessions that aren’t online-dedicated.
All
proposals are due Friday, March 11, 2022 at midnight Eastern Standard
Time.
Submission
instructions: Individual proposals should include a title and an
abstract of no more than 250 words, along with 2 keywords from the list below.
We also welcome proposals for panels, roundtables, and streams (two panels on
one theme). Please note that online presenters should organize a full panel
(we will not be accepting individual papers for online presentation this year)
and that, though we traditionally accept most papers, we may need to limit the
number of online panels we accept, depending on demand. Panels, whether
virtual or in-person, should include three papers (or, exceptionally, four
papers). Please specify a title and designate a chair for your panel. The
panel chair may also be a panel presenter. It is not necessary to write an
abstract or proposal for the panel itself. To indicate your pre-constituted
panel, roundtable, or stream, please ensure that individual registrants
provide the name of the panel and the chair in their individual submissions on
the registration site. All panel, roundtable, or stream participants must make
an individual submission on the registration site. When submitting a proposal,
we also ask that registrants identify two keywords to help us align sessions
with each
other.
Proposal
submission is free. All proposals must be submitted here:
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/2021-aslch-annual-meeting-proposal-submission-registration-228111426417
Conference
Fees
The fees for in-person participation in the Conference are:
• Graduate students and post-doctoral scholars: $35
• Income less than $75,000: $125
• Income between $75,000-$99,999: $155
• Income between $100,000-$124,999: $210
• Income $125,000 and over: $260
The fees to participate remotely are:
• Graduate students and post-doctoral
scholars: Free
• Income less than $75,000: $50
• Income between $75,000-$99,999: $75
• Income between $100,000-$124,999:
$100
•
Income $125,000 and over: $150
Graduate
Workshop
The ASLCH Graduate Workshop will be held at Emory on
Wednesday, June 15. We will circulate information about it soon. Any questions
may be directed to
March 2, 2022
Indiana University School of Law (Indianapolis) Hosts Conference on Law and Antisemitism @IUMcKinney
The IU McKinney School of Law is hosting a special event: Law vs. Antisemitism: Inaugural Conference. Here is the link to the conference website.
Here is the description of the event. More information is available from Professor Robert A. Katz at rokatz@iupui.edu.
Antisemitism is more than a hatred and a practice -- it's legal phenomenon. Join legal scholars and experts at the Law vs. Antisemitism Inaugural Conference as they discuss how law has been used both to perpetrate and to combat antisemitism, historically and today. US law in particular has been used to fight antisemitism through the constitutional separation of church and state, anti-discrimination laws, and “hate crimes” laws, among other means. Despite these laws, there has been a recent resurgence in anti-Jewish violence and antisemitism more generally, ranging from online hate speech to cemetery desecration to attacks on synagogues. What does this tell us about the efficacy of law in combating antisemitism?
The Conference will be held at IU Robert H. McKinney School of Law on March 14-15, 2022, and will be broadcast live online. It will consist of the panels and speakers listed below. It is hosted by IU McKinney and the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality. The Conference conveners are Robert Katz, IU McKinney Professor of Law and John S. Grimes Fellow and Prof. Diane Klein, Visiting Professor of Law (remote), Southern University Law Center. The Conference is presented by the Law vs. Antisemitism Project, a nonprofit organization founded by Professors Katz and Klein.
The Conference is sponsored by the Indiana State Bar Association, the Indianapolis Bar Association, and the IUPUI Division of Diversity, Equity & Inclusion. Additional support is provided by Cohen & Malad, LLP, Hoover Hull Turner LLP, Ice Miller LLP, the Indianapolis Jewish Community Relations Council, Katz Korin Cunningham PC, Kosene & Kosene Development Co., Mitchell Dick McNelis LLC, and the Academic Engagement Network (AEN). Breakfast and lunch provided by Bagel Fair and Shapiro's Delicatessen.
February 19, 2022
Sheppard, Moshirnia, and Sullivan on What's In a Name: An Experimental Analysis of Law Titles @SetonHallLaw @MonashLawSchool
For the last fifty years, Congress has embraced a tactical approach to naming its legislation. In that span, a distinctly American lawcraft has emerged, with official short titles frequently taking the form of acronyms (e.g., the USA PATRIOT Act), victim names (e.g., Megan’s Law), or other evocative phrasings (e.g., the Ryan White CARE Act). What was once mundane and routine has become yet another opportunity for political messaging. At their best, tactical titles may be cute, clever, or even moving, but they still fail to provide useful insights about their underlying measures. It is hardly surprising, then, that they have become an object of scorn or ridicule, with scholars, commentators, and occasionally legislators calling for measures to curb the practice. If tactical titles lack the power to change the likelihood of a law’s passage, then we might be able to disregard the phenomenon as a silly, if trivial, pastime. But what if titles have the power to manipulate people’s opinions of the laws so named? What if titles give laws an advantage by making them more likely to be noticed or remembered? Then these titles become a threat to democratic principles by harming the electorate’s ability to make informed conclusions about laws and those who support them. Remarkably, there has never been an empirical study of the effect of tactical titling on Americans. To fill that void, we have designed a novel experiment that isolates the effects of common title types (acronyms, victim names, sponsor names, and generic titles) on favorability and memory. This experimental design further reveals how these effects are moderated or enhanced by the political ideologies of those who read them. Our results are illuminating. Tactical titles have the power to change people’s opinions of underlying laws. Troublingly, this effect appears to be ideologically asymmetrical: Left-leaning participants’ opinions did not exhibit a titling effect, but Right-leaning participants gave higher ratings to a law with an acronym title and lower ratings when the very same law had a victim-named title. Moreover, the effect was limited to a conservative law; we did not observe it on either a liberal or nonpartisan law. Our results also showed that, regardless of the participant’s or the law’s political leaning, our participants were better at recalling the names of acronym titles than our other title types. The magnitude of the effect was substantial. Regarding opinion, our results indicated an average shift in the favorability of a law from a six to a nine on a ten-point scale. As to memory, participants were nearly twice as likely to remember the names of laws with acronym titles than generic titles. These findings dovetail with political psychology research on negativity and in-group biases. And most importantly, they provide empirical justification for measures that seek to put an end to tactical titling.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
February 18, 2022
Forthcoming: Christina Luckyj, Liberty and the Politics of the Female Voice in Early Stuart England (Cambridge University Press, 2022) @ArsScripta @speght @CambridgeUP
The female voice was deployed by male and female authors alike to signal emerging discourses of religious and political liberty in early Stuart England. Christina Luckyj's important new study focuses critical attention on writing in multiple genres to show how, in the coded rhetoric of seventeenth-century religious politics, the wife's conscience in resisting tyranny represents the rights of the subject, and the bride's militant voice in the Song of Songs champions Christ's independent jurisdiction. Revealing this gendered system of representation through close analysis of writings by Elizabeth Cary, Aemilia Lanyer, Rachel Speght, Mary Wroth and Anne Southwell, Luckyj illuminates the dangers of essentializing female voices and restricting them to domestic space. Through their connections with parliament, with factional courtiers, or with dissident religious figures, major women writers occupied a powerful oppositional stance in relation to early Stuart monarchs and crafted a radical new politics of the female voice.
February 16, 2022
Call For Papers: Special Issue on International Arbitration in the Digital World @AnneWag26082949
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law: Call for Papers Special Issue on International Arbitration in the Digital World
Guest Editors: Vijay K. Bhatia, Chinese University of Hong Kong Magdalena Łągiewska, University of Gdańsk, Poland.
CFP available online at:
https://resource-cms.springernature.com/springer-cms/rest/v1/content/20136590/data/v1
February 9, 2022
Newly Published: Andrew Bricker, Libel and Lampoon: Satire in the Courts, 1670-1792 (OUP, 2022) @OxUniPress
An interesting new book from Andrew Bricker, Assistant Professor of English, Ghent University, and Senior Fellow at the Andrew W. Mellon Society of Fellows in Critical Bibliography at the Rare Book School at the University of Virginia.
Libel and Lampoon: Satire in the Courts,1670-1792 (Oxford University Press, 2022).
Libel and Lampoon shows how English satire and the law mutually shaped each other during the long eighteenth century. Following the lapse of prepublication licensing in 1695, the authorities quickly turned to the courts and newly repurposed libel laws in an attempt to regulate the press. In response, satirists and their booksellers devised a range of evasions. Writers increasingly capitalized on forms of verbal ambiguity, including irony, allegory, circumlocution, and indirection, while shifty printers and booksellers turned to a host of publication ruses that complicated the mechanics of both detection and prosecution. In effect, the elegant insults, comical periphrases, and booksellers’ tricks that came to typify eighteenth-century satire were a way of writing and publishing born of legal necessity. Early on, these emergent satiric practices stymied the authorities and the courts. But they also led to new legislation and innovative courtroom procedures that targeted satire’s most routine evasions. Especially important were a series of rulings that increased the legal liabilities of printers and booksellers and that expanded and refined doctrines for the courtroom interpretation of verbal ambiguity, irony, and allegory. By the mid-eighteenth century, satirists and their booksellers faced a range of newfound legal pressures. Rather than disappearing, however, personal and political satire began to migrate to dramatic mimicry and caricature—acoustic and visual forms that relied less on verbal ambiguity and were therefore not subject to either the provisions of preperformance dramatic licensing or the courtroom interpretive procedures that had earlier enabled the prosecution of printed satire.
Some early reviews:
“Grounded in
enterprising archival scholarship and skilled interpretation of verbal irony,
this book is a major contribution to scholarship on literature and law during
the golden age of satire.” - Thomas Keymer, Chancellor Henry N.R. Jackman
University Professor of English, University of Toronto
“Andrew
Bricker’s supple and energetic Libel and Lampoon can be read – and with
profit – as an entertaining account of a long game of whack-a-mole, in which
courts and comedic expression, lugubrious legality and satiric mockery, chase
one another through the presses, pages, pamphlets, and poetry of
post-Restoration England, each shaping and reshaping the other in a constant
and dizzying display of creative interpretive adaptation.” - Christopher
Tomlins, Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law, Berkeley Law
“Libel and
Lampoon will change the way we think about satire—both its literary history
and its generic ambiguity—while revising our understanding of the history of
libel law and the freedom of the press more generally.” - Helen
Deutsch, Professor of English Literature, UCLA
More about the book here from the publisher's website. Order online at www.oup.com/academic with promo code AAFLYG6 to save 30%.
Sheikh on Ten Fragments on Lawful Storytelling @dsheikh726
In this essay, I describe the movement of an affidavit across different sites – from its first manifestation in a legal submission before an appellate court in India, to my own rewriting of the story in theatrical form, to its subsequent adaptation by a different set of theatre practitioners. Multiple acts of translation take place here, the genre of the affidavit changing to accommodate the shift in each site. The lawyers in the first instance translate life into law; I translate that legal form into a theatrical form; my theatrical form is once again translated into a different kind of theatrical form. My description of these translations takes the form of a story, albeit a fragmented one. I start with a particular understanding of translation, one where I worry about what might be lost when law attempts to capture life. As the story proceeds, I find myself shifting towards thinking about what might be found and made possible in translation, about how these different genres of the affidavit might allow for different visions of law and life to flourish.
Download the essay from SSRN at the link.
February 8, 2022
Solum on The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Theory of Constitutional Meaning @lsolum @BULawReview
Public Meaning Originalism is the predominant form of constitutional originalism. What makes Public Meaning Originalism distinctive is the Public Meaning Thesis—the claim that the best understanding of constitutional meaning focuses on the meaning communicated by the constitutional text to the public at the time each constitutional provision was framed and ratified. This Article provides a precise formulation of the Public Meaning Thesis, supplies reasons for affirming the thesis, and answers objections. The constitutional record strongly supports the claim that the constitutional text was intended to communicate to the public. The Constitution begins with “We the People” and the ratification process included intense popular participation. Jurists and scholars emphasized the public nature of the Constitution. The communication of public meaning is made possible by two features of constitutional communication. The first of these features is a shared language: the drafters of the constitutional text could rely on the fact that American English was spoken by most Americans and was accessible via translation to those who spoke German and Dutch. The second feature is a shared public context of constitutional communication: the drafters could rely on widely shared understandings of the circumstances in which the Constitution was framed and ratified. These features enable the creation of public meaning. Common objections to the Public Meaning Thesis, including the “summing problem,” are based on mistaken assumptions about the way linguistic communication works. In sum, the central claim of the Article is that Public Meaning Originalism provides the best understanding of original meaning and hence the most attractive form of originalist constitutional theory.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
February 4, 2022
Siegel on The Nineteenth Amendment and the Politics of Constitutional Memory @YaleLawSch
Those who sought votes for women made claims for liberty and equality in the family on which constitutional law might now draw—but there is no trace of their voices or claims in constitutional law. The Supreme Court scarcely mentions the Nineteenth Amendment when interpreting the Constitution. Nor do Supreme Court opinions mention those who led women’s quest for political voice or the constitutional arguments they made in support of women voting, even though these arguments spanned two centuries. There is no method of interpretation that the Justices employ with sufficient consistency to account for this silence in our law. This Article explains this silence as a feature of American constitutional memory. Constitutional interpreters produce constitutional memory as they make claims on the past that can guide decisions about the future. It is the role of constitutional memory to legitimate the exercise of authority; but constitutional memory plays a special role in legitimating the exercise of authority when constitutional memory systematically diverges from constitutional history. Systematic divergence between constitutional memory and constitutional history can legitimate authority by generating the appearance of consent to contested status relations and by destroying the vernacular of resistance. Though women contested their lack of political authority in the constitutional order over two centuries, there is no trace of their arguments in constitutional law. To illustrate, the Article examines a long-running tradition of suffrage argument that began before the Reconstruction Amendments and continued in evolving forms after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment: that women needed the vote to democratize the family. Two centuries of constitutional arguments are nowhere reflected in the United States Reports. As a consequence, constitutional doctrines about liberty and equality in the family appear to lack historical antecedents. But argument, inside and outside of courts, can counter the politics of memory. Justices across the spectrum regularly make heterodox claims on the past. Constitutional interpreters can invoke the voices of the disfranchised and the concerns that the disfranchised brought to the democratic reconstruction of America. Imagine how we might understand our Constitution in another generation if we did.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
February 3, 2022
Seabourne on "Let Her Be Burned, etc.": A Consideration of Husband-killing and "Petty Treason" in Medieval England @gcseabourne
This is a working paper based on research to date on medieval petty treason, specifically the treatment by the common law of wives alleged to have killed their husbands.Download the paper from SSRN at the link.
February 1, 2022
Now Available: Journal of Law and Religion, Volume 36, Issue 3 @JLRatEmory
Newly published:
Volume 36, issue 3 of the Journal of Law and Religion.
Read it for free until March 1, 2022.
January 31, 2022
January 30, 2022
Call For Papers, Australian Feminist Law Journal, General Issue, December 2022 @austfem
From the Australian Feminist Law Journal: CFP for a General Issue:
Australian Feminist Law Journal: New
Call for Papers (CfP) for a General Issue 48(2) (December edition, 2022)
The Australian Feminist Law
Journal welcomes high-quality submissions informed by diverse critical and
feminist legal traditions, including (but not limited to): cultural and literary,
Indigenous, post/de-colonial, critical race, Marxist, queer, psycho-analytic,
political economy, post-structuralist, and socio-legal approaches.
For more
information, please see:
a) below
b) submissions and queries for the editors should be sent to aflj@griffith.edu.au
CALL FOR PAPERS
THROUGH A LEGAL
LENS:
LAW, HISTORY
AND VISUAL CULTURE
26th May 2022 (virtual)
WORKSHOP THEME
Law is often seen, and indeed often presents itself, as
image-less, a text-based discourse. Perhaps for
this reason, the use of images in legal historical research is an undervalued
and under- researched – if fascinating – area.
This one-day conference aims to encourage the
asking of questions, to reflect the
growing interest and scholarship in
the interdisciplinary field of law, history and visual culture. The conference offers a forum
for discussion, debate and the presentation of research.
The organizers are keen to welcome scholars
from any stage in their career and, as the conference is held
online, submissions are invited
from all jurisdictions.
The conference will construe ‘visual culture’ widely, to
attract papers from a range of disciplines. With
a focus on images in and of law, subjects for papers may include, but are by no
means limited to:
· television, film and theatre,
· artworks (including sculpture), photography and graffiti,
· architecture and maps,
· legal artefacts
and objects,
· clothing and costume associated with the law.
SUBMISSION PROCESS AND ORGANISATION
Submit a
250 word abstract to: Visualimagesconference@northumbria.ac.uk. The deadline for submissions is the 1st February
2022.
The workshop is
organised by Victoria Barnes, Helen Rutherford, Clare Sandford-Couch and Sarah Wilson
January 29, 2022
Katz on The "Judicial Power" and Contempt of Court: A Historical Analysis of the Contempt Power as Understood by the Founders
This Note focuses on the power of the federal judiciary to hold litigants in contempt of court. In particular, this Note analyzes whether the contempt power of the federal judiciary stems from an inherent grant of power in the Constitution or whether it is derived purely from acts of Congress. The extent to which Congress can limit judges’ power to punish contempt depends on whether judges have an inherent power to punish contempt. Because judges have used the power to punish in ways that abridge individual liberties and civil rights, it is imperative that Congress be aware of whether it can constitutionally limit judicial conduct vis-a-vis contempt. Part I of this Note outlines what judges and scholars have written about an inherent judicial contempt power. Part II of this Note explores whether the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution intended to vest the judiciary with an inherent contempt power. In doing so, this Note examines the most important sources from the Founding Era. Those sources include texts from pre-revolutionary British legal practice, American colonial practice, revolutionary state practice, the ratification debates, and the actions of the Founders immediately following the ratification of the Constitution. By tracing the history of the contempt power from British practice all the way to constitutional ratification, this Note provides a comprehensive overview of how the thoughts of the framers changed over time and what the framers finally intended with regard to contempt when they drafted the Constitution. This Note argues that the framers did not intend to create an inherent judicial contempt power and that judges’ contempt power is therefore under Congress’s control.Download the note from SSRN at the link.
January 27, 2022
Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference, June 16-17, 2022 @Law_Cult_Huma
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF LAW, CULTURE, AND THE HUMANITIES TWENTY-FOURTH Annual Conference
June 16-17, 2022
Atlanta, GEORGIA, USA
The Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Association for
the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities will be held at Emory University
School of Law, June 16-17, 2022.
We welcome humanities-oriented proposals on topics
broadly related to law and legal studies. In addition, our theme this year is:
Unsettling Law
Law often resides in the pull between what is settled and
what is not.
Precedent guides us until it does not. Law’s stability is
in constant conversation with its own necessary responsiveness as well as with
what troubles it from outside of legal institutions. Disobediences, whether
civil or not, have the power to unsettle what is taken to be settled. And
forces like climate change pose challenges to settled law by destabilizing what
may make obedience and order possible at all. Law continually expands the range
of persons it recognizes, for better or worse, while it claims across all
changes that it serves the interests of all. Borders exclude but remain
permeable, and we argue about what is owed to others regardless of their
citizenship status.
States claim sovereignty and face refusals from other
sovereignties within their borders. Even settler colonialism is a process
rather than an outcome, so what is settled and what remains open to different
futures may be contested. How do and should we imagine law in these unsettled
times? What creative forces might we bring to bear in these moments between
past and future, whether for unsettling what ought to change or stabilizing
what is endangered? How might different disciplines, methodologies, arts,
literatures, and technologies represent, reinforce, or resist unsettling law?
We invite proposals taking up that question from a variety of
humanities-oriented perspectives.
The conference will emphasize the ASLCH tradition of
in-person conversation while making some panels available for those who wish to
participate virtually. Rather than hosting hybrid panels, there will be one
full session dedicated to online panels each day of the conference. Virtual
attendees can view these, and there will be public viewing rooms at the
conference so that attendees can engage in conversation with each other and the
virtual panelists. We will also host three plenary sessions that will be
available in person as well as streaming online. Some of the in-person panels
will be streamed during the sessions that aren’t online-dedicated.
All proposals are due Friday, February 4, 2022 at
midnight Eastern Standard Time.
Submission instructions: Individual proposals should
include a title and an abstract of no more than 250 words, along with 2
keywords from the list below.
We also welcome proposals for panels, roundtables, and
streams (two panels on one theme). Please note that online presenters should
organize a full panel (we will not be accepting individual papers for online
presentation this year) and that, though we traditionally accept most papers,
we may need to limit the number of online panels we accept, depending on
demand. Panels, whether virtual or in-person, should include three papers (or,
exceptionally, four papers). Please specify a title and designate a chair for
your panel. The panel chair may also be a panel presenter. It is not necessary
to write an abstract or proposal for the panel itself. To indicate your pre-constituted
panel, roundtable, or stream, please ensure that individual registrants provide
the name of the panel and the chair in their individual submissions on the
registration site. All panel, roundtable, or stream participants must make an
individual submission on the registration site. When submitting a proposal, we
also ask that registrants identify two keywords to help us align sessions with
each other.
Proposal submission is free. All proposals must be
submitted here:
Conference Fees
The fees for in-person participation in the Conference
are:
Graduate students and post-doctoral scholars: $35 Income
less than $75,000: $125 Income between $75,000-$99,999: $155 Income between
$100,000-$124,999: $210 Income $125,000 and over: $260 The fees to participate
remotely are:
Graduate
students and post-doctoral scholars: Free
Income less
than $75,000: $50
Income between
$75,000-$99,999: $75
Income between
$100,000-$124,999: $100
Income $125,000
and over: $150
Graduate Workshop
The ASLCH Graduate Workshop will be held at Emory on
Wednesday, June 15. We will circulate information about it soon. Any questions
may be directed to lch@lawculturehumanities.com.