Legal scholarship presents itself as an exercise in reason: the scholar elucidates, weighs the sources, follows the argument, emotions left at the door. This Article argues that the pose is false, and consequentially so. Emotions shape not only the margins of scholarship-the topics we choose, the tone of our debates, the schools we form-but they also reach all the way into what we take to be legally valid and true. Building on Pierre Schlag's account of the aesthetics of law and on work in psychology and the philosophy of mind on the role of emotion in cognition, the Article reframes the validation of juristic truth as the product of two emotionally laden processes: epistemic decision-making, the "acts of truth" by which a proposition is accepted as valid, and epistemic negotiation, the agreements through which a community settles what counts as known. It then identifies emotions likely at work in each-beauty, the fear of death, the fear of exclusion, the needs for recognition and for toil; and, in negotiation, appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role-arguing that they carry ontological weight, helping to constitute law itself as an object of knowledge and argument. Why, then, do scholars so insistently deny them? The answer lies in a "normative alexithymia," a trained inability to read one's own emotions that leaves a community poorly equipped to see the lens through which it apprehends its object. The Article proceeds by suggestion rather than proof, aiming less to demonstrate these emotions than to make their workings visible. Its claim is that emotion has always accompanied reason in the making of legal knowledge-and that recognizing this is itself a condition of thinking well.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
June 8, 2026
Schultz on Acts of Truth: Emotions and the Validation of Legal Knowledge
June 4, 2026
Giddens on Typographic Legality: The Source and Transmission of the Common Law (forthcoming from Edinburgh University Press)
Forthcoming from Thomas Giddens, Dundee Law School: Typographic Legality: The Source and Transmission of the Common Law (Edinburgh University Press).
From the publisher's website:
The typographic form of judgment stages the authoritative presence of the common law. It is in the encounter with typographic materials that legal meaning is generated, yet typographic legality—the material expression of law as visual text—is rarely examined. In this book, Thomas Giddens refocuses critical attention by studying the history of the common law’s visual technologies and unpacking the heritage, meanings and techniques of its typographic appearance. It thereby develops new methodological approaches for reading the common law’s primary materials as visual media. From the archive as a typographic theatre of jurisdiction, to early law report printing, to the mass duplication of reports and their entanglement in the project of empire, to the common law’s digital display, Typographic Legality encounters enduring questions of legal authority, media and technology in the material details of the common law’s textual form.
Thirty percent discount available with the code NEW30.
Solove on A Century Ago, E. M. Foster's "The Machine Stops" Predicted How AI and Digital Tech Are Hollowing Us Out
From Daniel Solove's Solove on Tech: A Century Ago, E. M. Forster's "The Machine Stops" Predicted How AI and Digital Tech Are Hollowing Us Out.
Subscription might be required (free).
Indigenous Legal Orders, Legal Pluralism, and the Coloniality of Method Across Comparative Law, International Law, IP, and Trade Governance Webinar Now Online
News from Paolo Davide Farah, University of Tulsa College of Law:
The webinar Indigenous Legal Orders, Legal Pluralism, and the Coloniality of Method Across Comparative Law, International Law, IP, and Trade Governance.
The webinar brought together an outstanding group of scholars to explore how Indigenous legal orders challenge dominant legal epistemologies and invite us to rethink foundational assumptions embedded within international law, comparative law, intellectual property, cultural heritage governance, technology governance, development, and global governance more broadly.I was happy to moderate and contribute to the discussion featuring:
• Professor Chidi Oguamanam (University of Ottawa)
• Professor Elena Baylis (University of Pittsburgh School of Law)
• Professor Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci (Hofstra University School of Law)
• Professor Dana G. Jones (North Carolina Central University School of Law)The conversation addressed a range of interconnected themes, including Indigenous knowledge systems, legal pluralism, cultural heritage and repatriation, intellectual property, governance theory, artificial intelligence, structural bias, epistemic governance, and the future of global governance in an increasingly multipolar world.
Watch the Webinar Recording
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-DGGXPwRZI
Read the Full Post-Webinar Reflection
Additional Information, Speaker Biographies, and Suggested Readings
I hope these materials will be of interest to those working on Indigenous rights, legal pluralism, international law, comparative law, intellectual property, cultural heritage, governance, artificial intelligence, and related fields.
With best wishes,
Paolo
https://paolofarah.wordpress.com/
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=629289
Princeton University Press Sale--Fifty Percent Off Many Titles
Princeton University Press is having a fifty-percent-off sale through June 9th on most of its books. Many titles of interest, but here are a few.
Tristan G. Brown, Laws of the Land: Fengshui and the State in Qing Dynasty China.
Indira Ghose, A Defence of Pretence: Civility and the Theatre in Early Modern England.
Lynn Hunt: The Invention of Pornography.
Peter Manseau, The Jefferson Bible: A Biography.
June 3, 2026
Mazzone on The Unitary Executive and the Decisions of 1789 and 1861
Debates over the constitutional power of the President to remove executive officers are almost as old as the Republic itself. These debates continue today in the academic literature — with a vast body of writing on the constitutional basis (if any) for a presidential removal power, its scope, and the authority (if any) of Congress to regulate the power — and at the Supreme Court, which has decided a series of removal cases in recent years, and which has some removal cases on its current docket. Virtually every discussion (regardless of the conclusion reached) of the power of the President to remove executive officers invokes the so-called Decision of 1789. This Essay does also. But it focuses additionally on another important decision: that of 1861. In that year, the states that had seceded from the Union adopted their own permanent constitution. The Constitution of the Confederate States mimicked and repeated (with modifications) many of the provisions of the federal Constitution. It also included something the federal Constitution had not: a specific provision specifying the scope of the powers of the President to remove executive officers. Unusual though it might seem to turn for guidance to the Confederate Constitution — a charter written and ratified by traitors — the exercise has some payoff. It helps us identify some possible conceptions of presidential removal authority (under the federal Constitution) and to assess the relative merits of alternatives.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
Hyland on "It Ends With a Lawsuit": Blake Lively v. Justin Boldoni A Mock Trial: Sexual Harassment and Defamation
It Ends With Us, adapted from Colleen Hoover’s best-selling novel about a couple in love caught in a cycle of domestic abuse, grossed more than $351 million globally upon its release in 2024. However, rumors of a feud between the co-stars took center stage. After the film debuted, Blake Lively filed a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (CRD) against Baldoni and his associates. Lively, among other legal claims, alleged sexual harassment, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Baldoni denied all allegations and filed his own defamation suit against Lively. A trial is tentatively set for May 18, 2026, in New York Federal court. This article attempts to analyze what a “mock” trial of the case would look like in Federal court, analyzing the legal allegations on both sides, the burden of proof necessary to prove the various claims, including defamation and sexual harassment, affirmative defenses, the major witnesses to be called, possible opening arguments for both sides, jury instructions, and a potential jury verdict.Download the article from SSRN at the link.